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ABSTRACT
Si:nce West Germany emerged once more as a sovereign 
nation after World War II, it has become known as a " Social 
Market Economy " to describe its economic policy making mecha­
nism. This system places a strong emphasis on the free interplay 
of the market forces of supply and demand, tempered only by the 
need to eliminate its excesses by providing social benefits to 
the less privileged members of society. Theoretically, therefore, 
the " Social Market Economy " occupies the middle ground between 
the capitalist and socialist states. The thesis suggests a spe­
cific definition of the term as an observable entity.
West Germany's economy has functioned very successfully 
during this era, and it is generally believed that the practice 
of " Social Market " economic policy has been responsible. Al­
though there is some truth in this assertion, the overwhelming 
evidence suggests that " Social Market " policy had little di­
rect credit for the " Wirtschaftswunder ". The discussion is 
related to three criteria of economic performance, the balance 
of payments, price and monetary stability, and investment and 
capital formation. In these areas Germany's economic activity has 
been particularly exemplary according to its records. The analy­
sis of the determinants of progress reveal why the actual causal 
process was largely independent of subjective factors, i.e. eco­
nomic policy decisions and why specifically of " Social Market 
Economy " related decisions.
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WEST CffiHMANY: ECONOMIC POLICY
IN A "SOCIAL MARKET ECONOMY"
INTRODUCTION
The purpose of this thesis is to evaluate the influence of 
economic policy on the economic development of Germany in the post-war 
period, particularly in the last ten years from 1957 to 1967. Three 
criteria have been chosen from the mass of factors which -underlie the 
country's economic evolution, namely the balance of payments, price and 
monetary stability, and investment and capital, formation. The reason 
for choosing these particular criteria is that they are generally believed
to be the keys to the economic development of Germany that brought
1
prosperity in the post-war years. In addition, these criteria are very 
broad and allow much scope for policy decisions.
Economic policy will not, however, be analyzed only through its 
forward link, that is as a determinant of economic development, but also 
through its backward link. Backward linkage in this sense means motiva­
tion of economic policy. The West German economy is often referred to 
as a "Social Market Economy" . It is understood from such a label that 
the economic policy practised by the government followed the guidelines 
of a specific economic system. The more precise intent of the thesis is
■i
The Economist. "The German Lesson", 15-21 October, 1966.
I
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2then to show both the evaluation of economic policy on Germany's economic 
development in general and the extent to which that policy was motivated 
by "Social Market" theory in particular, if "Social Market" theory was a 
meaningful reality.
In the analysis of the factors influencing the economic develop­
ment of post-war Germany, a very clear step-by-step method must be main­
tained. First the influences that were subject to economic policy 
decisions must be separated from those that were not, the objective 
influences as they are usually called. Secondly, the respective evalua­
tions must follow. Were the economic policy decisions and the objective 
influences conducive or not conducive to economic progress? Furthermore, 
it must then be determined whether those subjective factors, that is 
economic policy decisions, that did influence economic development were 
motivated by "Social Market" theory. Was this relationship beneficial 
or was it harmful to the economy? Finally, a judgment must be made of 
what on balance decided the outcome of economic development. 7/ere the 
objective or the subjective factors predominant, and if the latter, were 
they "Social Market" oriented or not?
Since I do not presume to label West Germany a "Social Market 
Economy" a priori, the first chapter explores the meaning of this ex­
pression. The questions of how the idea of a "Social. Market Economy" 
originated, how unique it was as an economic system in Germany and else­
where and how it was actually incorporated into the system of economic 
policy in Germany are elucidated. Once the degree of the validity of 
the hypothesis that Germany does constitute a "Social Market Economy"
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
3is established, economic policy can be evaluated in the context of the 
actual criteria of economic development.
The following three chapters are devoted to that purpose.
The balance of payments is the first criterion. This criterion has 
set the stage for the overall development of the economy through its 
radiating effects to the other two criteria and so it precedes the 
stability and capital formation questions. A statistical account on 
the balance of payments is presented over the post-war period. The 
factors, structural or otherwise, that are important as the underlying 
elements of the balance of payments and the effect of policy on them 
complete the chapter. The other two chapters are similarly organized. 
Chapter three, which deals with monetary and price stability, explores 
the presence or absence of inflation in Germany during the same time, 
the behaviour of the economic agents responsible for the outcome and 
the reaction of the government to it. Chapter four, which deals with 
investment and capital formation, analyzes this major phenomenon of 
growth in Germany. The analysis of growth includes a sectoral break­
down of the components of the economy's product subject to growth as 
well as the causative elements behind evolution and the action of policy 
to reinforce or counteract their movement.
The thesis should clarify the intense intellectual struggle 
that has prevailed in Germany throughout the sixties on the question of 
economic policy. There is a widespread diversity of opinion among 
economists and politicians. There are those who consider that Germany 
constitutes a "Social Market Economy" and that it is this fact that
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
accounted for the economic resurgence of the country during the post­
war period. Others agree that Germany is a "Social Market Economy” 
"but hold this system responsible for the economic troubles that have 
beset the country in the sixties. Finally others insist that whether 
or not the country is or is not a "Social Market Economy” hats had no 
connection with the economic policy followed.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
CHAPTER 1
THE SOCIAL MARKET ECONOMY
In this chapter the meaning of the term "Social Market Economy’1 
shall he investigated. The fact that only one country1s economic system 
is referred to as such is not an indication by itself that one is dealing 
with a system that is different from any other. Thus, the concept must 
be defined and supplemented by a historical analysis of how it evolved to 
its present connotation.
Secondly, the extent to which the German economy took on the 
features of the "Social Market Economy" concept shall be determined.
A theoretical system implies a certain institutional and legal framework 
an well as a certain behaviour on the part of those responsible for the 
execution of the system in practice. Again then the question must be 
answered; how unique has practice, or more specifically, economic policy 
made the German economic system?
The meaning of "Social Market Economy" involves a very complex 
philosophy of economic behaviour. The philosophy is based essentially 
on the competitive market mechanism, into which some protection is built 
for the less fortunate members of the economic community. There can be 
excesses to competition e.g. when bankruptcy leads to unemployment, which 
can lead to temporary hardships. Reuss, an expert on the German post-war
5
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6economy, acutely noted the essence of the "Social Market" principle when
he stated that it was an economic system that worked through incentives
at the top and through paternalism at the bottom, in other words, freedom
of competition among large economic agents and protection of the lower 
2classes of agents. Its purpose was then, not only to secure the greatest 
degree of prosperity possible, but also to eliminate social conflicts, as 
those between economically different classes. It is in this sense that 
the system can be termed a philosophy of economic behaviour, rather than 
simply an order of economic relationships. Expressed in still another 
way, the essence of a "Social Market Economy is not synonomous with its 
goals, for it includes non-economic judgments along with economic judgments 
in setting the criteria for specific goals. Further clarification as to 
the idea of "Social Market Economy" will follow from the analysis of its 
historical, evolution.
The origins of the ideas on which the "Social Market" concept 
relies most heavily can be traced back to classical economic thought.
Both Smith and Ricardo emphasized the supreme importance of the market 
principle as the "engine of progress and prosperity". These ideas consti­
tute one half of the dual notion "Social Market". The attribute "Social" 
relates to the second half of the nineteenth century. During that era, 
the free market in Germany became the most concentrated one in Europe.
Smith and Ricardo had pointed out that unless a free market, or perfect 
competition as it is now called, existed, resources were not distributed
^Frederick Reuss, Fiscal Policy for Growth Without 
Inflation: The German Experiment (Baltimore; The John Hopkins Press,
1961) ,p.6l,
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7justly and efficiently. Consequently, opposition to the course of events 
in Germany arose. Religious doctrines on social justice, dated from the 
Middle Ages, were revived, and the onus was placed on the government to 
correct the injustices. "Staatssozialismus" or state socialism was advo-
cated. When the German Empire collapsed in 1918, and the Social Democrats 
started the Weimar Republic, social reforms were extended, but the problem 
of competition in the market was left untouched. In fact, the great steel 
and chemical cartels in Germany were formed during this period. Finally, 
the era of nazism removed the last remnants of a free market economy.
It was during that reign that the exponents of what later became known as 
the "Social Market Economy1' formed their crucial ideas.
In 1945, the autocratic and totalitarian system was swept away 
and the "Social Market" supporters had the opportunity to bring their ideas 
to fruition. The continued electoral victories of the CDU party (Christian 
Democrats ) were, however, the decisive factor that allowed the "Social 
Market" theorists to predominate in the re-shaping of the economy. If the 
Social Democrats had won the election in 1949, they would have instituted 
a social welfare state based on the British Labour party's model and would 
not have heard the "Social Market" advocates who stood in the ranks of the 
Christian Democrats for the most part.
Despite the fact that the "Social Market" protagonists were in 
general opposed to the Social Democrats and the welfare state they stood 
for, there is by no means complete harmony in their interpretation of 
"Social Market" theory. There are two distinct lines of thought on the
Reinhard Behlke, Per Neoliberalismus und die Gestaltung 
der Wirtschaftsverfassung der Bundesrepublik Deutschland (Berlin; Duncker 
und Humblot, 1963), p. 80.
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8subject. Walter Eucken, who until his premature death in 1950, was 
Professor at Freiburg University in Germany, is the originator of one 
line of thought, the "neoliberal" or "ordoliberal" one. Alfred 
Muller-Armack, Professor at Munster and later advisor to the economics
II
minister, Ludwig Erhard, constitutes the other. Wilhelm Ropke at
Geneva was another prominant economist, who thought along "Social Market"
lines, but since his main work was directed less to theoretical economics
than to specific problems, he cannot readily be classified as either in
the Eucken or Muller-Armack traditionA The school of thought that Eucken
formed, the Freiburg School, unfortunately did not develop very much after
Eucken died, although there were several other contributors along the same 
5 i*lines. Muller-Armack, on the other hand, has tried to elaborate and 
clarify his own ideas. On account of his close association with Erhard, 
moreover, his influence must be considered at least equivalent to that of 
the Eucken School.
Eucken considered the "Social Market Economy" as the natural 
outcome of the requirements for economic and political order. Progressive 
concentration of economic power created "disorder" economically because it 
distorted the working of the price mechanism and lead to a maldistribution 
of resources. It lead to "disorder" politically because social injustices 
resulted. (He has fused the implications of classical economics and 
"Staatssozialismus"). If all economic processes were highly integrated, 
and if the whole economic order was interrelated with the state, law and 
society he reasoned, then the entire social order depended on the continued
^ Wilhelm Ropke, Pin Jahrzehnt Sozialer Marktwirtsch^ft in 
Deutschland und Seine Lehren (Cologne - Marieriburg: Verlag fur 
Politik und Wirtschaft, 1953), p.30.
 ^ Franz Bolim and Alexander Rustow et al. ; see bibliography.
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9£
existence of the free market mechanism. "/hat his economic "morphology" 
revealed had to he the prime concern of his " Ordnungspolitik", the 
search for forms of economic behaviour and institutions to be set up and 
the conditions for continued existence. The forms were those required 
for the institutionalization and preservation of the competitive order. 
Within this order, households and firms were absolutely free to carry on 
their business."^ He used emphatically the word forms of behaviour instead
of processes. If processes were defined, the result would be a socialist
8
economy, a "Zentralverwaltungswirtschaft" as he called it. The 
distinction essentially rests with the detail to which behaviour is speci­
fied, the implication being that only the broad lines of behaviour had to 
be dictated. This is the crucial distinction. He wanted a broad frame­
work set up as a guide but not to specify its details. The forms which 
Eucken compilated were of two kinds, "constitutive" and "regulative".
The former are those required for the establishment of a perfect competitive 
order and the latter, those assuring its continuation. The constitutive
9principles are the following:
1. An operationally meaningful system of prices existing 
under perfect competition. The argument, in this 
regard, is the classical one for perfect competition, 
maximum output and minimum price.
Behlke, Neoliberalismus. p. 57.
^Walter Eucken, Grundsatze der Wirtschaftspolitik (Berlin;
Duncker und Humblot, 196l), p. 152.
O
°Behlke, Neoliberalismus. p. 45
Q .
Eucken, Grundsatze, p. 150-7
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2. Monetary Stability.
Eucken regarded this as the most important constitutive 
principle, essential economically to preserve the role 
of the price mechanism and politically to prevent social 
unrest.
3. Free access to all markets.
The neoliberals were of course free traders and wanted 
tariffs and patent rights etc. restricted in their extent 
to assure maximum market freedom.
4. Private Property.
This was a condition of individual freedom and of a 
competitive order based on performance. It should not, 
however, be used to limit competition. Complete 
liability of property in contracts was to be a move in 
this direction as well as assuring that profitability 
was based on economic performance and not on the legal 
position of the entity.
5. Stability of general economic policy.
TOiat Eucken meant by stability was economic policy that 
did not vary too drastically from one period to another. 
For if it did, it would act as an exogenous force inter­
fering with the market forces and upset the price 
mechanism's role as a signalling device. This leads 
to inefficiency and speculation, both of which encourage 
concentration. The threat of a sudden change in economic
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
11
policy increases the risk of any decision and so firms 
concentrate to spread the risk.
The regulative principles, on the other hand, must insure the 
preservation of the competitive order and correct its excesses, which 
cannot always he avoided. There are two regulative principles, namely:
1. Monopoly Restraint.
The preservation of the competitive order by necessity 
implies monopoly restraint. To accomplish this Eucken 
envisaged a commission independent of private or govern­
ment interference to serve as the regulating agent.
The criterion he suggested to judge the degree of 
restraint was the uniformity of the products offered.
2. "Sozial" and "Vitalpolitik" or Human Welfare Policy. 
Since the forms were to be established only as broad 
categories, minor infractions of social justice and 
income distribution were bound to occur, and so 
provisions had to be made to allow for corrective 
interferences on the part of the government.
Occasionally perfect competition was necessarily non­
existent as in the case of natural monopolies and,
at other times, it would not be just an in housing, 
for example. These negative interferences had to 
be likewise complemented and supplemented by positive 
corrections or "Vitalpolitik". "Vitalpolitik" 
basically means improving the social status of the
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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working classes. The capitalist process, according 
to the neoliberals, tended to downgrade the intelligence 
of workers, as it demanded only mechanical tasks from 
them. To counteract this tendency, they advocated 
worker-manager cooperation and expanded educational 
opportunities for the workers. The neoliberals were 
extremely conscious of the social and intellectual 
needs of man-kind apart from the material requirements.
The economic relationship between management and workers 
in the competitive market could not make allowance for 
these needs and so government had to provide for them.
Further elaboration of the ordoliberal system is largely lacking. 
Eucken established only basic requirements and two criteria where govern­
ment interference in the economic sector would be permitted. Instead of 
specifying further, his followers have restricted themselves to classify­
ing any potential interferences as either market conforming or non-market 
conforming, according to whether they changed the market-determined supply- 
demand relationship or not. For example, a specific subsidy to one 
industry would be considered non-conforming, while general subsidization 
would be conforming.
Before turning to the Muller-Armack School reference should be 
made at this point to Ropke, for although his work was less theoretical, 
he spelled out the neoliberal forms in specific reform demands. For 
instance, he strongly supported the liberalization of foreigh trade and 
the maintenance of monetary stability after the war. In this latter
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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capacity, he had considerable influence in pressuring for the revaluation
it
of the Deutsche Mark in 1961. Monetary stability was for Ropke the
ft
essence of a "Social Market Economy". Erhard aptly voiced Ropke's
thoughts in his own definition of a "Social Market Economy1: An econoniy
that was based on freedom in the realm of goods and discipline in the
realm of money.^ Ropke reasoned accordingly because he believed that
in Germany, as in most other European countries, there existed an inevitable
11tendency toward collectivism. The slightest disorder in the economy
encouraged such a tendency and the value of money was the most vulnerable
point. He believed that only the Swiss had those characteristics which
made them invulnerable to collectivism, the farmer-burgher traits as he 
12
called them.
In all other cases, assurances for order had to be more strongly
entrenched. In addition to the observance of strict monetary stability,
Ropke believed that capital formation on the part of the working classes
was very beneficial. The workers would only value freedom and order if
they had an interest in the economy, which meant that they should take
13part in the investment process. Likewise, it would raise their sense 
of identity and status, both of -which again guaranteed economic order 
further. And that was the main object of " Sozialpolitik" . He did not
10.Ludwig Erhard, Prosperity Through Competition (London: Thames 
& Houston 1953), p. 3.
It
11 .Wilhelm Ropke, "Belastungen der Marktwirtschaft: Im A-bweichen 
von den Prinzipien Liegt die Gefahr", Die Politische Meinung. (August,1963), 
p. 19. Collectivism here implies the leader and followers principle.
12 Ibid.
"^* Ropke, Jahrzehnt p. 3t«
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emphasize monopoly restraint as much as did the neoliberals, but thought 
in terms of workable competition. He admitted that technical considera­
tions of efficiency enlarged the permissible spectrum of competition
14beyond that envisaged by the neoliberals. In almost every instance he 
was somewhat more pragmatic and less doctrinaire than the Eucken school.
t»
Unfortunately, Ropke's death in i960 set an end to his brilliant comments
on theory and policy.
Muller-Armack remains today the only prominent "Social Market"
economist who continues to expound and elaborate his views. However,
because he has written on the subject for the last twenty years, his
precise ideas on the "Social Market Economy” have also evolved with time,
and so it is often difficult to determine exactly what he means by it.
When he first coined the term in 1947, he defined a "Social Market
Economy" to be one in which social progress and economic reform were
15the ultimate goals and competition the means. In other words, free 
competition enabled the achievement of the highest possible income.
Once achieved, some of the income had to be redirected to those members 
of society who might have been hurt by the free functioning of the 
market mechanism, the unemployed, the sick, the aged, etc. The excesses 
or omissions of perfect competition needed to be curbed to achieve social 
progress. There is a noticeable distinction of emphasis between 
Muller-Armack and Eucken among the components that is important. The
"^ t"* Wilhelm Ropke, "Belastungen..." , p. 27.
AlfredtMuller-Armack, Das G-rundprinzip der Sozialen 
Marktwirtschaft (Munster : Author, 1950), p. 1.
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former emphasized the "Social " component, the latter the "Market" 
component. At the same time, the contrast shows the relationship between 
the two components. It is that of creation and preservation. Eucken 
was concerned more with the creation of the competitive order and
t!
Muller-Armack with its preservation. Hence, their respective emphases 
on monopoly restraint and "Sozialpolitik". There is, however, no funda­
mental disagreement between the two lines of thought.
Muller-Armack's tendency to accentuate the part that 
"Sozialpolitik?' played in a "Social Market Economy” became even more 
evident in his later enunciations of the theory. He emphatically spoke 
of a second phase after 1962. From that time on Muller-Armack defined 
the "Social Market Economy" as a system of economic behaviour that had 
as task the removal of "tensions" between economic growth, personal free­
dom and initiative and social equilibrium or the solution of the class 
conflict. The scope has consequently considerably broadened in this 
phase, beyond the mere protection of the underprivileged economic units. 
The removal of tensions became synonomous with social politics or 
" Gesellschaf tspolitik?1 . The task of "Gesellschaftspolitik" was to
secure the increasing maturity of society as well as economic growth. 
Immediately after the last war, this was accomplished simply by securing 
enough to eat. But in the mid-sixties, the solution to the problems of 
tensions in the economy was much more complex. A mature economy required 
mature individuals composing it. In other words, whatever problems the 
economy faced, creeping inflation or unemployment, the behaviour of the 
individual had to be such as to correct the problems. This is, moreover,
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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what Muller-Armack meant when he stated that whether or not the"Social
Market Economy" was successful could never "be finally decided "but was
confirmed solely "by the continuing process of solving the internal
16conflicts of society. Contrasting this idea once more with the
approach that Eucken used, it becomes obvious that liuller-Armack sees
the "Social Market Economy” more as a dynamic concept, whereas Eucken
envisaged it in comparative static terms. Both had an orderly economy
and society in mind, where all individuals had high moral standards,
!?
and everyone had identity and status, but Muller-Armack was more interest­
ed in the individual steps in getting there. This is the dynamic 
approach. Eucken was, perhaps, also interested in the road to the 
perfect order, but he only elaborated on the imperfect and the perfect 
order. His foims were to do the rest. In his latest work,
tl
Wirtschaftsordnung und ffirtschaftspolitik. for example, Muller-Armack 
strongly advocated regional planning or "Raumpolitik” as a necessary- 
further step toward social progress.
Such evolution of thought has, however, complicated the matter 
of trying to translate the "Social Market" concept into practical economic 
policy, that must largely be based on everyday economic data. In his 
earlier writings the aims of economic policy were clearly and simply stated. 
The "Social Market" principle meant insuring perfect competition, preventing 
unemployment and other difficulties to which the less privileged classes 
were particularly susceptible. The recent expositions almost completely
Alfred Muller-Armack, "Wirtschaftsordnung und 7/irtschaf tspolitik 
(Freiburg, Brsg: Rombach, 1966), p. 300.
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divorce the goals of the "Social Market Economy" from the goals of 
economic policy. As part of the so-called "magic triangle" of tensions 
only mflrirmim growth was to he maintained, a fact which would allow even 
non-conforming interventions as long as they did not impinge on the 
economy1 s performance. Kow Muller-Armack came to this conclusion is 
quite difficult to ascertain. There can be various explanations.
Either he feels that the question of social politics has become too 
theoretical to be included in general economic policy, or he is coming 
back to his original meaning of "Social Market Economy1' emphasizing 
maximum national income, or it is his awareness of the real problems 
the German economy is facing in the sixties and which need concrete 
economic solutions applied to them which have brought about the altera­
tion of thought. The latter explanation is probably most appropriate. 
Muller-Armack has, however, at the same time been ingenious in separat­
ing the ethical ideals of the "Social Market Economy" from the economic 
ones, allowing him to discuss a switch from one to the other without 
contradicting himself or without being inconsistent. The contrast with 
the neoliberal stand, of course, which is still what it was in 1950, is 
self-evident.
Fran this historical outline it becomes clear that the "Social 
Market" system represents a philosophy of economic behaviour. The 
concern with economic prosperity is principal in the writings of Eucken, 
Ropke and Muller-Armack. But all of them envisage something more than
II
just the essentials for economic wealth. Social progress for Muller- 
Armack and social order for Eucken are integrally related with the economic
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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sphere. Economic goals sire only partially the essence of the "Social 
Msirket Economy" . They are behavioural guidelines but not the blueprints 
themselves. Unfortunately, the problem in such a case remains to proceed 
from the guidelines to the ends sought, and both Eucken and Muller-Armack 
have been extremely vague on this point. There are no operationally 
meaningful specifications beyong monopoly restraint, monetary stability 
and " Sozialpolitik" . Muller-Armack, moreover, always believed that he
need not really bother, for as he stated it, the "Social Market Economy1' 
wsls one complicated in theory, but simple in practice.
As it is very difficult to shed more light on the essence of 
the theory on its own merit, further clarification should result from 
the comparison of the theory of the "Social Market Economy" with other 
capitalist economic systems such as the social welfare state or the 
contemporary American economic system. The " Social Market Economy" 
must be placed between these two approaches and somewhat closer to the 
American system. All three are derivatives of the nineteenth century 
confrontation of classical economic thought with socialist thought that 
arose as a result of unrestricted capitalism. Where socialist criticism 
was energetic or where capitalism was not strongly entrenched, democratic 
socialism emerged. The modern welfare state came into existence.
The Scandinavian countries, Sweden in particular, and Britain under 
Labour Party rale are good examples of democratic welfare states. The 
essence of such states from the economist's point of view is that the 
emphasis of economic policy has been shifted from "supply to "demand" 
as the means to secure growth, full employment, etc. This shift was
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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strengthened by the experiences during the Depression and by the writings 
of Keynes. The concept of the "Social Market Economy" , on the other 
hand, was born of the same confrontation and compromise of classical 
economics with nineteenth century socialism. But the climate in Germany 
during the thirties was different than in Scandinavia or in Britain.
The country had a totalitarian welfare state. Hence, as a reaction to 
collectivism and authoritarianism, another welfare state did not emerge 
after 'World War H, but one in v/hich the emphasis was once again on 
"supply" as the driving force for economic progress. The entrepreneur 
and the capitalist, i.e. supply not the consumer, i.e. demand, were the 
forces forging renewed economic progress, however slight the distinction 
may have been at times. The time that the "Social Market" idea wan 
propounded was decidedly of more significance, in fact, than the defini­
tional novelty.
On the other hand, the distinction between the "Social Market 
Economy1' and the American type economic system is more difficult to 
establish. From the point of view of the emphasis on growth, the 
entrepreneur is the key in both cases. But in this case, the difference 
occurs at the bottom of the economic and social scale. "Social Market" 
implies a greater degree of paternalism vis-a-vis the less privileged, 
a greater degree of collectivism. American tradition has been too 
individualistic at all levels of society to adopt such an outlook as 
prevails in Germany. The "Social Market" system allows, consequently, 
a substantial degree of government direction of the economic sphere 
which in the United States would be regarded as being strictly under the
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auspices of entrepreneurial or trade union associations. Paradoxically, 
the paternalism incorporated into the theory of the "Social Market Economy" 
marks a great achievement for individualism in Germany when compared to 
the industrial order during the imperial and nazi eras. The combination 
of free competition and social welfare policies advocated by the "Social 
Market" theorists envisaged a very individualistic freedom, a freedom as 
implied in the British or American tradition. In the German context 
this was novel. In nineteenth century Germany and again during the 
nazi reign, freedom meant the free, conscious and dutiful submission to 
that already existing whole organism molded by history, the state and 
the nation^ One could only be free in serving the state, not in serving 
oneself. By opposing this definition, the neoliberals at the same time 
destroyed the basis for the concentration of economic power. For if 
freedom was to be attained by submission to the whole, then in the economic 
sphere this meant the green light for economic cooperation and concentration. 
This had previously always been regarded as something natural and necessary 
by the entrepreneurs. As a result of the different attitude encouraged by 
the "Social Market" theorists, even if only in Germany, the idea is again 
new and worth noticing.
It has now been shown that the theory of the "Social Market 
Economy" is unique as far as the theory is concerned. It is neither the 
same as that underlying the welfare state, nor the same as that character­
izing the American economic system. It must be emphasized, however, that
17 Franz Ottel, Untergang oder Metamorphose der Sozialen Marktwirtschaft 
(Stuttgart; G.Fischer, 1963), p. G>0.
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the distinctions are not absolutely clear cut. Opinions differ els to 
what comprises a social welfare state, and most certainly do they differ 
greatly as to what economic ideology the U.S. economic system is based on. 
Hence, in some matters, the "Social Market" concept will resemble the one, 
in others, the other. This is unavoidable. The conclusion that the 
"Social Market" theory is, nevertheless, distinct rests in the difference 
in the intent of the roles that the various economic units in society 
should play. The capitsuList1s incentive is definitely more relied on 
in the "Social Market Economy" than in the social welfare state, and there 
are advantages seen from collectivist action in a "Social. Market Economy", 
specifically in the German context, which are alien to American indivi­
dualistic spirit.
The next step is necessarily the comparison of theory and 
practice. Theoretically, a case has been made for a unique system of 
economic policy. Whether Germany actually did follow the course set 
out requires an analysis of the legal and institutional framework brought 
into existence when Germany again became a sovereign state or thereafter. 
The legal issue aroused great interest in 1965 when Nipperdey, a prominent
jurist, concluded after an investigation that the constitution of 1949
18
(Grundgesetz) was in fact a "Social Market" constitution. The predomin­
ant concensus does not go so far as Nipperdey suggested. The constitution 
of 1949 was a political compromise between the Christian and Social 
Democrats. No doubt the former had somewhat more influence, but the
H.C.Nipperdey, Soziale Marktwirtschaft und Grundgesetz. 
(Cologne; Heymanns, 1965)',"pp. 1-25.
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constitution represents "a synthesis of polar economic ideologies and
19
interests typical of a mixed economy". In other words, no specific
economic system was favoured. Free enterprise was to reign in some
sectors, while the government remained in control of others. Under
the Bonn constitution, Germany has usually Been referred to as a
"Sozialer Rechtstaat", a reference that has little economic meaning
in itself, hut which has been generally interpreted to allow for a
greater degree of government intervention than a pure "Social Market
20Economy" would allow. The crucial factor would then he whether the 
government refrained from intervening where it had the right or not. 
The constitution would definitely allow a de facto "Social Market 
Economy" to exist depending on the views of the persons in the govern­
ment.
Apart from the "Grundgesetz", the only other hroad piece of 
legislation passed in the economic sphere was the Anti-Cartell Law of 
1957 ("Gesetzgegen Uettbewerbssbeschrankungen"). This law was to he 
the monopoly restraining document that a "Social Market Economy1' could 
not do without. It was to control three types of competitive
21restraints; cartells, market dominating firms and price maintenance. 
The commission that supervised the economy, however, has not heen able
19 Behlke, Neoliheralismus. P. 134.
20 Arndt Teichmann, "Die Wirtschaftsordnung in der Bundesrepublik 
Deutschland" Deutsche Studien Nr.4 (Bremen; April, 1963), p.28.
^  Nipperdey, Grundgesetz. p. 25.
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to deal effectively with competitive restraints. First, it has not 
always been able to identify them, and second, the approaching integra­
tion of the Common Market has made the consideration of competitive 
restraints in a single national market outdated. What has been done 
to prevent concentration in Germany is negligible. The cartell 
commission works with the concept of a zone of toleration as regards 
different degrees of competitive restrictions. In so doing, it is 
naturally not following the neoliberal demand of the absolute prohibi­
tion of competitive restraints.
Aside from its inadequacy as an anti-monopoly instrument in 
the eyes of avowed "Social Market" supporters, the commission and the 
law that created it do not represent anything unique internationally. 
Most western industrialized nations have similar controls. Hence, 
while there is no doubt that the law was motivated by "Social Market" 
supporters, it does not practically distinguish the "Social Market" 
system from the welfare state or the American economic system. In 
fact, the practice of monopoly restraint in Germany was never vigor­
ously followed and has now turned into encouragement of monopolization, 
reminiscent of nineteenth century empire building tactics.
On the other hand, there are innumerable occasions where 
fragments of "Social Market" theory could be implemented. The day-to- 
day government business is a case in point. The presence of Ludwig 
Erhard as economics minister in the cabinet and Muller-Armack as his 
chief advisor in the ministry would have made this prospect a definite 
possibility. Both are avowed "Social Market" adherents and this bias
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naturally had to exert itself in everyday economic, policy decisions. 
Again, however, the practice of their policy did not reveal itself to 
he much different from that followed in other western countries.
There were no drastic interventions into economic affairs such as 
practices by industry apart from selective price controls in the early 
fifties. The government inherited a mixed economy; the ratio of the 
private to public sector had been set before the war and there was 
little to be changed as a result. Probably the proportions were 
weighted slightly in favour of the public sector through the massive 
government investments in industry during the thirties, and so the 
post-1949 government had some leeway to redress the balance. The 
previous regime had vanished but the remnants of its institutional 
framework remained and this framework allowed a much greater degree 
of centralization than the social welfare states.
The apparent contradiction between theory and practice of 
the "Social Market Economy” must be borne in mind, for it explains many 
confusions surrounding the operation of the system. The economic 
policy that was followed by the German government was guided by "Social 
Market” concepts not in the sense that certain economic institutions 
were created or certain laws established to implement a different 
economic system. The "Social Market" concept manifested itself in the 
attitude that those responsible for the execution of economic policy 
took toward the economic development of the country. As stated pre­
viously, the "Social Market" approach is a philosophical one. Endless 
attitudes follow from the two main principles, competition andsocial
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betterment that can be shown only in the execution of day-to-day matters.
Various features of the system are not distinguishable from a welfare 
state or the American economic system, yet anyone who has observed Erhard
t!
and Muller-Armack at work will realize the different style of trying to 
accomplish like tasks.
The problems that the German economy faced in the fifties and 
copes with now in the sixties are those experienced by all mature and 
growing economies. And the solutions in each case will also be similar. 
Thus it is difficult in any case to talk of basic differences in 
approaches to economic policy. All governments realize that they have a 
responsibility for ensuring full employment, growth, price stability and 
a fair income distribution even though there need be no legislation to 
that effect. But there are different ways of arriving at the same solu­
tions, slight as they might be. The "Social Market" system is idealistic 
and individualistic in theory; the social welfare state is idealistic and 
collectivist, and the American system is pragmatic and individualistic. 
Such difference in outlook must inspire economic policy in distinct ways, 
part of the time if not all of the time.
How this inspiration made itself evident in German economic 
policy since the last war is the subject of the next chapters. That is 
not to say that "Social Market" ideas always influenced the originators of 
economic policy. It will be made clear when it did influence decisions 
and when other factors motivated economic policy. Likewise the results 
of economic policy shall be analyzed in this fashion. was the "Social 
Market" spirit beneficial or adverse to the economy's performance when
o pr q a n X
w  O  U  U  (
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it was evident; were other economic policy decisions responsible or was 
it the objective structure of the economy which was the primary deter- 
minent of its performance?
Three determinants of the performance of the German economy 
in the post-war period have been chosen for analysis; namely, the 
balance of payments, monetary stability and capital formation. In 
each case, economic policy will be assessed according to the above 
criteria. The assessment is an evaluation of economic policy in Germany 
in general, but with special reference to "Social Market" influence.
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THE BALANCE OR RAIMENTS
The Balance of payments will be the first question to he 
discussed with respect to the evaluation of economic policy. In order 
to evaluate policy correctly a careful distinction must he made first 
between objective and subjective influences on the German balance of 
payments. Objective influences are defined in this case to be those 
independent of government economic policy, while subjective influences 
are those arising out of economic policy decisions.
The balance of payments is also interrelated with the other 
two determinants of Germany's postrar success, namely price and monetary 
stability and capital formation and investment. for example, an excess 
of exports over imports increases aggregate demand, other things being 
equal, and helps to use more fully the existing productive capacity.
It absorbs more fully the saving which the economy generates, since it 
makes possible an excess of saving over investment (X-M = 3-1). Since 
the utilization of productive capacity is an important criterion for 
further investment activity, a positive trade balance is thus a factor 
encouraging it. It does not, however, ensure that investment will take 
place. In fact, an excess of imports over exports increases the volume
27
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of goods and services and makes possible a higher volume of investment.
The positive trade balance stresses the income generating effect 
influencing investment while the negative trade balance stresses the 
capacity creating effect. The relationship with stability arises 
from the fact that an excess of exports over imports increases the 
level of aggregate demand and along with investment and consumption 
determine the general price level, depending on their relationship to 
aggregate supply.
Before proceeding to the analysis of the balance of payments
in the post1,Tar era, a descriptive picture of the statistical background
should be presented. For this purpose, the two main components of the
balance of payments, the current and the capital account, will be
separated. As summarized in Table 1, the current account of the
Federal Republic has been positive from 1952 through to 19£>5. It
reached the highest surplus position, 6.5 billion EM, in 196l and the
lowest in the first and last years mentioned. These years could hardly
be classified as normal years. In 191-8 and 1949, there was no Federal
Republic yet and in the two following years, it was barely getting started.
The highest deficit occurred in 1949 with a total trade value only a third
22
of that three years later. The volume indexes of exports and imports, 
on the other hand, show that the volume of imports has increased progress­
ively more than the volume of exports. Both the per capita and the total
“^ United Nations Statistical Yearbook,1966, (New York,1965),
The deficits for 1948 and 1949 were 1,247 and 3,524 billion EM 
respectively. This applied only to Bizone. Statistics are not 
available for the previous post war years.
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indexes "behave in this manner.
Looking at merchandise trade by itself (Table 2, columns 1,
2 and 3) it becomes evident that the favourable current account balance 
is primarily attributable to the merchandise trade component. In 19&5, 
the current account surplus had almost disappeared, but the merchandise 
surplus remained at 5.1 billion Hi. Since 1965, however, the trade 
surplus has once more risen considerably. In 19^7, in particular, a 
new record v/as established. By August, the merchandise trade surplus 
had surpassed 10 billion HI and was expected to reach 15 billion by the 
end of the year. whether this improvement is the result of the 1966 
government change which installed a Christian-Democrat-Social-Democrat 
coalition for the first time since 194-9 that counteracted inflation 
domestically and inspired new confidence after years of growing dis­
illusionment in business circles, or whether 1965 was merely an 
accidental downward displacement from a rising surplus trend cannot be 
determined from the statistics alone. This question requires further 
analysis, which will follow shortly. Part of the explanation of why 
the surplus value is increasing rests with the price indexes of Germany's 
foreign trade (Table 3). The aggregate price index for imports has 
remained fairly constant from 1958 to 1965, while the price index for 
exports rose 6.7/o during this span of years. The discrepancy is most 
evident in the last two years, Then the volume indexes showed a strong 
trend in the opposite direction. To some extent, of course, the dis­
crepancies are interrelated; price and quantity tend to move in opposite 
directions and stabilize total values.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
30
What the disaggregation of the price indexes shows is 
naturally predetermined by the qualitative disaggregation of the exports 
and imports themselves according to main product groups and main origins 
and destinations. (Tables If and 5). Looking at the export product mix, 
the German predominance as a manufacturing goods exporter stands out 
clearly. The four top export categories comprise more than 5Q;3 of the 
exports, and all manufacturing exports together approach the 9Q.3 mark. 
Primary goods such as iron and iron products are stagnating,increasing 
by barely 2Qv in seven years, whereas machines, vehicles, chemical 
products and electrical equipment all more than doubled in value.
Imports, on the other hand, do not reveal as precise a picture 
as exports. Germany is a highly developed manufacturing country and so 
its import needs are correspondingly diverse. The country imports food­
stuffs and raw materials that either are not found in Germany at all, such 
as tropical fruits, or not in sufficient quantities, such as ore, oil and 
wheat. Secondly, it imports secondary manufactured products that do not 
necessarily require the latest technology from cheap labour countries. 
Textiles are a typical example of this type of import. Finally, Germany 
imports those products which its technology has not yet mastered to 
produce, either because of lagging scientific knowhow or because of the 
limitations of market size. Computers are a good example of the knowhow 
question and they are imported to keep the country competitive in other 
fields. The market size problem is best exemplified by the machinery and 
chemical products categories. Although German industry is very efficient 
in these areas, the possibilities of economies of scale and the limited
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size of the domestic market dictate some international specialization 
according to the principle of comparative advantage. Other highly 
industrialized countries would exhibit a similar pattern as regards 
their imports. How balanced Germany's import requirements are is 
attested by the fact that all the major groups of imports doubled in 
value between 1958 and 1965 (Table 4).
The geographic distribution of the best German trade pro­
duces a very simple picture. The primary destinations of German 
exports are its European neighbours, particularly those in the Common 
Market. The percentage of exports going to the latter rose from 25/o 
in 1958 to virtually 3Q3 in 1965. When the Efta countries are added 
the result brings the percentage above 5Q3 for Europe. The only 
important non-European market is the United States, but it ranks only 
in fourth place. The United States is much more a source of imports 
(about 15$) than a destination of exports for Germany. Nevertheless, 
the European Common Market countries are Germany's principal suppliers 
of imports, and their importance is growing. The percentage of 
imports coming from these countries has increased from 22, j to 4QJb from 
1958 to 1965. Germany is thus much more dependent on Europe for its 
imports than for its exports, indicating perhaps that the country has 
reached a more refined state of production than neighbours. There 
are, likewise, indications that the trend to further trade with the 
EEC countries will be intensified, both because the countries are by 
nature complementary economically and because of the progressive libera­
lization of intra-Common Market trade.
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Lastly, the sub-aggregates require some explanation. If 
total values of the individual categories composing the export aggre­
gate are compared with the price indexes for the respective categories, 
it can be seen that only the machinery and electrical equipment price 
indexes move in the same direction as their values. In the case of 
chemical products, the price index fell while total value rose consi­
derably, Vehicles display a stable price index with enormous value 
increases. In both of these last circumstances, the divergent move­
ments are an indication of the amount of technological progress and 
economies of scale that had an impact on these industries.
The causal determinants of Germany's foreign trade which 
have created the preceding statistical picture must now be elucidated.
In a study entitled "Germany's Persistent Balance of Fayments 
Disequilibrium" Charles Kindleberger stated that its balance of pay­
ments, or more precisely, its surplus was determined by the nine 
following factors: (1) the structure of German trade, (2) the competi­
tive situation in German markets, (3) the economic situation in Germany's 
trade partners, (if) the German propensity to export, (5) the docility of 
German labour, (6) German innovation and technical progress, (7) the 
German propensity to save and not to consume, (8) the deficiencies of 
the German capital market, (9) the beggar- thy-neighbour policies of 
the German government, including economic policy in general and the
23
specific aspect of export promotion. He probably exhausted all the 
23 Charles Kindleberger, "Germany's Persistent Balance of 
Payments Disequilibrium", Europe and the Dollar ed. B.3.Caves 
(Cam.br., Mass: Harvard University Press, 1966), p. 44.
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possibilities with this classification. Any other factor can he incor­
porated into one of these and so, a similar pattern will he used to 
investigate how important each one has heen in the last decade. More­
over, the classification is suitable because in each case there is 
adequate scope for economic policy influence. The causal factors could 
be divided into three types; first, those where there is no room for 
economic policy, i.e. the objective factors, second, those where the 
objective and subjective factors overlap, and finally, those where the 
subjective policy influence is the overwhelming determinant.
The Structure of Trade 
If there is one category in which the scope of government 
activity might be expected to be minimal (especially in a "Social Market 
Economy") the structure of trade should qualify. If the country had a 
favourable structure of trade then its exports had to be income elastic 
and price inelastic and its imports income inelastic and price elastic. 
It is important that both exports and imports be considered for the 
emphasis could just as well have been on the import deficit as on the 
export surplus. Unfortunately, this aspect is often overlooked. In 
Germany's case, however, the principal determinants can be said to lie 
’with exports. As S.J. Tells put it: "The secret of German success in
exports lay in its rate of growth, and the success in the rate of growth
pi
lay in exports. The interrelationship constituted a continuous re­
inforcing circle. The all-important investment that rebuilt Germany
gl
S.J. Tells, British Export Performance: A Comparative Study
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 19^4), p. 75.
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originated in the foreign export sector and pulled imports with it as 
a passive reactant.
Only lately can one speak of an independent import compo­
nent, not as an adjunct or input to produce exports.
Let us then begin with the export side. There is no doubt 
that West Germany had and has the right export structure at the right 
time. In a study of the structural changes in the country’s foreign 
trade, Hesse derived a correlation coefficient for the value of exports
and world income for the period 1950 to I960 which he found to be .9952,
25(regression coefficients: .1 = 2L1.82 + 3.40 Y). The average annual
growth rate of Germany's major manufactured exports was 6.7,3 between
1950 and 1966. Since world income increased much less rapidly during
this period, Germany was able to increase its share of total world
2 6
exports of manufactures from lCfo to 2Cfa. .'/hen world income grew 
Germany's exports grew faster.
One of the main reasons is that the nation's short-run com­
parative advantage lay in the same direction as its long-run comparative
27
advantage, specifically in contrast to the British position. (The 
British economy lends itself well to comparison with .Test Germany's.
The two countries have approximately the same size, the same population 
and similar industrial structures).
~ 25
Helmut Hesse, Strukturwandlungen im Aussenhandel der 
Bundesrepublik Deutschland (Berlin: Buncker & Kumblot, 19 62), p. 270.
2.S The Economist, p. iii.
27 Wells, p. 76.
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During the fifties, however, Germany had an advantage in
relatively capital intensive, finished industrial products such as
vehicles and chemical products. It was for these types of ccanmodi-
ties that the longer run income elasticity of demand was high and
28price elasticity of demand was low. Britain's advantage lay in 
semi-finished products which were confronted with the opposite posi­
tion in world markets. Germany's exports in themselves reveal the 
phenomenon. Between 1958 and 1966, the exports of the very capital, 
intensive products, vehicles and chemicals, rose hy over 100^  and the 
exports of semi-finished products, such as iron and iron products 
grew ty only 20$. In addition, domestic production in Germany is 
becoming more and more specialized and differentiated in capital 
intensive, income elastic goods. It is a direction typically taken 
by rich developed countries, and it is bound to reflect itself in 
continued strong exports. Income elasticity of demand was then a 
definite advantage of the German product mix. But such goods were 
necessarily quite capital intensive even in the mid-fifties. Demand 
elasticity had consequently to be complemented by sufficient supply 
elasticity so that the demand could be met.
Thus, one should investigate whether the West German case 
naturally corroborates the usual assumptions made about factor propor­
tions and foreign trade according to the Heckscher-Ohlin theory of 
comparative advantage. On the basis of war-time destruction of plant 
and machinery and the post-war flow of refugees to the Federal Republic,
28 Wells, p. 76.
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one would expect exports to be relatively labour intensive and imparts
to be relatively capital intensive. The greater labour supply reduced
wages and the lesser supply of capital increased its rate of return.
The only study of the capital and labour intensities of exports and
imports on West Germany, however, reveals that, as late as 1954, trade
made capital less abundant and labour more abundant, contrary to expec-
29tations according to the theoretical Heckscher-Ohlin model. But it is 
possible, as Kindleberger has pointed out, that capital as a whole may 
be scarce and labour abundant, yet the marginal product of new invest­
ment is highest in familiar lines where it combines with existing 
equipment and trained management and labour.^
Certainly, the familiar lines of export of the western part 
of Germany, particularly the Ruhr Valley, were of a capital intensive 
nature in contrast to the labour intensive, light-industry oriented 
eastern part of Germany. This disparity had been energetically en­
hanced by the nazi government's war-time structural intervention in 
the economy which sought to give the country a high degree of self- 
sufficiency. The intrusion gave East Germany a large part of light 
industry, and West Germany received additional capital intensive 
heavy industry. When the country was divided, enough capital had 
survived the war in the west to return to its traditional interna­
tional markets. It will be noted likewise, that the heavy influx
29Karl W. Roskamp, "Factor Proportions and Foreign Trade:
The Case of West Germany^  Weltwirtschaftliches Archiv. (19650 p.321.
^Kindleberger, p. 4-6.
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of refugees to the west exemplified not only the presence of more labour,
31but also of "human" capital. Much of this "human" capital had worked
in armaments production during the war- where it acquired many of the skills
suitable for heavy manufacturing. Exports were essential because this
capital would not have been employed elsewhere. There was no armaments
production until 1955 to absorb the former military technicians and
32
engineers in their familiar lines. On the other hand, the refugees 
that qualified in effect strictly as the factor labour were not all 
immediately absorbed into the productive sphere. Traditional lines of 
export, concentration of heavy manufacturing in West Germany, human capital 
skilled in armaments production, the absence of capital absorbing armament 
production, and the non-absorption of refugees labour consequently shaped 
the capital intensive production and export structure. After the basic 
heavy manufacturing sector, iron and steel, began to stagnate in the late 
fifties, the automobile, chemical, optical instruments, shipbuilding 
industries etc. assumed the responsibility for continued rapid growth.
Mostof these rapidly expanding industries were traditionally in the western 
part of the country. In some cases, however, entire industries previously 
located in the east, emigrated to the west. Part of the chemical trust 
IG Farben and the huge optical concerns Agfa and Zeiss axe important cases.
On account of this development, capital intensive exports grew consistently
33as a proportion of total exports from 75/2’ in the fifties to SQSfo in the sixties. 
^  Roskamp, p. 321.
70
Anton Zischka, War es ein Wunder? (Hamburg: Mosaik Verlag,
1966), p. 4.54.
^  Kindleberger, p. 4-7.
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The economic policies that other nations followed with regard 
to trade and economic development have been a further causal, element in 
Germany’s large trade surplus lead by the production goods sector. 
International tariff and trade restrictions are much less stringent 
where capital goods are concerned in contrast to consumers goods. Any 
country can produce consumption goods if this industry is given tariff 
protection, but only advanced countries can furnish technically complex 
goods. All mature countries have this advantage vis-a-vis the under­
developed ones. The advantage was emphasized additionally during the 
fifties by both types of countries' efforts to promote investment booms 
through economic policy. The developed countries sought to raise the 
standard of living which was threatened by obsolescence (Europe mainly), 
whereas the underdeveloped nations desired industrialization and self- 
sufficiency. Since there was, at the same time, very little prejudice 
in the underdeveloped countries toward Germany because it had not been 
a colonial power, German goods enjoyed a particularly widespread reputa­
tion there. Krupp-built factories and Mercedes-Benz cars are among the 
most prestigious signs of economic maturity in these countries. The 
strong German export position among the developed countries, on the 
other hand, has been secured and extended since 1958 through German 
membership in the Common Market. Prior to its creation, Germany had 
already the advantage that its investment goods were subject to fewer
34restrictions than consumers goods. Most of Germany's partners were
V  Carstens, Die Aufwertungsdebatte. Kieler Studien, Nr.63
(Tubingen: Mohr, 1963), p. 45.
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less developed in the investment good field. The Common Market harriers 
to trade in consumers goods have likewise drastically receded, a fact from 
which Germany is benefiting increasingly. As a result of the initial 
concentration on capital and production goods and the success in thei r 
export, the economy achieved a high rate of growth and technical progress. 
Adding the benefits that German industry obtained from operating in the 
largest single national market in Western Europe, it is obvious that the 
country was able to adopt mass production techniques in the production 
of consumption goods to a greater degree than its neighbours. Prices 
are lower for a greater variety of products and exports are thus boosted 
in this sector. The automobile industry's success in exports is certain­
ly derived particularly from thisadvantage. Only in the area of primary 
and semi-finished products sire German exports being squeezed out. Often 
the German products cannot even hold the domestic market any longer.
Goal production, for instance, has receded for export and domestic use in 
the face of rapidly rising costs. Higher protective barriers in the
lesser developed countries and competition from inexpensive American coal
35increasingly imported into Germany are responsible. The iron and steel 
industry suffers from very similar problems internationally and domesti­
cally. It is a key industry which every underdeveloped country insists 
on having and will go to any lengths to set it up locally. When steel 
must, nevertheless, be imported, Japan produces a high quality product 
for much less than it costs Germany, the United States or any other 
developed country to produce.
Hesse, p. 276.
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The imports development reveals alone from the statistics a 
very different picture and , in many ways, a much more obscure one.
As mentioned above, until recently, imports played a passive role, a 
domestic resource-balancing factor to further investment and export. 
Usually there were no alternatives since the additional resources were 
not available in Germany at all, or their procurement was only possible 
at exorbitant costs. In addition the imports’ function is discontin­
uous. Whenever they result on the basis of realistic competition, the 
amounts are absolutely large, but relatively marginal. If exports 
were strongly influenced by world income, imports might be expected to 
be influenced by domestic income analogously. That is not to speak of 
the direct influence of exports on imports itself, so much more so 
because the income derived from exports plays a strong role in contri­
buting to national income. Hesse’s correlation coefficient in this 
case comes to .977^ (regression coefficients: M = -23.88 + .27 Y) and
it is slightly increasing as the demand elasticitj'- is also increasing, 
though at a much lower level than that of exports. In 1961, for example, 
the import elasticity was 1.15 while the corresponding export elasticity
37was -2. The reasons for this discrepancy lie in part with the nature 
of the growth of exports, including domestic structural, factors, and 
partly with domestic factor behaviour. In a world of rising incomes 
the import intensive industries just happened to be those which produced 
goods that were not too much in demand, and the goods that they had to
 ^ Hesse, p. 250.
^  Carstens, p. 76.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
41
import previously were replaced by domestic substitutes. Germany is no 
exception in that synthetics, for example, have replaced so many raw 
material imports. It is only the imports of those raw materials for 
which no substitutes exist and which are vital to the economy which 
continue to rise steeply. Oil is a key import in thise sense.
The income elasticity of imports is , furthermore, influenced 
by the domestic rigidities of supply. In a complex fully employed 
econony such as Germany, income increases beyond those made possible by 
productivity gains must spill over into imports. The more differen­
tiated and specialized production becomes the more difficult it becomes 
to shift resources when tastes change. Imports fill the gap. Hence, 
the proportion of finished products imports rises in all likelihood.
In I960, the ratio of raw, semi-finished product imports was already
381:1:2. Since that year, the proportion will have shifted further in 
favour of finished products. The economy was consistently at the full 
employment ceiling; in fact, the situation could be called one of over­
full employment where incomes increased to the point where exotic imports 
begin to appeal to the average consumer. In any event the import elas­
ticity probably has risen since the last time it had been estimated for 
the years 1950 to I960.
Not only does the argument of limited ability to increase 
output in a full employed economy support this hypothesis, but there is 
also a socio-psychological justification. The individual German was
3 Hesse, P. 256.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
42
very restrained in his consuming habits until the early sixties. In 
most respects, such as calorific intake or consumption of imported 
luxury products, Germans ranked considerably below their neighbours 
during the fifties. Oneeconomist has stated that if Germany had had 
the British consumption pattern in I960, it would have had to import
5 billion EM additionally, a sum that would virtually have wiped out
39the export surplus. Until the sixties G-ermans still had a recon­
struction mentality. After having lost everything in 1945 the people
were very security minded so that consumption was restricted to a 
minimum and saving was encouraged. The experience of what seemed an 
endless boon throughout the fifties and sixties ultimately changed 
these frugal attitudes in favour of more demanding consuming habits.
Some of the discrepancy in the consumption patterns of 
Germany and Britain owes its existence, however, to the differences 
in agricultural protection in the two countries. Britain gave little 
protection and so imported extensively from North America and 
Australia, whose products were inexpensive in comparison to European 
prices. In Germany the agricultural sector was subsidized and the 
consumers paid the price. There is, indeed, considerable truth in 
this theory, for German food imports are rising as a result of the 
Common Market countries agricultural policy, German prices had to 
come down 10 % on the average and the additional demand at the lower 
price was to be met from imports. In one study its author has gone
39
J. Marlcus, "Some Observations on the West German Trade 
Surplus," Oxford Economic Papers. XV (1965: I), p. 139*
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so far as to insist that in Germany’s case the expansion of imports in
general following lower duties came largely at the expense of domestic 
40production. This hypothesis is undoubtedly more correct now than it 
was during the fifties. Frugality was the predominant outlook when 
purchases were in question at that time. It is then correct to con­
clude that domestic tariff barriers were and still are a hindrance to 
German imports, even though the country is one of the lowest tariff 
countries in the world. Nevertheless, one can really speak of hin­
drance only in comparison with the ease with which German exports 
enter other countries. In other words, if all international tariff 
barriers were removed, imports into Germany would increase relatively 
more than its exports to the rest of the world.
Before leaving the topic of the structure of German trade 
some remarks concerning the terms of trade must be made. They are 
at least a related aspect in so far as their influence on the balance 
of payments is concerned. They are more or less objective, indepen­
dent of direct policy influence. Beginning with 1950, the terms of 
trade were against Germany in view of the rising world prices for raw 
materials in connection with the Korean V/’ar. At this time, the 
adverse terms of trade were of little significance to Germany because 
industry was just beginning to get on its feet again. There were 
enough basic materials in Germany to fulfill the requirements. In
^  J. Wemelsfelder, "The Short-term Effect of the Lowering 
of Import Duties in Germany," Economic Journal. (March, i960). p.97.
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fact, they were occasionally exported to the United States. During the 
first three years of the economic boom that started in 1954, the terms 
of trade were constant and thus, the trade surpluses were not helped by 
favourable terms of trade The unilateral tariff reductions in 1956 
lowered the price of imports by the insignificant amount of 1,8%.
During the next stage of the boom, 1958 to 1963, the terms of trade were 
in Germany’s favour; export prices remained constant while import prices 
fell. The composition of trade basically determined this favourable 
development. Exports tended to display more price inelasticity of demand 
than inports. Thus, when the Common Market came into existence in 1958, 
imports had to become less expensive to ccrapete in Germany and exports 
could retain the same price level to compete internationally.
In contrast to the role that income plays in determining exports 
and inports, that played by price is still negligible in conparison. The 
income and price effects actually worked in opposite directions on occasion. 
With falling inport prices, quantities have decreased and with rising export 
prices, quantities have increased. To be more specific, the 5% currency 
revaluation in 1961 did not appreciably boost inports immediately there­
after, while exports continued to increase at an only slightly lower rate.
It must be emphasized that this situation does not necessarily prevail in 
general, but is determined by the composition of trade and consumption habits. 
Britain certainly undertook the 1967 devaluation to increase exports and 
decrease inports. The distinction is easily found: in the case of exports,
Britain exports price inelastic capital goods proportionately less than does
^  Carstens, p. 28.
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Germany, and in the case of imports, Britain has already been a more 
international market and so more price sensitive than Germany. It 
means that British exports compete with goods on a price more than on 
quality, and imports are likewise determined on a price basis, not 
because the domestic market cannot supply them or because there is 
something exotic about them. Finally, since 1963, the German terms 
of trade have remained constant, and the trade surplus cannot be ex­
plained by prices.
Summarizing preliminarily the evidence of the structural 
component of the economy's foreign trade, it must be concluded that 
it was very strong in a positive direction. Germany had in the 
fifties and still has in the sixties, the favourable product balance 
to find response in foreign trade, and it has it independently of 
government economic policy. Economic policy played no role in selec­
tive structuring for imports; it created a once-and-for-all tariff 
wadi of medium importance within which imports were unrestricted and 
always overshadowed by the export sector.
The economic situation in Germany's trade partners is 
Kindleberger's third determinant of Germany’s trade balance. iVhat 
is really meant in this instance is the impact that other countries* 
economic policies have had on their respective economic conditions and 
consequently on their trade relationship with Germany. France and 
Italy are the typical cases where the respective domestic conditions 
affected the German trade balance significantly. In contrast to
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Germany, whose government did not actively follow a full employment policy
by the expansion of aggregate demand according to the Keynesian principle,
France and Italy did so regardless of sectoral bottlenecks. Unequal rates
of inflation move the balance of trade in favour of the country with the
lowest rate. Thus in both cases, this encouraged exports from price
stable Germany and discouraged imports into that country. The problem
42was quite acute in the years 1963 ancL 1964, and when France and Italy 
followed active stabilization policies in 1965, the result reflected itself 
immediately in the reduced German balance of payments surplus, both in the 
current and the capital accounts with these countries.
Objective - Subjective Trade Influences 
The next group of factors to which Kindleberger referred, namely, 
the German propensity to export, the docility of German labour, German 
innovation and technical progress and the German propensity to save and not 
to consume, all constitute that realm of determinants where objective market 
influences and economic policy decisions can coincide. In the three pre­
vious explanations, the influence of economic policy on the part of the 
German government was totally absent. If complementarity of objective and 
subjective forces in this group of factors existed, the relationship must be 
clarified and then policy can be evaluated where it applied. The task is, 
however, somewhat difficult, for qualitative value judgments essentially 
identify the determinants. Quantitative data is not always available.
The four factors can also be lumped together in one category because indi­
vidually none of them is important enough to warrant separate attention.
^  Kindleberger, p. 45.
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Propensity to export can denote a variety of meanings. One 
frequently used argument in support of a strong propensity to export 
states that since Germany no longer had any political or military power 
the on!ly place for vigorous Germans to get anywhere was business. The 
domestic market was at first not big enough because of the low per capita 
income after the war, so that there was only the export sector. Zischka 
acutely observed when he wrote that the export push was identical with 
Germans1 will to live^ Today remnants of this idea still remain; only 
it is no longer simply the will to live now but the will to be powerful 
again economically that underlies the export drive. German firms are 
meticulous about their exports. They often plan them for ten years 
ahead, and send their own contacts abroad instead of relying on the 
commercial representatives of the government. Evidence of the strength 
of this export push was really shown by the response to the 19 6l revalua­
tion. Despite the additional cost disadvantage to which exporters 
were henceforth subjected, exports rose the next year. Two explanations 
have already been given for this phenomenon: first, German exports are
price inelastic and second, creeping inflation in Prance and Italy count­
eracted the price change. The third explanation is that the response to 
hold and increase exports was enormous. The additional cost burden was 
not reflected in export prices on account of a skilful system of price 
differentiation in world markets.
Domestic prices were raised in order to keep the export prices 
at pre-revaluation levels. The result was exact opposite of what the
^  Zischka, p. 458.
The Economist, p. xix.
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revaluation was designed to do. One can then detect a double negative 
policy decision on the part of the government. Price differentiation 
was not to be allowed according to "Social Market" theory because it 
artificially distorted the market forces of supply and demand. Secondly, 
the action of raising domestic prices while leaving foreign prices at pre- 
revaluation levels was a direct move to counteract the policy decision's 
intent. Since the government stood by without taking any action, its 
response must be judged negatively. It permitted an action that was 
contrary to its belief and to its authority. Public denouncements of 
the action did not discourage it frcan being taken. In fact, Volkswagen 
increased its domestic prices exactly the next day after Erhard had de­
nounced the policy in front of the auto company's board chairman, 
Nordhoff^ 5 In this instance, export mentality was certainly a reality, 
but it would have been neutralized if the government had disallowed the 
price differentiation.
A further testimony of the German propensity to export was 
the acceptance of lower profit margins by industry when costs rose steep­
ly in the early sixties just to keep up exports and investment. One 
student of the situation has concluded that the trade surplus was some­
thing to be achieved apart from keeping the rate of investment high and
i g
that it thus arose exclusively at the cost of consumption. This cost
45 Herbert Ehrenberg, Die Erhard Saga; Analyse einer Wirtschafts- 
politik die keine War (Cologne: Seewald, 19o6), p. 125.
46 "Alois Oberhauser, "Zahlungsbilanzuberschusse und 
Einkommensverteilung," ¥e1twirtschaftliches Archiv. (1963s II), p. 296.
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came to nearly 5 billion HI annually. The welfare of one group was 
sacrificed for the benefit of another, but the fact that it continued 
so long without resentment by anyone is a sign of how extensive the 
export mentality The innate motivation to export stands out
most emphatically. Not only were exports promoted, but they were pro­
moted by sacrificing consumption.
The market organization reinforces the export mentality 
further. It was already noted that cost pressure on exports was met 
with price differentiation between the domestic and foreign markets and 
that constituted an imperfection of competition. Aside from the fact 
that it violated a principle of perfect competition, the use of price 
differentiation suggests a high degree of dependence of the larger West 
German firms on the export market. Indeed, the 100 largest corpora­
tions of the Federal Republic account for 50. j of its exports and the
48
largest thousand for over 70%>. The two giants in particular, Volks­
wagen and Daimler-Benz, receive 60% and kO% respectively of their sales 
revenue from exports. Such independence makes these enterprises decid­
edly export-conscious and ready to defend exports regardless of what the 
rules of competition imply. Since continued prosperity depends on 
increased exports, any government must face the realities of the interna­
tional market. To compete internationally against the huge American 
corporations Germans have also expanded to comparable size in some canes.
47 "H.H. Lutzke, "Woran krankt unsere Wahrungspolitik?,"
Die Aussprache. XV (1965: 2), p. kO.
G. Ollenburg, "Konzentration und Aussenwirtschaf t" ,
Die Aussprache. XV (l9o5: 5), p. 144.
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In so doing, they have become oligopolists or monopolists in the smaller 
German market. This has been accomplished either by the acquisition of 
numerous small companies by the larger ones as in the chemical industry 
or by having publicly known working arrangements for cooperation in 
certain fields as in the automobile industry. The domestic market is 
divided by agreement and competition determines success in other countries. 
Market organization hence complements the innate export mentality of the 
business community.
Both innate export mentality and market organization have pro­
vided difficulties for those attempting to follow "Social Market" economic 
policy. The complementarity complicates the decision making beyond resol­
ving the questions of the permissibility of price differentiation and the 
neutralization of revaluation. As long as tariff and trade restrictions 
exist, price differentiation is a necessity of competition. A firm has 
to compete in different countries with different prices. In some cases 
its profits will be low, and in others high. For example, Volkswagen 
could not sell its cars in the United States at as high a price as in 
Canada because the general level of prices for cars is considerably lower 
there as yet. Price differentiation such as this is not dumping either. 
Selling a product so that its price in another country is lower than that 
charged in the domestic market is considered dumping only if the foreign 
price is below the competitive priceprevailing in that market so that 
injury results to the producers of that country.
The "Social Market" theory did not provide any guidance for 
making economic policy decisions that affect the international corpora-
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tion. In Eucken's lifetime the international giant companies were much
fewer. Concern as to their behaviour was not veiy prevalent. More
importantly, however, the neoliberals saw the large enterprise in a 
different light. They were less worred about the companies' interna­
tional competitiveness than their relationship with society. They feared 
that monopolization left society at the mercy of a few large enterprises. 
These are problems with which the sociologist is more concerned today than 
the economist. There has been only one attempt to explain the concept 
of consumer sovereignty in a monopolistic economic structure, namely, 
Galbraith's notion of countervailing powers. Large producer entities 
confront large consumer entities and so provide a check on each others' 
power. The government and the labour unions also provide some check on 
the giant corporations' practices today.
In its undeniable capacity of augmenting the export surplus, 
the German propensity to export was perhaps too strong for economic policy 
to cope with apart from the disagreement with "Social Market" theory.
The export drive was so strong that it could virtually neutralize the reva­
luation. Since the revaluation was, nevertheless, relatively successful 
in stabilizing the economy externally and internally, it is difficult to 
say whether it was beneficial or harmful. Certainly, government economic 
policy should retain the upper hand. If the revaluation was designed to 
decrease exports, the government's lack of concrete response to the 
exporters' evasion of its designs must be considered a failure in a prac­
tical sense. This judgment must be upheld unless it can be proved that 
the government anticipated the attempted circumventing of its policy measure
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and. so, adjusted the rate of revaluation higher than -what it intended.
No evidence to this effect can be found, however.
Similar possibilities of conflicting doctrines arise from 
the connection of exports and German innovation and technical progress. 
The rationalization of production and innovation took place principally 
in the larger firms, which were not so susceptible to sudden changes in 
demand for their products, so that they could organize their production 
most efficiently no matter what investments for new machines, etc, were
49required. This characteristic is much more important in Germany than 
in the United States. Prom observation European businessmen seem to 
invest for longer periods than their American counterparts, and so in­
vestments must pay their way much longer. Large firms are in a better 
position to undertake large capital outlays; they thus progress faster 
and export more. The theory of the "Social Market Economy" is silent 
on this question. Erhard has not interfered with concentration and the 
federal cartell office has been reluctant to proceed againstbig industry.
The docility of German labour and the German propensity to 
save and not to consume come more into the direct sphere of economic 
policy influence. Until the sixties, German unions were very sensitive 
when exports were being threatened, the cause of which relates to the 
immediate postwar era of codetermination. If the government had any say 
in regard to this matter, its influence was restricted to moral suasion. 
The 1949 constitution guaranteed autonomous collective bargaining 
"Tarifautonomie" to the contract partners, industry and the unions. The
49 Kindleberger, p. 57
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government never mediated disputes. The next chapter will elaborate on 
this issue more extensively. It will suffice here to say that the res­
traint practised by the unions throughout the fifties with respect to 
wage demands undoubtedly aided in the creation of a surplus for the pro­
ducer, but if the producers would not have adjusted to lower profit mar­
gins their influence would have resulted in exactly the opposite in the 
sixties, for the wage increases granted in Germany since 19 60 are the 
highest in Europe, Thus today one must regard this trait as an obstruc­
tion to the export surplus.
The propensity to save and not to consume, likewise is a main 
subject in a later chapter, and so its mention here in connection with 
exports shall be brief. Savings were the prerequisite without which the 
massive exports could not have been possible. The average propensity 
to save is high, especially among private households. These economic 
units contributed 37, o of the total savings in 1963, based on an average 
rate of lQo of disposable income. The marginal propensity to save is 
also high, although in the mid-sixties it is probably declining. The 
cause has already been referred to as the desire for security, precaution 
and lately the quest for identity.
Savings occupy an important part in the determination of exports 
in the long run as well as in the short run context. In the long run, if 
savings constitute a high proportion of income, investment can be high both 
in the domestic and export sectors. Hence, exports will grow, raise income 
and set the same chain of events into action once again. liVhile the long 
run significance is applicable at all stages of employment, the short run
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connection between savings and exports takes on importance particularly 
at the full employment level at which Germany has been for the greater 
part of the postwar era. According to the theory of national income 
accounting, exports can increase at the full employment level without 
inflation only if there is (a) a corresponding decline in investment,
(b) an increase in imports or (c) an increase in savings. (X = (S -±) +M). 
During the late fifties, investment was too profitable to be reduced and 
imports were stable. Thus, marginal savings were the flexible element 
that allowed exports to increase. In the sixties, the long run connec­
tion retains its former importance but the short run savings have declined 
in favour of an increase in imports. They are, nevertheless, still quite 
important and preferable to increased imports because any short run savings 
contribute to the long run export prospects.
Economic policy was an important factor affecting savings.
Together with the psychological motives that were responsible for frugality 
they explain the high average and marginal propensities. Economic policy 
provided many financial incentives for saving above the already extensive 
precautionary amounts set aside by the public. The last chapter will 
present a thorough analysis of the details. The promotion of exports was 
not the only reason for which incentives were created. Exports were part 
of the general effort of reconstruction for which savings were required.
The Role of Economic Policy
The last part of this chapter will deal with those issues which 
exclusively or nearly exclusively involved the influence of government 
economic policy. Kindleberger has suggested that they were the deficiencies
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of the German capital market and the beggar-thy-neighbour policies of 
the government. Since this last phase is a priori negative value 
judgment its connotation must be changed. The manner of presentation 
will also be based on two broad causal elements, direct government 
export promotion and the management of the capital account. The latter 
aspect will complement and complete the analysis that has up to now 
dealt only with the current account or even more specifically the mer­
chandise trade balance. Export promotion has been consciously follow­
ed since the beginning of the Federal Republic in 1948. At various 
times this export promotion has taken the form of taxation privileges, 
special bank discount rates, export insurance schemes, and miscellan­
eous expenditures to foster better communication and information inter­
nationally.
On the whole, Jest German export promotion has receded ever 
since its initiation. The early fifties until 1955 were the most im­
portant era. Portions of the income from exports to the dollar area
were income tax tree, and the bills of exchange financing the exports
50were free of the bill tax. This privilege ended in 1955 with the
GATT convention, where it was agreed that no industrialized country
was to grant tax privileges for exports. All that remains today in
the German tax system is the rebate of the turnover tax, which has been
51arbitrarily set at 3.5/i irrespective of the actual burden of the tax.
^  7/irtschaftsdienst "Soil und kann der Staat den Export fordem?" , 
Interviews des Tfirtschaf tsdienstes, (October, 1966), p. 527.
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R. Adouard, "Kehren die alten Handelsbilanz uberschusse wieder?",
Wirtschaftsdienst. (October, 1966), p. 71. Since this thesis was origin­
ally written, Germany has switched to the value added form of taxation 
thus removing the ambiguity of this rebate.
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As its counterpart, there is also an import equalization tax to equalize
the burden domestically, that has, however, been differentially adjusted
52
to reflect the actual burden more adequately. Again, this is not really 
a tax privilege but a competitive measure to prevent the cummnlative tax 
from pricing the commodities out of the international market. In France
/ 53such rebates come to 8-9,3.
The reduction of discount privileges of exports by the banks 
began somewhat later when the surpluses were getting too large. Ninety 
day bills of exchange in the export business had been rediscounted by 
the German banks without the acceptance of the central bank and at rates 
in the pairticular countries concerned if they were below the rates pre­
vailing in the Federal Republic. The costs were borne by the so-called 
"Plafonds B" of the central bank, containing 300 million Dtvl and created
54by the treasury specifically for that purpose. That remains of this 
credit system since 1957 is carried on by the "Kreditanstalt fur 
iederaufbau" (credit institute for reconstruction) and the 
"Ausfuhrkreditanstalt" (export credit agency). The former has at its 
disposal a fund of 300 million IM out of the former SEP programme with 
which to aid in the financing of long term investments in underdeveloped 
countries. The second institution is a private bankers consortium en­
gaged in the aid of medium-term projects, 6 to 48 months. The funds
52
Heinz I.Iesenberg, " Schwerpunkte der Steuergesetzgebung" ,
1961 -65", Steuer und Y/irtschaft. Nr.42 (December, 1965) p. 882.
53 Adouard, p. 71.
54 Carstens, p. 39.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
57
55came from the original "Flafonds B" of the central bank. In contrast 
to the earlier period these agencies no longer are permitted to provide 
for continuous refinancing.
As export credit is, nevertheless, a fairly strong allocative 
support which is internationally frowned upon in debtor countries, the 
main efforts of German export promotion have shifted to export insurance 
in recent years. Other factors have, of course, contributed to this 
shift also. Export insurance is as close as one can get without dis­
torting the competitive ideal of the "Social Market Economy11 . Insurance 
does not distort trade; it only reduces the risk, although there is some 
doubt on this issue. In addition, only the government can handle so 
vast a programme as international insurance. Finally, the development 
of the trade pattern in recent years has done much to bring insurance to 
the forefront of export promotion. Export insurance began in 1950 and 
has contributed very much to the success of the winning back of export 
markets after the war. The two agencies primarily engaged in this 
activity are the "Hermes AG" and the "Deutsche Revisions - und Treuhand AG", 
both credit insurance agencies having a public guarantee fund at their
56 -
disposal. It contained 120 million EM in 1950, and by 19o5 it had grown 
to 17 billion EM, of which 16 billion DM was in active use.
The main function of export insurance in recent years has been 
to bridge the risk and the credit conditions in underdeveloped and communist
56 K. Hamann, and U.H. Habicht, "Zur Geschichte der deutschen 
Exportkreditversicherung," Neue Perspektiven aus lirtschaft und Recht. 
(Berlin: Duncker und Humblot, 196(5), p. 20.
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countries. In absolute terms, therefore, export insurance does not 
play a major role. ffith the advent of Common Market integration, 
the relative importance of the underdeveloped and communist markets 
has receded. Communist countries demand very long credit terms of 
seven to eight years, and if the political risks are added, private 
insurance companies would not enter this field. In comparison with 
other countries, the German government insurance is small. For 
example, French and English exporters are covered to 90 - 95^ for 
political risk and 85 - 9Qo for economic risk as compared with the
57meagre German rates of 15, j and respectively. The success of 
German firms in still getting orders and completing them can then 
either be attributed to their love of risk, or to the good reliabi­
lity of the debtor when dealing with German enterprises because he 
values their goods. Something should definitely be said for the 
latter. The problem in underdeveloped countries, on the other hand, 
is somewhat different. Here it is very difficult to draw the line 
between direct aid and export promotion, and because competition for
exports is very intensive, there is every indication that a good deal
58of business is a donation to the exporter by~ the government. But 
this phenomenon is not restricted to Germany alone. The American 
Export-Import Bank financed 12,6 of all U.S. exports through the 
foreign aid programme also. More precise information on this topic
F. Berg., "Interviews", iff irtschaf tsdienst. (October,1966) , p.36,
rO
Rudolf Munemann^ "Probleme der Kooperation bei der 
Exoortfinanzierung", Vortrage des 17. Betriebswirtschafter Tages,
[Munich : Duncker & Humblot, Deutschen 19^-), p. 181.
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is difficult to obtain, and quantitative data legally obtained are 
virtually unavailable.
Finally, a word should be said about informational export 
promotion. Apart from 12 million DM allotted for fairs and exhibi­
tions by the government, there has been very little activity. Private 
industry itself invests only 1.5/0 of its earnings in research of for­
eign sales opportunities. Not until recently has the new government 
proclaimed that the economics ministry hopes to receive ideas from
private industry as to what sort of research should be financed by the 
59government. Erhard had remained unconcerned about this matter even 
in a year of meagre surplus such as 1965.
The quantitative effect of the export promotion aspect of 
the German trade surplus cannot be calculated. The impression that 
one obtains is that export promotion was helpful in the early years 
after 1949, but that in the last decade, it has affected trade only 
marginally. Moreover, the German system hardly had the scope of the 
British or French promotion, whereas German exports have grown much 
faster. 7/he the r a greater effort would have improved the results
further is unimportant. Germany did not need greater exports.
The government's laisser faire attitude with the addition of a small 
dose of moral suasion was sufficient. Direct export promotion by a 
rich country vri.ll always remain marginal in the quest for internation­
al markets.
The management of the capital account is the most contro-
59 '
Adouard, p. 73.
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varsial feature of the government’s economic policy on the issue of 
the balance of payments. If Germany is ever referred to as having 
followed a beggar-thy-neighbour policy, the management of the capital 
account is generally the first argument put forth. Statistically, 
the judgment would seem to be supported. Not only has the current 
account been in Germany's favour, but the capital account has also 
been consistently positive. As summarized in Table 6, it was nega­
tive only in 1962. Bor the period 1958 to 1965 the answer to whether 
Germany really followed a beggar-thy-neighbour policy can only be 
determined from an analysis of the causes of the capital account surplus.
The underlying theme of the capital surplus is the dilemma
resulting from an irrevocable conflict of domestic and foreign economic
policy that Germany faced since 1954. Domestic price stability was
given priority in economic policy decisions, and its price was paid in
terms of ever increasing trade surpluses and capital inflows. Some
observers see the origin of the problem in the undervaluation of the
exchange rate which gave Germany a natural 5-IQ-j advantage over its 
60competitors. But the situation became drastic when Germany reached 
full employment in the mid-fifties, and bottlenecks put pressure on 
prices. ’.The re as other countries fostered domestic expansion in com­
parable situations, Germany suppressed it and piled up surpluses to be 
used in creating even more exports, which in turn once again strained 
domestic stability. Concomitantly, the deficiencies of the German 
capital market added flames to the fire, as the central bank was unable 
to neutralize the surplus required to maintain permanently the domestic
1 ’ ■ ■  1  '■
The Economist, p. xi.
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stability. The insufficiency found expression in rising interest rates 
which drew large capital inflows with them. for a short time, the 
dilemma was accidentally remedied. Reaching a high point in 1956, a
portion of the surpluses accumulated and was neutralized in the
^2
"Juliustuzm" to an extent of 7.7 billion DM. These were originally 
planned expenditures for foreign troops stationed in Germany which were 
either not spent or not spent on schedule. After 1957, however, they 
were reduced and the surplus ceased to be neutralized. In addition, 
the surplus funds which the government was able to reach through the 
influence of the central bank on the commercial banks wan only a seg­
ment of the total. The non-bank sector could not be reached at all by 
way of open market purchases and rediscount policy, used an it wan to 
self-financing, and thus still more capital streamed in from abroad.
Remedying the balance of payments crisis by means of re­
export of money capital, gold and foreign exchange, was considered for 
some time at this point. The notion had been brought up by German 
economists for several reasons: (a), it would put the German accumula­
tions of gold and foreign exchange to work in underdeveloped countries, 
(b)} it would help to alleviate the international liquidity crisis for 
which Germany was receiving a large part of the blame, and (c), it 





^  Patrick Boarman, Germany*s Economic Dilemma: Inflation
and the Balance of Payments (.London: Yale University Press, 19«f),p.2V7.
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In view of the structures and the economic policies followed
by the underdeveloped countries in contrast to Germany, credit extension
would, however, return to Germany like a boomerang. As Boarman states:
"Extension by surplus countries of credits to deficit 
countries which followed inflationary policies con­
tained an economic booby trap. The soft currency 
countries frequently used the monetary "elbow room" 
provided to increase the general condition of over­
expansion with its import-increasing export- 
decreasing consequences. As a result, the export 
credits made the deficits still bigger. The export 
of German credit abroad was nullified to the extent 
that the recipient countries returned the gold and g, 
exchange to Germany for the purchase of German goods."
The goods that Germany produced were especially in demand in developing 
countries. What were permanently exported were thus German goods for 
which no equivalent goods were received in exchange. The fact that 
Germany usually insisted on loans tied to German products virtually 
assured this reaction. Moreover, the process of reexport of foreign 
exchange in Germany itself forced real capital exports. What was re­
duced by the reexport of inflowing gold and currencies was not primarily 
income but bank liquidity. Thus a surplus in the balance of payments 
may be turned into a deficit, which did occur in 1959 but without thereby 
cancelling the original impact of the current account surpluses.
As already mentioned, even if the "boomerang effect" would not 
have been operative, the high interest rates prevailing in Germany in the 
late fifties would have reversed the flow of exchange again. The German 
rates were phenonomenally high during this time. The average 1956-1961 
long term interest rates were 6.55/° as compared to 3.66^ for the United
^  Ibid.. 248.
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65States and 3*18,0 for Switzerland.
Despite the impressive growth in investment in Germany through­
out this period, there was still a great scarcity of capital. About 
ktfa of all funds were directed to solving the housing problem, and further 
amounts were needed first to re-equip labour with new tools and later to 
overcome the scarcity of labour. Capital costs simply skyrocketed.
Only if the recipient countries used the credits to settle debts 
with other countries or international financial institutions, or if they 
neutralized them in their treasuries would the reverse flow of funds not 
have been inevitable. These policies did not begin to make headway in
most countries until well into the sixties.
The boomerang effect, on the other hand, would not operate in 
the same way with regard to money inflows in the short or intermediate 
period. The outflows of credit were bound to turn into goods outflows
while the inflows were not followed by real capital inflows. Credit
inflows were mostly in the form of direct investments by foreign com­
panies establishing subsidiaries to serve the European Common Market.
These investments were constantly nourished by fresh inflows of capital, 
but they grew principally through reinvestment of retained earnings.
Direct goods imports did not follow from this investment process imme­
diately. Eventually, the additional investment contributed to a 
rising level of national income and so to more imports as determined by 
the marginal propensity to import. Similarly, the increased investment 
had this time undoubtedly strained some resources, raised prices,
^  Ibid.. p. 25 h r .
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discouraged exports and encouraged imports. The connection remains, 
nevertheless, indirect, -whereas Germany's capital exports were subject 
to both the direct and indirect effects.
The basic dilemma continued until 19 6l. The trade surplus 
had increased every year; gold and foreign exchange were at an all 
time high and price stability was weakening. The economy had reached 
a point of fundamental disequilibrium. If prices were to be kept 
absolutely stable, the trade surplus would have had to reach a size that 
the other countries no longer could accept without retaliation. Conse­
quently, the only way out if Germany was unwilling to inflate the price 
level and if the other nations were unwilling to apply restraint was to 
revalue, and this Germany undertook in 1961, Once more, it must be 
emphasized that the German case would hold in general in industrial coun­
tries practising restraint. There are notable exceptions; the United 
States and Switzerland are good examples that show that long run capital 
exports are possible. But it is primarily possible because most of the 
capital exports are reinvested profits accruing from their substantial 
foreign direct investments.
In his analysis of the 1961 revaluation, Carstens has shown
that given the export and import elasticities of Germany, the normal
reduction in the size of the balance of payments should have resulted
66and it did in 1962. (Table 2, column 6 shows this). The current 
as well as the capital account (Table 6) contributed to the reduction. 
Exports rose only 3.9,j (19o1, 6.3/b) while imports increased by 11.6;o 
(1961, 3.8/2). The next year, however, the same problems began to
Carstens, p. 73.
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reappear as in the late fifties. Inflation abroad was strong and German 
exports rose rapidly. At the same time, one revaluation established 
hopes for another one to follow. Exporters were eager to export before 
a second revaluation gave them an additional price disadvantage abroad, 
while importers held off pure liases in the hope of acquiring them at lower
prices following revaluations. 2.5 billion DM of liquid capital also
/• 67entered the country in 1963 in expectation of speculative gains, or one
half of the German net exports of goods and services. But in contrast
to five years earlier, revaluation was no longer needed. Some pressure
was reflected in increasing domestic prices and a great deal in foreign
leakages. Tourists accounted for 2 to 3 billion EM, foreign workers
for another 1-g billion EM in remittances, 1 to 2 billion EM went to
underdeveloped countries, and 2 billion EM went abroad as net dividend
68
remittances by 1965. In addition, the foreign demand for German bonds 
received a halting blow with the 25 % coupon tax imposed in March, I96A. 
Previously, this demand was infinitely elastic whenever their price 
dropped below the foreign bond prices. So by 1965, the total balance 
of payments turned negative, (Table 2, column 6) and the problems all 
seemed to have solved themselves.
Before commenting on this aspect of government economic 
policy, one interesting point might be made. Carstens once again has 
pointed out that one half of the surplus on current account could be
Hans J. Brems, "West German Problems, Price Discipline and 
Economic Integration", Quarterly Review of Economics and Business, 
(Winter, 19&0, p. 55.
68 The Economist, p. 28.
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69explained by a non-economic phenomenon, receipts from foreign troops. 
(Table 2A). Ke insisted that because of their political nature, the 
troop receipts were not a permanent feature of the German economy.
If they were omitted in calculating the balance of payments surplus, 
no appreciable surplus remained. But there is adequate reason to 
regard them as just as permanent a category as some nations regard 
shipping receipts.
Despite the dilemma,there is undoubtedly no country that 
would not gladly have changed place with Germany. Moreover, one 
cannot attribute the problem to the beggar-thy-neighbour policy de­
liberately pursued by the government. It did not follow its course 
primarily with surpluses in mind. After several historical exper­
iences with domestic inflation, which deeply affected the "Social 
Order" theorists of the "Social Market Economy", a rigid course with 
regard to price stability had obviously to be the predominant concern. 
When the other countries do not share those opinions, they must be 
aware of the consequences. Not only did they encourage the German 
trade surplus accumulation by their stimulation of aggregate demand, 
but they put Germany in a position where it could do little to remedy 
the situation. For while a policy to expand exports by holding down 
prices and curbing domestic spending works well, a policy to increase 
imports and to improve the functioning of the capital market, both 
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responsibility lay with the debtor not the creditor. The validity of 
this conclusion is poignantly shown by France and Italy since 1965.
The theory of Sucken and Ropke was followed to the letter by 
the government policy makers, and in their eyes the surplus must be 
viewed a triumph. One can support that position, calling it a "Social 
Market Econony" triumph, but of the short, not the long run. Steering 
a one directional course can be successful for some time. The "Social 
Market Economy" theorists and practicians responsible for economic 
policy in Germany in the mid-fifties were probably too optimistic in 
believing that the "others" would revert to the German practice. Ulti­
mately these hopes were dashed at a time when the domestic-foreign policy 
disequilibrium strained the economy to the limit. A decade of huge 
surpluses and their effects were beginning to disrupt the domestic social 
order. Here the Erhard administration was no longer master of the situa­
tion as the economy was sliding into greater difficulties than the tradi­
tional problem countries, France and Italy. Under such a reversal of 
the situation, even the best export structure, which Germany still has, 
is of little value. Little more needs to be said about that question, 
for it is the topic of the next section.
Conclusion
In this chapter, the attempt has been made to evaluate the 
influence of economic policy on the German balance of payments in the 
postwar era and to relate that economic policy to the ideas which under­
lie the "Social Market Economy" . The balance of payments position has 
almost consistently been in Germany's favour. Of all factors analyzed,
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the composition of trade stands out as the major explanation of success 
in foreign trade. The keys as to why Germany had the correct composi­
tion are its economic structure and its capacity for innovation and 
technical progress. Both in turn can he attributed to unique histori­
cal occurrences. The separation of Bast from '.Test Germany gave to the 
West an economic structure whose comparative advantage was in capital 
goods production. These were in great demand in the postwar years.
The war itself was the other historical incident that gave Germany an 
advantage. The technical experience gathered in such a vast military 
effort was of great value to German engineers and technicians in con­
tinuing technical progress after the war. Economic policy did not 
actively affect the structure of trade. If it can be said to have 
played a role, it was one of passive acceptance of the new postwar en­
vironment, which in fact, meant the encouragement of trade based on 
comparative advantage instead of renewed self-sufficiency. Such 
acceptance meant trade liberalization and proved successful.
The same criteria apply to the influences that other coun­
tries* economic policies had on German trade. The creation of the 
Common Market benefited Germany primarily because it was in the best 
position to adopt mass production techniques. In the less developed 
nations, German exports had none of the stigmas attached to them as 
those from the ex-colonial powers, France and Britain, or those from 
the neo"colonialist" Americans and Russians. Nevertheless, the 
general lines of economic policy were again an underlying theme. The 
German government was Europe oriented, a fact which contributed to the
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establishment of the Common Market, while in the eyes of the third world 
it was a welcome change from one-country nationalism. Much of this new 
outlook was inspired by "Social Market" ideas in addition to the changed 
role that Germany could play after the war. In a vague sense, the two 
are really connected. Competition and comparative advantage were em­
phasized. Neither social welfare states like Britain nor the U.S. 
supported trade liberalization to the degree that Germany did. Classi­
cal economic theory triumphed when Germany exported successfully. One 
can, of course, say that economic policy was involved in all these issues, 
but the point is that the effect was purely secondary. Without the struc­
tural advantages to begin with, the export surpluses would not have resulted 
in all probability.
In addition, the propensity to export and the propensity to save 
were seen to play a role in the success of foreign trade. Economic sur­
vival as a mature nation meant exports and savings for the German economy 
after the war, a thought which still pervades the thinking of businessmen 
and workers today. The feelings were seen to be so strong that they even 
persisted against the economic policy of revaluation in 1961. That action 
paradoxically represents both the success and failure of "Social Market" 
doctrine. Competitiveness had been so strongly emphasized by "Social 
Market " theorists that German producers created a monopoly in the domes­
tic market to remain competitive internationally. This was clearly not 
intended by Eucken or by Muller-Amnack.
Direct export promotion was hardly a factor beyond the imme­
diate postwar years. It takes only the form of export insurance now,
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and in comparison to Britain, the U.S. and Prance, the German effort is 
far more limited. There is no significant economic policy decision nor 
"Social Market " doctrine in question when it comes to insurance.
Finally, the positive capital account was shown to be directly 
related to a fundamental requirement of a "Social Market Economy", domes­
tic price level stability. The export surpluses resulting were important 
but incidental outcomes of such policy. Throughout the entire period 
that Erhard was economics minister and later when he was chancellor, price 
level stability remained his prime concern. One cannot, however, go so 
far as to consider the positive capital account an unmixed blessing nor 
can it be indefinitely prolonged without incurring bad feelings in other 
countries. Domestic stability was achieved at the price of cumulative 
export surpluses which had a cumulative inflationary effect that was pro­
gressively more difficult to neutralize. Eventually revaluation was the 
only solution.
In conclusion, the impression is that it wan the objective 
economic factors that were on balance responsible for the strong balance 
of payments position. If economic policydid not leave a significant 
mark, it wan primarily because the success wan much more dependent on an 
economic philosophy than on precise policy. The economic philosophy wan 
liberal and did not prevent the objective factors from playing their role. 
The emphasis on trade liberalization, competition and comparative advantage 
which inspire the "Social Market " theory were evidenced only in a passive 
way. Whatever economic policy was applied, it did not have any specific 
"Social Market" traits except in connection with monetary stability. The
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conclusion is, moreover, unavoidable that no positive economic policy 
could have accomplished much more during the first twenty postwar years. 
But it does not imply that a new approach should not be warranted in 
1968 to keep the favourable trade balance either from the point of view 
of economic philosophy or economic policy. All objective and subjec­
tive criteria are subject to change.
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CHAPTER 111 
PRICE AND MOHETARY STABILITY
The objective of this chapter will be the evaluation of 
economic policy with respect to the second criterion of success in 
German's postwar development, domestic monetary and price stability. 
There are three types of possible inflations, demand pull, cost push 
and structural inflation."^ The chapter is an analysis of the fac­
tors that are responsible for these three types of inflation and what 
role they played in Germany. Government economic policy is an inte­
gral. part of such as analysis by virtue of the role government plays 
in contributing to inflation and in responding to its existence.
The degree to which Germany's postwar economic development 
has displayed a certain price or monetary stability can be judged rela­
tively or absolutely from statistics. Price stability means in any 
case the absence of inflation. The Gennan inflation of 1923 acutely 
demonstrated the adverse economic, social and even political results 
of inflation. Consequently, the preservation of price stability is 
generally recognized now to be one of the major objectives of govern­
ment economic policy. Certain^ the government has the direct
71
The three-fold division of inflation classification is 
emphasized according to the more modern approach, primarily because 
it allows economic policy response.
72
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influence through its control of the issuing of money.
In Germany, price and monetary stability were to be especially 
encouraged by economic policy. Both those who had lived through the 
1923 inflation and the "Social Market " economists were ardent supporters 
of stability. The economics minister Srhard, as mentioned earlier, even 
interpreted the "Social Market Economy" to mean "freedom in the realm of 
goods, discipline in the realm of money" . Price stability had to be the 
major policy consideration of any German government and particularly in 
a "Social Market Economy". There is no doubt, therefore, that the re­
placement of the Erhard administration by the Kiesinger-Brandt coalition 
in 1967 was partly motivated by the belief that Srhard and his "Social 
Market" economists were failing to solve the problem of creeping infla­
tion. The apparent success of the fifties was not being duplicated in 
the sixties.
Price and wage Movements
A brief statistical synopsis will outline how stable the 
price level has actually been. Tables 7 and 8 summarize the develop­
ments of the general wholesale and consumers price indexes and give a 
disaggregated picture of the major wholesale price index component as 
well as an international comparison. Both general indexes show sub­
stantial. price increases after i960 essentially concentrated into the 
years 1964 to 1966. During that span of years, the wholesale price 
index rose 36 annually, and the consumers’ price index rose by 4$ 
annually. The discrepancy with the average price increases during 
the fifties, which never passed beyond 2,1, is noticeable. 1$ price
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increases are virtually the upper limit if the inflation is to be called 
creeping. A look at the disaggregated wholesale price index shows that 
consumption goods and building materials have generated the most signi­
ficant price increases. Producers' goods price and basic raw materials 
and textiles,on the other hand, show less than average increases.
Labour costs axe also signposts of price level stability, for 
if the Cobb-Douglas production function is acceptable in the German case, 
labour is the major input in a product. A look at Table 12 reveals that 
contractual wages increased at an even faster pace, 31.5/a alone since 
1962 or almost 10, j annually since 19^3 • Jeekly gross pay for workers 
and monthly salaries for white collar workers show similar tendencies at 
levels only slightly below the hourly pay increases (Tables 9 and 10). 
Furthermore, it can be seen from Table 11 that the increases which, of 
course, affect the cost of produced goods put Germany into one of the 
worst positions internationally, together with the British and the 
Japanese economies. It is interesting to note that both Britain and 
Japan are having the same problems as Germany. Britain is not, however, 
a growing economy while Japan is. V/ages and price increases can occur 
in either growing or stagnating economies. The first year of the new 
government has been, on the other hand, very stable. Expected increas­
es were only about 1-gu until the end of the year 1967.
Inflation, as noted above, can be of demand pull, cost push 
or structural type and the remedies lie with monetary and fiscal policy, 
"Konjuhkturpolitik" as it is known to Germany. Of the three demand- 
pull is most sensitive to monetary and fiscal policy measures; the other
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two are less sensitive to them, and their correction often requires going 
outside of conventional policy.
In contrast to the decade of the fifties, the sixties show a 
definite decline in internal price stability, a decline that, nevertheless, 
compared favourably with the developments in other major countries. The
instability suggests that the government either could not diagnose the 
causes of the creeping inflation, or could diagnose correctly but was un­
able to find the correct remedy, or it was aware of both the illness and 
the cure but was unwilling to do anything about them for political or 
other reasons.
Demand Pull Inflation
Let ’us begin with the traditional demand pull inflation, deter­
mine the extent to which Germany has been affected by it and examine the 
government's policy response. The Keynesian model of income determina­
tion identifies three components of aggregate demand, consumption, invest­
ment and government expenditures. Exports have been deliberately omitted 
in this model because their role has already been noted. One must be 
aware, however, of the possible connections of demand and supply. Changes 
in the supply of labour, for instance, cause changes in the level of aggre­
gate demand. Consequently, Germany probably does not suffer from only one 
type of inflation but all three. The identification of the demand pull 
element is thus a problem in itself.
Although virtual full employment had been reached in 1956, 
noticeable demand pull inflation did not result until the beginning of the 
sixties. Until that decade, the economy had realized "the most favourable
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development of its potential with a high micro-economic flexibility and
72
a macro-economic full capacity. Inflationary pressure was there, 
provided by the huge capital inflows and the trade surplus, but the 
central bank and the government kept it under control an noted previous­
ly. After I960, demand pull inflation could no longer be suppressed.
While revaluation in 1961 temporarily slowed down the imported inflation, 
the domestic one was accelerated.^
The origins of the demand pull inflation were found in the 
order of government expenditures followed by investment demand and con­
sumption. Table 13 verifies this order of precedence. As a proportion 
of total domestic demand, government expenditures have increased from a 
low of 12.9/2 in 1956 to 15.6'o in 1965. Much of this increment was account­
ed for since 1959. Investment has moderately increased its share of de­
mand while consumption has displayed a persistent relative decline. The 
decline is, however, relative for column A shows that it has been increas­
ing in absolute terms.
An examination of sector aggregates reveals also that prices 
have risen most where government expenditures were important. The con­
struction sector above all has been influenced by government spending and 
its price index movement is correspondingly strong. The curtailment of 
the consumption share is particularly evident in the years i960 and 1961,
*72
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during which the investment share rose noticeably. Thus on the whole, 
consumer expenditures could not have contributed in any great measure 
to the demand-pull inflation at this time. The slight increases in 
their proportion in the following years were always overshadowed either 
by those of government or investment. .'/hat pressure there was, origina­
ted in specific sectors such as consumer durables and consumer services. 
Increasing differentiation of demand provide the basic explanation in 
this case. As for the investment demand component, which increased its 
share strongly in 1959 and I960, the foremost initiating forces were a 
building boom and an inventory expansion, both encouraged by low interest 
rates, along with the general vibrant investment demand in the other sec­
tors The weakening of the investment demand following from bad pros­
pects in heavy industry, temporarily cooled the demand in 1962, only to 
begin anew in 1964 until the end of that year in -which the building boom 
also reached a new height. Since the statistics for that year show a 
declining share for consumption, the conclusion is that investment always 
increased its share at the expense of consumption. If the correlation 
statistically is not too exact, it is because of the growing but fluctuat­
ing foreign workers remittances. These substantially stabilized domestic 
consumption expenditures.
On the other hand, the case of the government sector is differ­
ent, In every year since the mid-fifties its share has expanded, absolut­
ely and relatively, irrespective of the other two components. Slight
72, it
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correlation exists only with investment}for as might tie expected for 
through direct and indirect subsidies this component was encouraged to 
expand. For example, the building boom primarily achieved its enor­
mous dimensions because of government subsidies. In 19$2 these subsi-
75dies alone reached 16 billion EM. And from that sector, effects 
radiated to all others by virtue of the nature of the building industry.
In 1965, total subsidies reached 28.5 billion EM, almost 5Q j of the 
budget of the central government. Its own private investment demands 
naturally grew in step and added 4.5 billion DM of demand in 19&4.
The federal government's demand in the investment sector was overshadow­
ed by the other two levels of government, the "Lander” and the "Gemeinden" 
(local governments). Construction came more within the jurisdiction of 
the lower levels of government. Their projects were more extensive but 
their purses were smaller. In 1964 the "Lander" added 8 million EM or 
almost one-third of the total public investment demand of 28 billion EM.
And the "Gemeinden" added another 16 million EM. The means of finance 
of the "Lander” was the central bank, through its so-called "Juliusturm II", 
and debt creation in the capital market. As Table 14 shows, the local 
governments increased their debt constantly, from 3.5 billion EM in 1964 
to 4.6 billion in 1965, while the "Lander" followed with 1 billion DM in 
1964 and 3 billion DM in 1965. The federal government remained relatively
Linsenmeier, p. 134.
Karl Hettlage, "Grundsatzfragen antizyklischer Finanzpolitik”, 
Geldwert und offentliche Finanzen (Ludwigsburg: Aktionsgemeinschaft
Soziale Marktwirtschaft, 1965), p. 63
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modest with only 1 billion DM of additonal debts during the latter year.
The capital market in effect was being excessively strained. The public 
demand for capital has risen from a total of 31 billion EM to 37 billion DM 
in 1965. Total savings had also increased by 6 billion DM. Since the 
increased public expenditures meant an increase of 11. j over the previous
year and revenue rose by private savings had to be tapped and drawn
77away from the private sector.' Hence the inflationary gap arose, and 
the government demand component bore the responsibility.
While the private sector has in the last few years not been 
the principal villain in unleashing the inflationary forces, it has never­
theless had to bear the consequences. The creeping inflation lias foster­
ed the "disintegration of the society", hinted at earlier. Differences 
in income and more so of wealth were accentuated. This social disequili­
brium was as inadmissible as inflation in a "Social Market Economy" . 
Statistically the statement is partially correct. It is accurate with 
regard to the formation of wealth. Already between 1950 and 1959, 17,’0 
of all household united received three-quarters of the total accrued net
wealth; the average capitalist accumulated at that time twenty-three
73
times as much wealth as the average worker. Since then the results 
have not been substantially changed. Germany has thus achieved a more 
unequal wealth distribution than the United States though not comparable 
with that of under-developed countries.
77 t* ti
Heinrich Troiger, "Die Finanzreform, Grundzuge und
Leitgedanken", Offene Welt (November, 1966), p. 284.
Hhrenberg, p. 44.
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Government attempts to counteract the trend have not been
very effective. In 1961, for example, the government put into effect
the "law for the promotion of wealth formation", which was extended in
1963 and supplemented in 1965. The original law and its extension
offer premiums for savings for limited amounts (minimum 24012.1, maximum
480 Hi) at rates between 221a and 23 /a depending on family size and
length of deposit. The supplement, also known as the 312 HI law, is
a more direct stimulus for wealth formation through which the worker
is offered 312 HI annually by the employer, the determination of the
79type of asset being left to the employee. In both cases a negli­
gible percentage of those qualifying have taken advantage of the offer. 
The same disinterest was manifested with regard to the "Volksaktien" 
issues (peoples' stock). Vforkers were quick to purchase them at their 
below market prices but almost immediately resold them for a quick pro­
fit. The workers simply had no experience with the ownership of capi­
tal. For the "Social Market" supporters the rejection by the workers 
of capital ownership must be considered a blow, for they hoped that 
capital ownership would make them feel that they had a stake in the 
economy's future. If the social equilibrium lost its balance it was 
because labour did not take the initiative to overcome its inabilities. 
Labour could even be accused of augmenting the inflationary pressure by 
its actions and thus hurting itself. If woz'kers had kept their 
"Volksaktien" instead of selling them and spending the proceeds, excess 
demand would have been reduced and real wages would not as easily have 
suffered. The argument is true only so long, however, as excess demand
*7Q
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is the cause of inflation and there is excess aemnd in those sectors 
where the proceeds are spent. The concentration of wealth in Germany 
has increased and was facilitated to do so by creeping inflation.
The distribution of current income, however, does not show 
a bias against labour. Table 15, column 3 shows that since I960 the 
proportion of income going to non-self-employed labour has risen 
steadily. Conversely capital income is shrinking, despite the fact 
that investment has been increasing. The reasons are readily identi­
fiable. The capital-output ratio has remained fairly consistent and 
profits have decreased. There is no logic in the argument that 
because national income in Germany had doubled from 1957 to 1967 that 
the share of labours' income should rise. Nor did the distribution 
in favour of labour have an adverse effect on price level stability. 
Government and investment were the sources of inflation more so than 
consumption. Nhat matters is not the income distribution or the 
wealth distribution per se but how they affect the supply and demand 
relationship in any particular sector. Capital income affects pri­
marily the investment component and labour income the consumption 
sector*. Savings originate in both, but labour does not actively 
dispose of savings destined for investment. A forced redistribution
of income could disrupt the regular market forces and lead to price 
80
instability.
80 IWolfram Langer, Sicherung der Geldwertstabilitat: Sine
Aufgabe der Konjunktur -, Struktur - und Airtschafts-politik 
Kieler Vorthage Nr.44, 1966 (Hamburg: Hoffmann und Campe, 19^6), p.15.
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In conclusion, the case of demand-pull inflation is quite 
clear cut. In the last six years the economy has been facing excessive 
pressures leading to demand-pull inflation, at first slightly on account 
of private investment demand and subsequently replaced by a stronger 
government demand. Moreover, in both cases the demand surplus wan the 
original cause and not induced by preceeding cost increases on the supply 
side. Finally, the strength of the inflation can be calculated from the 
observation that in the case of the local governments the discrepancy bet­
ween the sources of revenue and the demand for expenditures exceeded 25;a 
most of the time.
Cost Push Inflation 
On the supply side of the economy it is cost induced or struc­
tural inflation which occur. Both originate on the supply side; the 
difference exists in the sense that in the case of the former the purely 
macro-economic supply inelasticities are the cause, while in the latter 
the inelasticities are micro-economic. Demand pull could be the initiat­
ing force in regard to structural inflation, but usually the consequent 
price increases are supply originated. Cost push emphasizes the total 
excess of demand for factors of supply, real or artificially created,
'while structural inflation emphasizes the differentiation of supply.
The word excess demand always remains, but it is distinguished from the 
real demand pull inflation by virtue of the theoretical difference between 
the theory of derived demand for factors and the marginal productivity 
theory of factor demands. Inflation can arise in a specific sector with­
out the existence of an excess demand for its products.
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A brief statistical summary will once more introduce the 
analysis. Just as in the case of the demand side of the economy, 
from which data can be obtained on aggregate demand and its relation 
to supply in the realm of goods can be estimated, so on the supply 
side data can be obtained on the aggregate supply of factors and an 
estimate can be made of its relation to the demand. Supply is cal­
culated from the size of the labour force and its productivity.
Table 12, column 2 demonstrates that the active labour force hats been 
growing but at a diminishing rate since I960. The increase of 1.6 
million employed can be attributed almost completely to imported la­
bour. The actual supply, quantity employed multiplied by hours 
worked, has in effect slightly decreased despite the arrival of these 
foreign workers. The index of hours worked with origin 1950 = 100 
has declined to 195 by i960, and reached 88 in 1965. The native 
labour force in Germany itself is stagnating and will soon start de­
clining (by 1970 = -300,000). The manpower market throughout the 
seventies will be marked by the absence of the war and postwar genera­
tions. The postwar baby boom was retarded until the mid-fifties.
The situation is still one of full employment. The rgistered un-
82
employment rates were 0.63 in 1965 and 0.7,3 in 1966. Productivity 
increases, on the other hand, have been substantial, 5.5-3 since 1958, 
on the average (Table 16), 8,3 annually during the sixties, but de­
creasing to (preliminary estimated statistic) in 1966. Givai the
81 T o Langer, p. d.
82 Statistisches Jahrbuch fur die Bundesrepublik 
Deutschland. 1967.
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static labour force and comparing the productivity gains with the 
increases in remuneration (Table 9, 10 and Table 12, column l) reveals 
an unmistakable cost inflation. The wage index (Table 12) shows a 65,u 
increase for the same period and even salary increases have followed 
closely with gains of 58,6.
The discrepancy is in effect greater since contractual earn­
ings increases fall consistently below actual increases by approximately 
2,.o annually (Table 17) . Combining this differential factor with the 
annual IQw contractual wage - productivity discrepancy yields an average 
cost increase of 3,j annually. This follows from the additional require­
ment of constant capacity utilization. The manufacturing industry capa­
city utilization index still stood at 89 (Table 12, column 6), which may 
be taken to be the lowest point on the average cost function, at a point 
lCfj below absolute maximum production. It ’would mean that for 1966 the 
cost increases must have been greater, for the index fell to 84, and that 
result corresponds approximately to the results in Table 11 . Here is a 
clear evidence of cost push, for demand has actually receded as shown by 
the lov/er capacity index. It can be said that aside from some excep­
tional years in which demand fell the supply side has been increasingly 
pressured by the rising scarcity of the factors labour and land during 
the last decade, leading to excess demand and higher costs. The effect 
has been heightened by the asymmetric response of these costs, the rat­
chet effect, particularly labour to demand changes. Rapid capital stock 
accumulation counteracts the trend to some extent, but it is not perfectly 
substitutable for the other factors. Limited possibilities of substitu­
tion apply foremost to land, and so the construction industry has become
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the leading cost push sector.
The exact relationship between factor prices, factor costs 
and product prices is difficult to calculate in the German case. The
83
only attempt for the sixties has been undertaken by Adolf Franke.
For example, he has estimatedthat the 10.4, j increase in actual wages
from I960 to 1961 led to cost increase of 4.5, ^ which in turn resulted
at that time in price increases of less than 2,3, the difference reflect-
84
ed in lower profits. host of the increased prices originated in the
consumption goods sector as a direct by-product where demand pull was 
relatively absent. (in the investment sector the latter was the ori­
ginal cause). After 1963 the rates were reversed. Cost push infla­
tion increasingly pervaded the investment goods sector and demand pull 
took hold of the consumption goods sector. The total effect has lately 
been more determined by cost push than by demand pull.
The statistical data seem, moreover, to suggest that labour 
has been the primary culprit of cost push inflation. That argument 
must be substantiated 8y analyzing whether there have been direct attempts 
to curtail the supply, a question which immediately brings union policy 
to mind. In order to understand union activity in Germany, one must
Adolf Francke, "Die Preis - und Lohnentwicklung in der 
Bundesrepublik Deutschland seit i960,” Aeltwirtschaftliches Archiv,
(1965: I), p. 126.
84 iieinz Scherf, "Bur Frage der Beziehungen zwischen Lohnen 
■and Preisen in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland 1951-61," 7/eltwirt- 
schaftliches Archiv. (1964: i) The point is made in this article that 
the wages have their primary impact on the prices constituting the cost 
of living index, more so than on the retail price index.
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first of all comprehend their institutional structure. German unions 
are strictly industrial unions; there axe sixteen broad and indivi­
dually independent groupings united together to form the German Federa­
tion of Unions (D G B;. This structure has had a profound impact on 
union policy. The unions are strongest at the center. Collective 
management of the sixteen engages in collective bargaining to set the 
contractural wage rates ("Tariflohne"). The unions are weakest at 
the plant level. It was not intended to be that way originally but 
was the consequence of the principle of co-determination with manage­
ment. In all directorates of the large enterprises, one director is 
a labour union representative, but as director the bond with labour is 
weakened and the affinity with management is augmented. The benefit 
is, of course, that the rationale behind strikes has been undermined.
The principle of co-determination and strikes are inconsistent. In 
effect, the number of days lost due to strikes drastically fell from
1580 to 40 during the period from 1955 to 1961, and today the frequency
85
of strikes in Germany is still the lowest in Turope. A further weak­
ness at the plant level steins from the independent attitudes and outlook 
of the works councils who represent the unions at this level. The im­
portance of this institutional feature, as far as this discussion is 
concerned, is that after 1954 it has created the tendency for actual
plant wages to divert from the contractually settled wages, the so-
86
called "'wage-drift" . <7age-drift occurs whenever the labour market is
gc
Haris Lilge, Deutschland von 1955 bis 1963 (Hanover: Verlag 
fur Literatur und Zeitgeschehen, 196>5), p. 124.
^  Scherf, p. 65.
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very tight and the union structure weak. To attract new labour or to 
retainalready acquired supplies, management will create new positions 
at higher pay that union contracts do not classify or it vd.ll pay bonus­
es for certain types of work. Thus the contractually settled wage tends 
to be below the actual rate of remuneration. Tor certain skilled jobs
there is always a wage -drift.
It remains to be seen whether the discrepancy in pay rates 
has had any bearing on the problem of inflation, Henry T/allich came to 
the conclusion in his study of the first postwar decade of German expan­
sion that upward wage pressure ’which has been such a powerful force for
technological progress in the United States has been largely lacking in
87
Germany. Undoubtedly the fact that the contractual wages were not 
those in force restricted the union influence in this direction. The 
flexibility introduced into the system by the wage-drift no doubt aided 
the employer. Studies have, however, shown ’wage drift occurred only 
in those sectors where the technological and organizational conditions 
allowed large productivity gains, and where the cyclical influence could
virtually force it to exist, given the institutional framework of the
38union. The reason for the absence of iallich’s force has been the
more cooperative atmosphere of union - management relations and the 
tight labour market situation, which makes it desirable for both sides 
to progress technologically; for labour, to reduce the hours worked;
- - II I T T
Henry Uallich, Die Triebkrafte des deutschen 7/iederaufbaus 
(Tubingen: Mohr, 1958), p. 215.
88 Scherf, p. 75.
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for management to fulfill the required demand of the market. In the
process additional wage increases vrere granted to labour. The profit
margin decreased but total profits increased.
It seems to be the general opinion among German observers
of union wage policy, that its role has been more of substantiating
Q9
than initiating significance, and that v/age pressure has been consi­
derably alleviated by the strong increase in savings of the public.
The wage increases which rise above productivity gains, a difficult 
hypothesis to prove in any case, have a greater chance of being rea­
lized, the higher is the marginal rate of savings of the wage increases.
The excess increases are simply reabsorbed without demand creating leak-
90
ages with growth detracting implications. If any conclusion can be 
drawn from the preceding discussion it is that neither industry nor 
labour alone were the initiators of cost push inflation. All produc­
tive factors, but particularly land and labour, became progressively 
scarce while the demands for their services expanded enormously. The 
case wan a mixture of demand pull and cost push; demand was excessive 
both at the product and factor levels. Once this was realized price 
and cost increases 7/ere inevitable. Unions were not overly active in 
pushing for wage increases but the wage drift compensated for their 
restraint. Costs rose and prices were subsequently adjusted upward 
also.
89
G, Zeitel, "Bestimraungsfaktoren der Preis-und 
Produktivitatsstruktur", Strukturwandlungen in der deutschen Yfirtschaft 
e&F. Neumark, (Berlin: Duncker &, Humblot, 1963), p. 680.
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Structural Inflation 
Finally, the problem of structural inflation must be clarified. 
Structural inflation is really demand pull seen microeconomically, but 
it also has important macroeconomic implications. Inflation is possible 
not only if there is a macroeconomic excess demand over supply at the full 
employment and capacity level of national income, but it is possible even 
when aggregate supply and demand are in equilibrium. The essence of infla­
tionary tendencies is that they are attributable to the fact that money 
wages and prices in a modern economy are flexible upwards but rigid down-
91wards. When demand rises, prices will rise, whereas in a sector where 
demand declines prices will not fall; in fact they will probably even 
rise. Monetary and fiscal policy can do nothing to solve the problem 
short of a reorganization of those sectors which have experienced de­
clines to permit them to operate profitably at lower prices, and policy 
should counteract the increases where they have occurred by encouraging 
economies of scale. The committee of experts in the economics ministiy 
formulated this requirement vezy simply in its 1965-66 annual report:
"A stable price level necessitates growth, and growth necessitates struc- 
92tural change".
The contrast of declining and growing industries has quite 
obviously contributed to the phenomenon of structural inflation in 
Germany as in most other modern countries. The construction industry
91
W.C. Peterson, Income. Employment and Economic Growth 
(New York: Columbia University Press, 1962), p. 411.
92 R.Jochimsen, "Wechselwirkungen zwischen Stabilitat und Wandel 
der Gesellschaft als sozialokonomische Bildungsaufgabe," Qffene Welt. 
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and the services sector are good examples 'where demand increases have 
led to direct price increases, and the iron and steel industries are 
good examples where demand decreases have led to price increases.
Both demand pull and cost push combined in the construction industry. 
Germany set a phenomenal pace in building an average 600,000 housing 
units a year in the last decade, (for comparison, Prance built 6000,000 
in total since 1955), but the housing deficiency is still 2C$ (Table 18) 
and it is an industry in which there is little room for productivity 
gains. The general cost push condition holds, moreover, that the lead­
ing productive sectors set the pace for wage increases with the result 
that all others suffer cost and thus price increases equivalent to the 
difference in productivity between them and the most productive firm.
In this particular industry, moreover, the costs are directly shifted 
to the consumer, so that the rent increases consistently account for
Q-Z
about 25$ of the increase in the cost of living. The whole field of
services ranks next to the construction industry in respect to price
increases. For example, in 1954- the average German spent 21$ of his
income on services, whereas in 1965 this percentage had risen to 35$,
the increase being partly occasioned by the change in demand but pri-
94marily by cost increases. On the other hand, the German iron and 
93
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Wirtschafts-und Sozialpoldtik ed.F. Dorge (Hamburg: Akaaemie f\ar 
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steel industry, on which the recovery during the fifties was based, 
represents the case where the declining demand has not lowered price. 
Prices have in fact been raised.
Of major concern in discussing the problem of structural, 
inflation is the question whether there actually are any compensating 
price changes that counteract the "permanent" inflationary pressure.
The answer unfortunately is not easily found because qualitative 
changes are always incorporated and their extent is not statistically 
identifiable. The chemical industry is the only major sector where 
prices have actually fallen while quality has improved. In the 
German oil refining industry prices have fallen very slightly for im­
proved products. In the automobile industry as in most other consumer 
durables industries prices have remained constant but quality has vastly 
improved. Economies of scale provide the explanation. Quality im­
provements are indirect reductions in price. In most countries,moreover, 
productivity changes are not passed on to the consumer in the form of 
lower prices tut to labour and management in the form of higher incomes. 
Unions prefer this approach because it enhances their power. Conse­
quently structural inflation is a phenomenon that one has to live with. 
Aside from encouraging increased productivity in the hope that some of 
it will be reflected in lower prices, there is little even government 
policy can do.
Inflation and Policy Response
The German economy has been affected by all three types of 
inflations during the first half of the sixties as the preceding
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analysis has demonstrated. One must not, however, exaggerate the 
degree of this inflation. Compared with other countries the German 
economy cannot he called inflationary (Table 7 compares the German 
performance favourably with those of her competitors). France, Italy 
and the Scandinavian countries all faired more poorly than Germany.
The comparisons of the last years only, 130+ to 1966, put Germany on 
a level with France and Italy but certainly not in a worse position.
The reason for the concern about inflation in Germany seems therefore 
to be unwarranted. Nevertheless, Germans are very sensitive about 
price increases on account of their historical experience with infla­
tion, and thus their concern is understandable. Secondly, France and 
Italy are considered as traditional problem countries as far as inflation 
is concerned and hence no proper comparison. It is the United States 
performance that the German one is compared to because the United States 
is Germany's biggest competitor in world markets. If German prices 
rise, not only are domestic buyers dissatisfied, but the one-fourth of 
national product that goes abroad faces stiffer competition.
Finally, it is not being facetious to say that great concern
is directly related to the government's practice of monetary and fiscal
policy to restrain inflation. The apprehension surrounding this aspect
of economic policy is astounding. Critique of the government has often
been very harsh. Ehrehberg, Erhard's sharpest critic, went so far as
to accuse him of having no ideas or concepts whatsoever in dealing 
95with inflation. Government forecasts predicted price increases,
95 Ehrehberg, Saga, p. 440.
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while at the same time they stated that no economic policy decisions 
were to be taken to prevent the increases. The market had only to
ii 9 6be free of "competitive interferences" (Wettbewerbsstorungen).
After Erhard had such success during the fifties in holding prices, 
it is remarkable that he should have been accused of failure ten 
years later.
Even the experts in the government ministries, however, 
were at a loss as to what to do about the inflationary pressures 
after 19 60 in the way of both monetary and fiscal policy. They were, 
indeed, aware of the fact that the econony faced a demand pull infla­
tion, which meant that monetary and fiscal tools had to be applied, 
but there their work stopped. Since monetary policy had been reason­
ably successful in cooling the strained econony in 1956, it wan natural­
ly the first weapon chosen to control price and cost increases. Prom 
1956 to 1959 monetary policy had been geared to expansion, these being 
stable years. The Bundesbank reorganized the capital market, lowered 
the interest rate, and gave selective credit injections to the steel 
industry and coal mining, a course which it suddenly had to reverse in 
I960 when the building boom was in full swing. The discount rate was
raised from 2-3/^ to 3i% and the 10fo bank reserve ratio was raised to 
9720$. When the impact was found to be negligible, the bank raised 
the discount rate to the highest since the 1956 credit squeeze 
(Table 19). At the end of I960, Blessing, the President of the 
Bundesbank, had to ease the restrictions in view of the international.
 qg  -
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situation which caused capital to flow into the country. The discount 
rate was lowered to jfo once more. But even the virtual doubling of 
the discount rate and the high reserve ratio were not sufficient to 
curb the boom. Investments in housing still increased by 2 billion EM 
in 1961, considerable compared to 3.8 billion EM the previous year.
The surprising fact about the situation is that Muller-Armack, the most 
notable "Social Market Econony" theorist in the government, was actually 
opposed to the restrictive policy in the first place. He seemingly 
contradicted himself, when he demanded that no expansion controls should
98be put on the investment sector. In general, of course, inflation can 
be controlled by reducing any one of the three components of demand, 
consumption, investment or government. Since in this instance it was 
obvious that government and private investment were creating the infla­
tion they had to be limited. The cost of limiting investment is reduc­
ed growth in the future, and hence most governments are reluctant to
start with investment controls.
After the revaluation the econony cooled off once more until
early in 1964. This time the Bundesbank did not apply the brakes until
a year later (Table 19), Blessing argued that the more restrictive 
monetary policy was, the more inflation was encouraged. The cost effect
of the higher interest rates predominated. (This justification was,
99however, provided by Schiller.) The discount rate, raised to 2$,
QO
Alfred Muller-Armack, Die kon.jukturelle Lage. das 
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took effect "by mid-1966, one-and-a-half years later. It was the length 
of time it took to stop the price increase that demonstrated the weakness 
of the monetary policy this time.
The inability of the central bank to force the econony to 
contract through monetary controls is not peculiar to Germany, but is the 
phenomenon present in most countries with a strong commercial banking 
system. In the first place interest rates on short term loans have lost 
their significance with regard to investments because of the excess liquid­
ity of the banks, and second, once the capital market functioned again the 
Bundesbank could no longer directly influence the interest rates there 
What remained was only its influence on long term rates, and in that case 
the large business had become less dependent on the market rates of 
interest. Not even open market operations were successful in view of 
rapidly increasing liquidity, nor the chancellor's "soul massages" 
"Seelenmassage" , or moral extortations for restraint
Monetary policy had its place but alone it was only of limited 
effectiveness. When inflationary pressures were very slight a small 
dosage controlled the situation, but in the face of real booms monetary 
policy was a failure. The increased costs of investment arising from 
higher interest rates were compensated by the rising expectation of 
returns. To impinge on the degree of spending the rate would have to 
be increased by a significant amount, which is an undesirable solution 
because it deters certain long range investments from taking place.
100 Linsenmeier, p. 177.
Ehrehberg, p. 71.
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Schiller Haa also noted that the substitution of labour for capital
could thus be encouraged in the long run and make a tight labour market 
102even tighter. (The lower governments would, nevertheless, have
been insensitive even to substantial interest rate increase). As an 
instrument to foster expansion, on the other hand, monetary policy 
never has had to prove itself.
If monetary policy alone is not effective as an anti­
inflation policy it must be supplemented by fiscal policy. Unfortun­
ately, in Germany what monetary policy sometimes accomplished was often 
undone by fiscal policy. Without any bias whatsoever it can be stated 
that fiscal policy represents one of the darkest chapters in German 
economic policy. Until the "Stabilization Law " was implemented in 
1967, anti-cyclical fiscal policy was a chance occurrence in Germany. 
Keynes’ teachings on the subject reached the German universities in 
the mid-fifties and the government approximately a decade later.
For most of the postwar period a fiscal policy to promote 
full employment and price level stability by anti-cyclical spending 
was not consciously followed. Fiscal policy was usually cycle- 
enforcing and determined by political objectivesErhard thought 
himself to be, in effect, not an economist as such but an economic 
psychologist, and this led him to be very sensitive to the demands of 
interest groups, especially as chancellor, at election time. The 
farmers were annually rewarded to the sum total of 11 billion IM, and
102 Schiller, p. 8.
Linsenmeier, p. 178.
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the voters received a substantial tax reduction for the 1965 election, 
regardless of the inflationary pressure persisting from the 196k invest­
ment boom. What the central bank did to maintain stability, the govern­
ment usually managed to undo again. Its cycle-pronouncing spending 
habits were remarkable. Beginning in 1948, a year of inflationary 
pressure, the federal budget showed a slight surplus that increased in 
1949, a year of recession. During the Korean boom, the budget was 
deficitary. Three years of surpluses followed, correctly anti-cyclical, 
but after 1957 deficits dominated until the sixties despite the boom.
It was not until 1961 that the government's financial report 
demanded the legal institution of anti-cyclical fiscal policy. In the 
1964 version it came to discussion and finally reached legal status as
the "Stabilization Law" on August 5th, 1966, at which time most of the
104harm had already been accomplished. And it was only the introduction
of the annual economic reports and their pessimistic predictions which
led the government to undertake this step. The reports were themselves
already a great step forward, if one considers that for Erhard every
quantitative prediction of economic development resulting from an econo-
105mic policy was a step in the direction of a planned econony. Fiscal
policy was interpreted predominately to mean changes on the expenditure 
side, not on the tax side. The allies had imposed very high taxes 
after the war so that any tax changes were always one way. But exten­
sive tax changes were rare. Taxes were mainly changed for specific
Jorg Beyfuss, Das Stabilitatsgesetz: Wende in d.er
Kon.junkturpolitik (Cologne: Deutscher Industrieverlag, 1966), p. 10.
Ehrehberg, p. 140.
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goals such els capital, formation and privileges for certain industries 
not for broad fiscal policy ends, such as budgeting.
Fiscal policy might actually have fared better if it had 
been based on the principle of the balanced budget as the 1948 consti­
tution in fact demanded. Along with the boom, Parliament and Govern­
ment became accustomed to the high revenues of the high growth period, 
and whenever this growth levelled off they simply resorted to stop gap 
measures, short term budgets, tax privileges, easier credit conditions 
of all sorts, etc. to re-establish the condition of high revenues.
In the event that this policy was unsuccessful, they resorted to price 
increases, and the process analogous to a vicious circle was set in 
motion. Although the government preached restricting the budget to 
keep prices stable, in the end it let prices rise so that revenues 
would rise and the government could hold the line on the budget.
After one cycle was over restraint was once again preached. If the 
vicious circle got out of control economic policy simply stopped the 
market mechanism from working altogether. For example, during the 
1962 building boom the government ordered an absolute construction 
stoppage on all public and private building where more than one-third 
of the space was used for offices and on all luxury home building.
The problem at hand was admittedly really much more complex 
than the situation seems to suggest. The building boom got under way 
not primarily with federal government investment projects, but with
106 " ti
J. Eick, Uberbeschaftigung urn jecten Preis?
(Cologne: Deutscher Industrieverlag, 19^5, p. 3«
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those of the lower levels. Likewise, the deficits were incurred as 
mentioned previously, mainly by the local echelous. The reason that 
the federal government cannot be considered the sole culprit, despite 
its often perverse cyclical spending policy, is that constitutional 
rigidities prevent one fiscal policy for all three levels of govern­
ment. The two lower levels, moreover, guard their privileges zealously 
to prevent a concentration of power in the hands of the federal govern­
ment reminiscent of the years 1933 to 194-5. Given the unquestionable 
predominance, moreover, of the government spending factor as the source 
of demand pull inflation, the conflict must be given ample consideration.
According to the Bonn Grundgesetz, financial matters are 
constitutionally instituted. Of interest in this particular matter are 
two principles of the constitution. One grants that the "Lander" have
10‘
complete autonomy in their budgeting, a provision that cannot be changed. 
The other defines the tax split among the different levels. In Germany 
there are both separate and joint taxes, i.e. all taxes except the income 
and corporation tax have been given to the individual levels and this
jqQ
one is divided on a quota basis. But although the quota is supposedly
flexible, changing it is virtually synonomous with changing the constitu­
tion, since the representatives of the "lander" constitute the "Bundesrat" 
(Upperhouse in Parliament). Both provisions have consequently had the 
result that the revenue has progressively accrued in favour of the federal 
government, while the expenditure requirements have risen more for the
Hettlage, p. 65.
108 Heinz Haller, "Brauchen wir eine Finanzreform?" ,
Stabilitat und Aufstieg (Hannover: Dietz Nachf, 1963), P.93.
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lower levels. These governments then had to create deficits to finance 
the expenditures fostering inflationary pressure, about which the central 
bank could do nothing. It could only attempt to counteract the rampant 
credit expansion on the part of the "lender" and "Gemeinden" by curtailing 
the credit in the private sector. Such measures more than any others 
ultimately brought about the 1966 recession from which the new government 
is finding it so hard to emerge. The "Stabilization Law" of that year 
solved this problem, and henceforth cooperation in budgeting is the rule.
The cooperation was accomplished because the provision on budgeting 
autonomy contained a clause whereby the lower levels of government could 
be forced to accept and engage in a long term planning of their budgets 
and to reach a decision on the division of the tax revenues every two 
years (Article 106, Par, 4-66)
The "Stabilization Law" put an end to the limited and direc­
tionless fiscal policy. The problem of wage policy, on the other hand, 
remains to be solved, and until that time cost push inflation cannot be 
attacked at its roots. Nor could it ever be entirely solved in a "Social 
Market Economy" that recognizes autonomous collective bargaining as a 
basic requirement for social and economic progress, Certainly the idea 
of wage pressure as a tool of technological progress finds its place here.
But if cost push inflation becomes serious, and reduces the competitiveness 
of industry, the obstacles to technological progress might become insurmount­
able so that the intended wage-technology relationship can never take effect.
RolfDahlgrVm, "Die Problemstik der haushaltswirtschaftlichen 
Unabhangigkeit von Bund und I&ndern" , Finanzwissenschaft und 
Finanzpolitik ed, F. Sch'afer (Tubingen; Mohr, 19^), p. 27.
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It cannot be claimed that the credit restriction policy of 
the sixties has had a negative impact on capital investments. When 
planning investment expenditures one has to look at Keynes but not 
forget about Harrod-Domar. Whereas in most developed countries the
problem of overcapacity predominates, Germany still suffers from under­
capacity, and tight money policy worsens the condition. The causal 
chain of reactions that is known as the purchasing power argument, did 
not live up to its expectations as the automatic remedy for growth.
This argument was based on the logic of a cycle of occurrences. The 
economy was to be forced to grow by increasing wages, thus raising 
purchasing power and ultimately production. But because of monetary 
restriction, production was not expanded while wage incomes still in­
creased; the results are inflation and undercapacity. This was the 
practice in Germany in 1966.
It was impossible for the government to restrict wage expan­
sion to productivity gains. It is extremely difficult to calculate an 
objective and correct productivity index, and Erhard was not interested 
in pursuing the matter. He considered the establishment of guidelines 
as in the United States too much of an intrusion of the private sector. 
Moreover, and this point has been made already, wage contracts cannot 
differentiate among all firms according to their productivity gains. 
Arbitrariness of calculations and inflexibility of the bargains made 
have contributed immensely to policy difficulties. Finally, the
JoachimGrunau, "Lohnpolitik, Produktivitat und Preisniveau" , 
Qrdo Jahrbuch f&r die Ordnung von Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft (1965) ,p.ll8.
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failure of Erhard's psychological approach accentuated the dilemma.
His favourite words were that the goal of economic stability could only 
be reached if all participating persons and institutions in the economy 
behaved accordingly.^^ What he meant by "accordingly" was never de­
fined. Occasionally he added the word moderation, but that term was, 
likewise, obscure. The only consolation for him is that the problem 
has not been solved concretely by the new government either. But 
taking over in a recession it has not yet really been confronted with 
the price problem. The new government has the advantage, however, that 
since it is a coalition in which the Social Democrats participate, labour 
listens more attentively when the government tries to use moral suasion.
Coming to the third aspect of inflation again, policy aimed 
at structuring the economy has not had price stability as its prime ob­
jective but growth, and that is the concern of the next section. It 
will suffice here to say that since the government directly influences
or controls 5Qf?o of the capital in the economy its influence can be ex-
112tended to each economic sector as required. Unfortunately, through­
out the sixties the government has not bee able to maintain moderation, 
and hence stability. It has not been certain of which sectors to in­
fluence and those that it has influenced have usually suffered a greater 
degree of inflation than those left to private initiative. Coal mining 
comes to mind as the greatest failure in this regard. This industry 
has received billions of marks of subsidies to modernize and rationalize
111 Ehrehberg, p. 122.
112 Linsenmeier, p. 12*j0.
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its production tut costs and prices are still rising. The government 
seems unwilling to face the fact that the industry can never he inter­
nationally competitive again because of the high mining and labour costs 
and that as a result most spending is in vain. The case of the construc­
tion industry is more difficult to evaluate. The private sector infla­
tionary pressure still remains, as Table 10 demonstrates. The reduction 
in the restriction on rents that began in i960 and the resulting increas­
ed rents in the so-called "white counties" (deficiency of housing less 
than j$) have only slightly alleviated the excess demand until now.
Opinions on the conditions in the public sector are divided.
On the one hand, most government experts attack the inflationary pressure
arising from government investment and demand moderation in spending*
Public building expenditures have to be reduced. The opinion is, of
course, by necessity shared by the entire finance ministry, for when
Erhard left the government there were no funds left in the treasury.
The 1966 weapons agreement with the United States had taken care of that.
There was not even enough money left for his community project
(Gemeinschaftswerk") of 3 billion DM. On the other hand, there are those
113who emphasize that there is a deficiency of public investments. Prom 
the point of view of the demands of a "Social Market Economy" the govern­
ment has to be actively engaged in"Sozialpolitik". It has obligations 
of helping provide housing and educational facilities. These duties 
require public investment. Historical comparison shows, however, that
Harald jlirgensen, Stabilit'iitspolitik und Offentliche 
Investitionen (Cologne: Deutscher Industrieverlag, 19^ 6), p. 3.
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the Federal Republic is investing a lower percentage of GNP than either 
the Weimar Republic or the Empire. Only in housing has the Federal 
Republic's effort excelled. In the remainder of the country's infras­
tructure, investments have been lower than in other comparable countries
114such as the United States and France in the postwar era. There has 
been an obvious bias in favour of directly productive investment in 
Germany. Social capital investments have been neglected. Requirements 
have been estimated to come to 260 billion DM until 1975, an average of 
.50 billion EM or 3% of GKP annually. If one considers that during the 
seventies the labour force will decline and the private sector continues 
to grow, price pressure would result if the social capital requirements 
were fulfilled. The only answer is that resources must be drawn away 
from the private sector by taxation. Such a solution has its own parti­
cular drawbacks again; the price is in terms of a lower rate of growth. 
In the next ten years much of private capital will have to undergo reju­
venation so that any diversion from this sector will have adverse conse­
quences on the competitiveness of German industry.
Conclusion
The overall evaluation of economic policy as a counter infla­
tion policy is negative. Before such harsh criticism is dispensed, 
however, the problem must be seen in perspective. Economies similar to 
the "Social Market" system are generally plagued with instability. It 
is a phenomenon inherent in the competitive mechanism. Market forces 
tend to fluctuate between surplus and scarcity, inflation and deflation
i:Uf r a a .. P. 3.
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unless prevented from doing so by anti-cyclical policy. The "Social. 
Market" concept of anti-cyclical policy, "discipline in the realm of 
money1', was cleanly insufficient. The demand pull and structural 
inflations persisted in spite of monetary restriction. The rising 
expectations of return always neutralized the additional restraint.
The persistence of cost push inflation, on the other hand, was faci­
litated by monetary restriction. The increased costs were added to 
the basic costs of production. It seems paradoxical that monetary 
restriction should encourage cost push inflation. The paradox is 
e.ttributable to a confusion of demand pull and cost push inflation.
The government was aware that monetary restriction was not applicable 
to cost push inflation but did not realize when the demand pull infla­
tion of the early sixties turned into a cost push inflation in 196^. 
Hence it was trying to solve a cost push inflation ty demand deflation 
snd enhanced the cost push element.
Fiscal policy encountered even greater difficulties and as 
such it must be considered as having been detrimental to price stability. 
The origin of the problem is two-fold. First, there is the matter of 
the constitutionally defined financial autonomy of the three levels of 
government. This privilege has been so jealously guarded that a co­
operative effort was virtually non-existent. The lower levels of 
government behaved in a cycle-enforcing manner. This characteristic, 
it will be noted,was not peculiar to Germany, but most federal countries 
face this problem. When the lower governments have money they spend 
it. They do not believe that they are responsible for the maintenance
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of price stability, and the fields relegated to lower levels of govern­
ment are such that if money is spent the government achieves a political 
advantage. Houses, roads, parks, etc., are such political investments 
which cities and provinces indulge in when they have money. In Germany 
prestige investments were very popular, and the governments did not mind 
borrowing vast amounts to achieve their goals. The federal government 
was not about to cut its spending either. It had political investments 
to make also. Agriculture and mining always received their subsidies 
and the American Defence Department consistently convinced the German 
government to invest more in armaments either in Germany or in the United 
States.
The second origin of the problem of fiscal policy relates to 
the -unwillingness of the German government to accept the responsibility 
for anti-cyclical policy. Apart from the 1954 to 1957 period the budgets 
were always cycle-enforcing. To what extent the unwillingness is related 
to the principles of the "Social Market Economy" and to what extent it is 
related to Erhard’s own ways of looking at government economic policy is 
not clear. The principles of the "Social Market Economy1' are not veiy 
explicit on this question. Total emphasis lies on monetary policy.
The essence of the "Social Market" philosophy would probably imply an 
adoption of a balanced budget. If the government diverted from a balanc­
ed budget over a period of years, it was by its own actions creating a 
deflation or an inflation depending on whether the budget was surplus or 
deficit. The government had to support the market system of competition. 
If in any year private industry was not investing enough here government 
had to accept that fact.
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In practice, however, the government followed neither anti- 
cyclical fiscal policy nor balanced budget financing. Consequently 
the conclusion must prevail that Erhard did not follow Keynesian nor 
"Social Market" economic policy. He simply followed a wrong policy.
Part of the explanation can be related to "Social Market" theory. The 
principles are too vague to provide concrete guidelines. Muller-Armack 
himself realized the vagueness of the "Social Market" theory for the 
practice of economic policy when he declaired that the "Social Market 
Economy had to be regarded as a semi-automatic mechanism which assumes 
economic policy direction but does not spell it out. Without proper 
direction the attempt to reach the social goals would have undesirable 
social results. Erhard could not escape the problem. His policy 
moves suggest indecision and reluctance to plan ahead. Planning meant 
the end of the market economy for Erhard. It was the last measure he 
would have resorted to. His attempts at moral suasion were equally un­
successful. Demands for the removal of interferences to the competitive 
mechanism and exhortations for correct economic behaviour had little mean­
ing to labour or industry in view of the fact that the government led the 
way each year with the greatest spending increases. The combination of 
the overemphasis on monetary policy, the unwillingness to accept anti- 
cyclical fiscal policy and Erhard's unsuccessful moral suasion thus gave 
the German economic policy a uniqueness that the other major free enter­
prise systems did not share. (The responsibility for the first two can 
be partly attributed to "Social Market" theory, and so the elements for 
wrong applications in the economy were present). It is astonishing that
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inflation was not more serious than it actually was. The secret must 
he in the rapid growth and technical progress of the economy that 
effectively counter-balanced creeping inflation.
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CHAPTER 1V 
INVESTMENT AND CAPITAL FORMATION
The third and final criterion of German's successful postwar 
economic performance, capital formation, will "be examined in this chap­
ter, Investment as well as capital foimation are really implied. 
Investment has a short run connotation as a major component in the pro­
cess of income determination, while capital formation generally refers 
to the long run, including also the creation of productive capacity. 
Together, investment and capital formation, thus derive their principal 
importance from their connection with growth. If the German economy
grew successfully in the postwar era it must almost certainly have accu­
mulated adequate investment and capital. The rate of growth cannot, 
of course, he explained solely in terms of capital formation. Technolo­
gical progress and qualified labour force are also important. Growth
can occur even with zero capital formation if there are technological 
changes and innovations that increase productivity. Such a situation 
will be rarely encountered. In general, inventions and innovations 
occur at the same time as capital is accumulated. Because of the con­
currence of progress and capital formation, because of the difficulties 
in quantifying technological changes and because technological progress
109
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lias already been commented on, capital formation and investment will
'be analyzed in this chapter as the principal determinants of growth.
Knznets has shown in fact that in many countries factors other than
115capital have been responsible for growth. Capital formation must
be regarded as a partial explanation of growth.
The process of capital formation is in addition suitable 
for the purpose of this thesis on account of its sensitivity to econo­
mic policy. Government monetary and fiscal policy are vital considera­
tions when investment decisions are made in the economy. Changes in 
interest and tax rates directly affect the profitability of an invest­
ment decision and hence the disposition of capital resources. Finally, 
the "Social Market" theozy could have applications in the realm of capi­
tal formation oriented economic policy. The theozy implies that the 
process of income determination, of which investment is a part, should 
be governed by the objective market laws and tempered only by 
" Sozialpolitik?'. The goals of "Sozialpolitik" , the reallocation of
some resources to the economically underprivileged can, likewise, only 
be followed by selective monetary and fiscal policies.
Connections between investment and capital formation, the 
balance of payments and price stability have already been touched on.
It was mentioned in the previous section that an excess of exports over 
imports helps use existing capacity and this might stimulate further 
investment, and a deficit will raise the available amount of capital 
that can be used in the economy directly.
,
Simon Kuznets, Modern Economic Growth: Rate Structure
and Spread (New Haven: Yale University Press, 196 )^.
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Price stability and capital formation can also have a dual 
relationship. Investment in the income generating sense is a factor 
of demand and once the full-employment ceiling is reached, prices must 
rise. On the other hand, investment creates new capital or capacity 
in the long run and if this cannot be used, deflationary pressures 
result. Germany is considered to have profited through these series 
of relationships in increasing its investment and capital formation. 
Trade balance surpluses stimulated investment; investment produced 
capacity and kept production fairly reasonably within the limits of 
its capacity.
The Growth of the German Economy 
As has been the case in the previous chapters, the claim 
of successful German capital formation and investment as regards 
growth must first be verified statistically. The success or failure 
of economic policy, whether it was "Social Market" oriented or not, 
will be evaluated thereafter. Table 20 summarizes the growth of the 
German economy from 1956 to 1966. In nominal terms, the size of the 
GNP increased by about 130,2 from 198.88 billion DM to 477.9 billion IM 
in that period. The increase in real 1954 terms amounted to approxi­
mately one-half of that increase, 75/2 or an average of 7% per annum.
116That performance has been surpassed only by Japan.
The table also shows the exact annual increases, and from 
these it can be seen that the decade can be divided into three cycles.
U.N. Yearbook of National Accounts and Statistics. 1966.
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The first years after 1955, when the growth rate reached a record 12fa, 
were in the sign of a cooling off period not peculiar to Germany alone. 
The growth rates were still quite substantial. The German building 
boom of 1959 created the next expansionary phase. It reached its peak 
in i960 and receded thereafter until the end of 1962, speeded up by the 
1961 revaluation. The third and last cycle began with the investment 
boom in late 1963, reached a peak in 1SQ+, and the recession that follow­
ed reached a trough in 1966. The decrease of ifo in the real GNP esti­
mated by Die Zeit for 1967 is indicative of the serious growth problems 
the German economy is encountering. The overall decline in growth is 
discemable over the three cycles. The high points reached each time 
are successively lower, 12/o in 1955, 8.8% in i960 and finally only 6.6fo 
in 196(4-. And the boom years became less in number each time while the 
recession years became more. The first cycle had four boom years,
1952t- through 1957, the second three, and the last cycle witnessed merely 
a one year boom.
Before a judgment be passed on the growth pattern of the 
German economy and its continuation be predicted, it is worthwhile to 
remember that North America went through a similar postwar experience, 
only ten years earlier. Pears of secular stagnation were widespread 
in 1959 and were swept away by what became the longest period of growth 
in the postwar period beginning with i960. In the second half of 1967 
there were similar signs of a new era of growth in Germany but it is 
still too early to judge its permanence. The government that took over 
from Erhard certainly is staking its reputation on a new era of growth.
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Now that the aggregate growth statistics have been analyzed 
the sectoral pattern needs to be examined. For this purpose the indus­
trial production index (Table 21) has been chosen, for output best reveals 
real growth. With the exception of the mining component the various in­
dexes show surprisingly minor discrepancies. The production and invest­
ment goods industries, of course, have expanded most rapidly, 9Q£ and 8~3fa 
respectively in the period 1956 to 1965.^ "^  The consumption goods sector 
follows with a ~JQ% increase in production. The construction industry 
ranks in fourth place with a 67/0 gain and mining is last with only a 3^  
increase. Thus, as far as these broad categories are concerned growth 
has been well balanced, more so in the sixties than in the fifties. If 
the aggregate index rises the sub-aggregate indexes rise also, and if it 
recedes the sub-aggregate indexes recede accordingly. The similarity 
of behaviour of the investment and consumer goods components is attribu­
table to the preponderance of consumer durables in the latter category. 
Durables often behave like investment goods in Germany, more so than in 
North America. Within these broad sub-aggregates the movements are
naturally quite diverse, ranging from increases of 248.2/j for profession-
lift
al and optical instruments to -47.7% for shipping (Table 22). Solely 
in the construction sector is there little difference among the sub­
components .
German national accounts statistics differentiate between 
production goods and investment goods. Machinery is a production 
good, while a plant is an investment good.
X13 D. Mertens and W. Kirner, Input-Output Rechnung: 
Investitionsverflechtung in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland 1950-1970 
(Berlin: Duncker und Humblot, 19^ 7), p. 37.
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Capital formation, it has been stated, will be the primary 
focus as to the cause of the growth. A first direct and important 
relationship arises from the proportion of the GNP that is invested 
annually. The statistics show that Germany is investing a slowly 
increasing proportion of its GNP. In the period 1950 to 1955 Germany 
invested an annual average of 20.4/0 of its GNP; from 1955 to I960 the 
proportion rose to 22.8$, and during the first half of the sixties it 
averaged 2$fa an can be calculated from Table 22. Even in a recession 
year such as 1966, the boom year figure was reached. Only Japan once 
again has surpassed the German rate of capital formation. According 
to United Nations statistics, Japan has invested more than 3 of its 
GNP annually since 1953. During the complete period the three levels 
of government have been responsible for about two-fifths of this invest­
ment, direct and indirect, private industry for one-third and private
119.households for one-quarter.
Direct government investment is, however, now declining,
120its weight having been shifted to the indirect method. (Table 24)
A figure for the respective industry investment component can be taken 
from Table 23. It is difficult to estimate how much of gross invest­
ment in turn can be considered net investment. But is is certainly
119
Ernst Schneider, Investitionen und Kapitalbildung in der 
Bundesrepublik Deutschland (Diisseldorf: Mitteilungen der List 
Gesellschaft, 19^3), p. 234.
120 (Care should be taken not to compare the figures in all 
tables too exactly; discrepancies arise both because the different 
research institutes use different calculating techniques and because 
the newer estimates constantly revise the older estimates. For 
example, the subcategory figures for industry in Table 24 always 
exceed those in Table 25 somewhat).
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more than 5Q& of the gross figure, which according to Krengel is the
lower limit for replacement of capital to occur, anything lower
121
signifying obsolescence.
To have the correct awareness of the impact of investment 
it is not enough to reveal its volume but also its productivity. For 
this purpose one must turn to Table 26, which shows the capital output 
ratios up to 1963. The aggregate coefficient for the six years pre­
ceding that year increased somewhat, but really not significantly, and 
it shows a tendency to move over the cycle, decreasing in boom years 
such as I960 and then rising again. In the last cyclical downturn, 
the coefficient has most likely crossed the 1.50 mark. This conclu­
sion would agree with the comparison of the change in the total amount 
invested per employee (Table 27), and the change in the index of produc­
tion likewise. Gross invested wealth increased by 38 % in the period 
1958 to 1964-, which would have been between 20-23% more without deprecia­
tion, (the percentage is based on allowed legal tax amounts), while the
index of production increased by hOfo. That yields an incremental capi-
122
tal output ratio of approximately I.36 . As long as it is under 2
The average net investment I have calculated to be 6 O/0 
or 71% depending on interpretation of gross investment in 1963.
Gross investment in that year was 9.1$ of capital stock. (Table 22, 
columns 1 and 2), while capacity increased by 7yi> (Table 21, column 2). 
If capacity increase is interpreted to mean capital stock increase, 
then net investment is 6O/0 because the capital output ratio is 1.3 that 
year, but if capacity increase means actual production power increase 
then the proportion rises to llfo (7 * 9.1). The former is probably 
more correct.
122 This follows simply on the basis of division, capital stock 
increases divided by output increases.
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there is no question that the investment productivity is one of the 
highest in the industrial world, and it is a rate that can usually 
only be found in the early stages of development.
Returning once more to the sectoral analysis, Table 22 
reveals the best details. Within the industry grouping, production 
and investment goods were by far the strongest areas of investment in 
absolute terms, with 50?o and b-7% increases in the period I960 to 1966, 
respectively. But in relative terms the increase in the consumption 
goods industry was greater rising by 6Q?o in this time span. However, 
the trend definitely indicates the continuation of the predominance of 
the production and investment goods sectors. This conclusion follows 
from the Mertens analysis which estimated the continuing investment 
trend until 1970. Apart from the construction industry these two 
fields retain above average annual growth rates of 6.7^  and 7.2%,
These figures are rather conservative since they show the growth with 
the housing construction industry excluded, and this will continue to 
be a rapidly growing industry in the future, despite its rapid 15%> 
increase in the 1960-1966 period. Direct government investment is 
still strongly on the rise in absolute terms and will no doubt continue 
its trend, especially since the new government seems to be more planning 
oriented than its predecessor. The only surprising sector as far as 
future growth is concerned is the consumption goods sector, for which 
investments are even expected to drop. All other sectors behaved more 
or less as one would expect them in a mature industrial econony like 
Germany.
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The sectoral breakdown in investment is approximately reflect­
ed by the capital output ratios. Differences result from different 
cycles and thus different capacity utilization levels. The rapid increas­
es in the investments in the production, investment and consumption indus­
tries were bound to lead to increased capital output ratios when the cycle 
turned down after i960. And since the consumption goods industry was 
slightly less cyclical, the increase in its capital output ratio was less. 
In mining, apparent sectoral stagnation and inefficiency have augmented 
the capital output ratio. The capital output ratio rose despite actual 
decreases in the annual amount of investment. The similarity of the 
major expansionary categories is likewise quite evident from the statis­
tics on capital intensification as demonstrated by the capital labour 
ratios. The production, investment and consumption industries were 
subject to about 30-35% increases. Consequently, given that the output 
increases were not too different, the capital output ratios were also 
similar in magnitude. The only noticeable discrepancy among the three 
is the greater size of the raw material and production goods component, 
for which the raw material part is probably responsible, behaving as it 
does more like the mining component. Finally, the equal increases in 
capital per employee in absolute terns of the investment goods and the 
consumption goods industries under conditions of different absolute 
amounts of investment must be explained by shifts in the labour supply 
in the particular sectors.
The statistical synopsis on growth alone can be concluded in 
a positive statement. The German economy has grown more rapidly than
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most comparable economies and Germany has also invested a higher per­
centage of its GNP than most of its competitors. Only Japan has done 
tetter in both circumstances. At the same time the accumulation and 
production processes have continued to display a high degree of techni­
cal and economic efficiency as demonstrated by the low capital output 
ratio, and finally growth has been of a very well balanced nature.
1966 was, however, a low point in the economic resurgence of the post­
war era, but it is not being too optimistic to say that the growth and 
accumulation pattern up to now have established a good basis for another 
era of prosperous development. It must only be properly made use of.
The underlying explanation rests on the analysis of the 
economy's progress. Neither the mere quantitative volume of capital 
formation, nor its distribution among the sectors suffice in itself.
What is important is whether capital formation has been conducive to 
growth and whether it will be conducive in the future. Government 
economic policy will be excluded for the moment. In the most general 
terms we can say that German economic growth during the fifties was 
conditioned by the ability of the econoany to combine successfully
increasing amounts of capital with labour as the source of increased
efficiency. The continued success in the sixties was and is still 
conditioned by the increased substitution of certain reserves of un­
trained labour by an increasingly complex productive structure, the
123source of which is capital accumulation. Structural change has
become a basic necessity now and for the future.
Dieter Mertens, Die Wandlungen der industriellen 
Branchenstruktur in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland 1950-19^ 0 
(Berlin: Duncker und Humblot, 19&»-), p. 65.
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For the whole period, moreover, the changing interrelation- 
stiip of aggregate supply and aggregate demand have made their impact 
felt. In regard to the supply-demand interrelationship one can divide 
the period not into two but three. Such division is more exact than 
using only the fifties and the sixties as dividing lines, and they reveal 
more clearly the actual driving forces in the process. The first period 
of postwar growth continued until 1955, the second from 1956 to 1962 and 
the third one from 1963 to 1967, to continue, most likely, for another 
five years at the least. It will be noticed, in addition, that this 
classification does not correspond with the cycles described earlier, but 
that some turning points on the cycle are also turning points of the growth 
segnents.
The first period was characterized by a surplus of labour.
The initiating force that determined growth was demand, primarily invest-
12Lment demand for heavy machinery. The problem of the structural im­
balance resulting from the loss of East Germany was overcome by 1950 so 
that the productive machinery was able to start a growth process with a 
low average capital output ratio of .IkK in 1950 when the Korean boom 
started. The export sector, it will be remembered, also was a key in 
this first real postwar expansion. To put this growth pattern into a 
theoretical framework, one can adopt the Harrodian model and say that 
from 1950 to 1955 G was greater than Gw. The actual growth rate exceeded 
the warranted growth rate, an imbalance which created an upward trend.
In addition because the natural or possible rate was greater than the
Winfried Vogt, Makrookonomische Bestinmungsgrunde des 
wirtschaftlichen Wachstums der Bundesrepublik Deutschland von 1950 
bis 19^ 0 (Tubingen: Mohr. 19^ -). P. 20.
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125actual one, the upward trend was cumulative.
In the second period of growth the roles of supply and demand 
were reversed. Demand continued to be strong, but growth was deteimined 
by the limitations on the supply side, i.e. by the changes in productivity 
and labour supply. On the demand side, foreign investment demand even 
became stronger than the domestic demand and the demand for consumption 
goods was just starting to boom. Together, the three factors led to 
complete capacity utilization in the economy. In every industry the short­
age of the labour supply led to full capacity operations. Because of the 
investment goods bias of exports, however, this sector was most hard press­
ed. The fact that this component was able to grow strongly in the second 
half of the fifties can be attributed to its initial head start, by virtue 
ofwhich it was immediately able to gain a large labour supply to use as a 
cushion later, an important factor since productivity gains were increasing­
ly difficult to make. The rising consumption goods industry was able to 
continue faced with a shortage of labour mainly because it was much more 
suitable for technological innovation and consequently productivity gains. 
For this reason temporary equilibrium was reached during 1959. Productiv­
ity gains were able to overcome the excess of demand, only to be upset by 
the ensuing building boom which made its effects felt as a general increase 
in the level of demand above that of the level of supply until 1962. To 
put it into Harrodian terms once again, during this period the following 
inequality held: Gn = G Gw. The natural rate of growth, determined by
1 O C
R.F. Harrod, Towards a Dynamic Economics (London: MacMillan 
& Co.Ltd., 1963), p. 887
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capital accumulation, growth of the labour force and technological
progress, was reached but it exceeded the warranted rate, that which left
producers satisfied with their decisions. Thus there was a deficiency
of investment persisting in most sectors, recreated from one period to
the next by new possibilities arising from productivity gains and capital
accumulation. A big export demand for investment and production goods
plus a big domestic consumption goods boom went hand in hand in their
quest for resources. Every year the importance of increased domestic
capital formation rose. In the first years increases in productivity
could still be achieved by increasing the efficiency of the work force
through better organization for which the high discipline of the work
force was a great aid, but thereafter increases in efficiency meant ex-
126clusively additional investment.
In the third period economic growth became a more complex 
phenomenon. Whereas in the first period growth could be referred to 
as demand determined and in the second as supply determined, whether 
demand or supply was the active force in the third period, depended on 
the sector in question. In 1962 the economy reached that point it had 
reached in 1959 > tut this time it remained there more or less permanently. 
Prom a macroeconomic viewpoint supply and demand were in equilibrium.
Pull employment persisted and the average productivity gain was just 
enough to balance the average increase in demand. But within the
" ±26 Unfortunately most statistical analyses on this question 
deal only with the period 1950-60, a reading of which gives the 
impression that the labour factor was much more important than it 
actually was, because averages are based on the whole period.
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•Individual sectors distortions arose; hence structural adjustment 
'became a prerequisite for growth. Investment and consumption demand 
were no longer at astronomical heights; the former was somewhat de­
pressed after the initial reconstruction demand had been met, and the 
latter was also slowly beginning to be saturated, especially with 
regard to most household goods. Specific sectors, however, were sub­
ject to excess demand, while in others the supply immobilities counter­
acted the removal of the demand-supply discrepancy.
The demand side continued as the influential factor in the 
investment goods sector, and the influence pervaded the entire invest­
ment goods sector. Changes in the investment structure did not influ-
127ence the level of demand until 1965. The factors that did influence
the structure of investment were, in effect, discontinuous capacity 
effects, but these were not strong enough to put a restraint on the ful­
fillment of demand or they did so for only a short period of time.
Krengel has even expressed the fear that in the second half of the sixties 
demand might not be sufficient to induce new investments when the capital
structure and its development must adjust to the new demands for a lower
123growth rate. Since he has expressed that fear, economic development
has proved the opposite. Investments in investment and production goods 
have risen at above average rates so that the total volume of investment
127 Rolf Krengel, "Ursachen und Y/irkungen der Strukturveranderunfren 
des industriellen Anlagevermogens der Bundesrepublik?,’ Strukturwandlungen 
ed. Neumark, p. 915.
128 £big., P. 913.
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has risen as a proportion of GNP also. And secondly, the demand for
investment in general and in the production goods field in particular
is just "being touched by the electronic revolution in data processing
that will henceforth determine "reality" in the economy as Mertens so 
129aptly stated it.
The slackening of demand in sectors susceptible to such 
scientific advances in 1965 and 1966 was thus in part a signal, not 
that the investment goods industry was undergoing secular stagnation, 
but that it has over-expanded in the wrong direction and with the 
wrong means. The structurally favoured sectors have become synono- 
mous with the capital autonomous ones, with very little resort to the 
labour factor. Consequently the emphasis on the importance of capi­
tal accumulation has been demonstrated once more as the key to success­
ful growth, and it applies to the great majority of the investment goods 
industry's branches. The electronic revolution is one that can easily 
change the rule that the nature of basic technological processes is fix­
ed and that productivity gains are no longer possible. All branches are 
subject to its influence where the demand is absolutely rising, for then 
it is worthwhile to replace labour by capital if capital is less expensive 
or if it is left over from use in the more productive uses. Whenever 
supply and demand are close to equilibrium the profitability norm will 
always act as a sieve.
In the consumption goods sector, on the other hand, the devel­
opment since 1962 has been more problematic. Total demand and total
2.29 Mertensj Wandlungen. p. 167.
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potential supply are in equilibrium, but the structural factor has been 
nuch more significant, so that in one case, demand has been the engine 
of growth and supply has been more than sufficient, and in the other 
supply restrained a sector's growth potential. In addition, due to 
inflexibilities in the consumption goods producing capital goods indus­
tries and immobilities in the labour supply the discrepancies could not 
be easily overcome, particularly since the demand structure was also 
constantly changing. The more rapidly the structure of demand changes, 
the less is the structural adjustment capacity and the lower are the 
growth rates. The process has gone so far already that even in the 
same branches of the industry distortions in the supply-demand relation­
ship have arisen. In the automobile industry, for example, some models 
made by the same firm are in excess demand straining available resources 
while for others there is idle capacity. In the previous growth period 
this phenomenon was completely absent. Increasing complexity of the 
production process in turn accentuates the possible distortions further.
Although the conflict between the ever widening and changing 
demand structure and the increasingly complex productive process is in­
evitable in a mature and decentralized econouiy, it does not mean that the 
distortions created cannot be reduced or avoided. One way to do so is 
to produce not for eternity and invest large sums of money only to find 
the machine unwanted or obsolete shortly thereafter. The German indus­
trialist is only slowly drifting away from that policy, but the slowness 
of the adaptation no doubt contributed if not directly to the lower growth 
rate of the consumption goods industry, at least to the long dragging out
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process of the reduction. Demand has not yet changed so rapidly in
Germany to force the entrepreneurs to see the illogic of "durability
130
above all" motivated production. (Part of the fault also lies with
the government's economic policy in this regard as it will be seen 
shortly.) Undoubtedly Mertens and Kimer forecast capital consumption 
for the investments in the consumption goods industry until 1970 par­
tially for this reason. What that development tends to, however, is 
a re-establishment of the conditions in the second "period" mentioned, 
except that this time scarcity is artificially created. It will conse- 
quantly mean a reduction in total growth. Maximum total growth in 
Germaryr will be achieved through microeconomic structural adjustment. 
Non-invested resources are wasted because in a non-centralized economy 
with Germany's investment demands they will not be transferred to a more 
productive use.
It is, furthermore, not the aim of industry or government to 
sacrifice consumption purposefully for the sake of investment. Never­
theless, (German industrialists have found that it is easier to survive 
in the field of investment goods, particularly where electronics has 
already made big inroads. The constant foreign demand for investment 
goods in turn reinforced the domestic one, and so the risk of investments 
in the capital goods sector was lower than in the consumption goods sector.
It is, of course, difficult to prove this argument with 
the help of statistics. There is, however, an undisputable durability- 
mindedness present in Europe which is not so prevalent in American 
business circles. Wallich, for example, has observed that "many (German 
businessmen find it difficult to accept the fact that obsolescence can 
make equipment value less while it is still in working order" (p. 337).
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In Germany the investment goods sector consistently displayed a high 
degree of activity and thus slight fluctuations. The consumption goods 
industry was not less susceptible to upturns and downturns. The appar­
ent paradox steins from the comparison of qualitatively different cate­
gories. The variety of consumption goods is greater than that of in­
vestment goods. Hence the consumption goods cycle, which is formed by 
adding up many individual up-and-down movements, has a less abrupt cycli­
cal pattern. The investment goods cycle, on the other hand, does not 
comprise so many components and so appears to be more cyclically pro­
nounced. The individual components of the investment goods sector have 
fluctuated, but because of the great surge in demand for investment goods, 
these fluctuations are movements around a rising trend. Absolute down­
turns have been rare. The fluctuations of the consumption goods sector 
have likewise been around a rising trend in the aggregate, but the demand 
for many specific items has decreased significantly.
The problem can best be resolved by generalizing the makeup of
131German industry into four categories as suggested by Mertens. These
four basic categories of industries are (l) growth industries, (2) cycli­
cal industries, (3) shrinking industries ("Schrumpfungsindustrien"), and 
(A-) secularly stagnating industries. The chemical, oil refining and 
automobile industries are typical of the growth category. Their charac­
teristic is a steep upward growth rate. The second group is constituted 
primarily by the iron and steel, rubber, non-electrical machinery and 
paper and paper products industries. These industries expand above
Mertens, p. 66.
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average in the expansionary phase and below average in the contrac­
tionary phase. Ore mining and the textile industry are representa­
tive of the third class, whose peculiarity is that production increases 
'but always at a lower rate of production. And finally, coal mining is 
the typical example of a secularly stagnating industiy. Production 
actually declined.
It is from this point of view that the question of structural 
adjustment must be seen. If the demand outlook for investment goods 
seems more optimistic, it is because a large proportion of these goods 
are found in the first two classes, and many consumption goods indus­
tries are in the third grouping. Prom -this classification it becomes, 
likewise, obvious that decreased capital investments in the consumption 
goods sector will accentuate the problems even further, for the dominant 
characteristic of the growth industries is their high capital dependency. 
There are, no doubt, exceptions, but their number is small. Structural 
change in the economy implies capital structure change, and expansion 
implies intensification of the capital component in the investment or in 
the consumption goods sector. Nevertheless, there are capital inten­
sive investments that do not fall under the first class, and so if the 
German structure of investment since 1962 shows an all-round balance 
among the major components, the structural effect need not have been 
necessarily well-balanced in the positive direction, and indeed it has 
not been.
Occasionally throughout the discussion the word factor mobi­
lity has been mentioned. There is no question that capital, mobility
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among the sectors is most essential to a flexible adjustment among the 
sectors of the economy. The direction of its movement is determined 
by the varying degrees of productivity, i.e. profitability. Labour 
mobility has at sane time, however, been of some importance, and so it 
deserves mention. One estimate has it that 12$ of the productivity 
gain between 1950 and 1963 is attributable to the change in the employ­
ment structure, and predicts a reduction to only 6/0 in the period
132between 1963 and 1970. The latter figure shows the negligible impor­
tance of labour mobility relative to that of capital. The higher figure 
for the 1950 to 19^ 3 period was, moreover, the result of the mass exist 
from agriculture. Immediately following the war the influx of refugees 
into the agricultural sector had been unusually heavy because of the lack 
of employment in industry and the necessity to have food. Rationaliza­
tion and mechanization of agricultural techniques as well as the indus­
trial boom simply reversed the trend in the fifties and sixties. Within 
the industrialsector movements have in the last few years been very slight. 
Distinctly noticeable has been only the exodus from the mining sector to 
the investment and consumption goods producing sectors.
This analysis of the structural aspect of Germany's economic 
growth can be summarized with mixed conceptions. There is no question 
that the productive power of German industry remains unbroken in the mid­
sixties, but the extent of its efficient application requires continual 
structural adaptation, in which the country has had only partial success.
1
Peter Schwanse, Beschaftigungsstruktur und Wirtschaftswachstum 
in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland. 1950-63 (Berlin: Duncker und Humblot,
1965), P. 77.
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There exist no fundamental structural problems at the present. There 
are, however, indications that the economy has overexpanded in some areas 
such as iron and steel and underexpanded in others such as electronics 
and computers. These distortions could become serious problems at a 
later date. Thus, it is often less costly for an economy to suffer a 
sudden drastic sectoral problem and shift rapidly than to experience the 
readjustment through a long drawn out process. As yet, the costs are 
not veiy high, if a positive structural policy ("Strukturpolitik”) 
should be implemented.
Before turning to government policy efforts in this direction, 
the complementary aspect of the objective economic structure must be dis­
cussed. Attention was so far concentrated on the two main barriers, 
namely, capacity and employment, the former of which has been seen to be 
the principal important one. It is in regard to this barrier that its 
complement, the financial barrier, is important. Capital intensifying 
sectoral restructuring must be financed. The German success requires 
an analysis of how Germany has been collecting funds to finance the invest­
ment and what are likely to be the prospects in the future.
The Financing of Investment and Capital Formation
From 1950 to 1962 the main concern had to be the procurement 
of capital regardless of sectors concerned. In the initial stage of 
growth it was required to create employment, and once full employment was 
reached it was required to rationalize production techniques once labour 
had became a scarce factor. In the third period of growth since 1962, 
the structural changes in the industrial product mix also had an impact
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on the financing of investments. It is no longer solely a problem to
obtain capital resources but also to secure a sound financial structure
133for the investing enterprises. Much of the risk of structural change 
is accentuated by unsound financing techniques which will be mentioned 
shortly, and unsound financing techniques in turn accentuate the problem 
of capital acquisition later on.
The two principal sources of industry finance are the banking 
and credit institutions and the stock market. Tables 28 and 29 reveal 
the quantitative importance of these sources. Savings are, of course, 
the ultimate source of finance, and so they will be mentioned first.
They rose from 2k.3 billion EM in 1956 to 110.7 billion EM in 1965, 311 
increase of k6C£o. Comparing figures for investment and saving shows 
that savings always increased faster, since I960 by 25/S for example. 
Because Germany had a favourable balance on current account during this 
period savings had to be greater than investment by this percentage. 
Savings banks (Sparkassen and Girozentralen) always account for more than 
5Q& of the savings followed by credit banks, credit co-ops and the postal 
savings system. Other minor capital collecting agencies include the 
building funds and mortgage banks, but these limit their activity mainly 
to the housing sector. The enormous rise in the volume of savings is 
attributable to private households. The amount of the households' share 
of current domestic savings rose both relatively and absolutely. Prom 
1950 to 1963, for instance, it rose from 21*0 to 377° and is still rising,
_ _ _
Ruprecht Melder, Die Geldkapitalnachfrage der -privaten 
Wirtschaft (Freiburg ilfe Dissertation (no publisher) 196k), p . 26.
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This development is the result of the steady increase in the ratio of 
private savings to disposable income, which also had risen from 3/o in 
1950 to 9.5% in 1963.^^ Particularly in 1966 the ratio increased to 
12% of disposable income due to the pessimistic employment outlook.
All of the increase in the share of households came at the expense of 
corporate savings, which were reduced from 47% to 21 % in the same time 
;period. The government's share also rose from 31$ to 43%
The stock and bond market increased its relative importance 
as the actual supplier or mobilizing agent of these savings during the 
sixties as evidenced by the lower corporate saving ratio. Savings, 
in general, increased by approximately 120% while the turnover of stocks 
and bonds increased by 145/5 in actual value and by 160% in nominal value. 
Of the two, the increase of 300% in bonds turnover has accounted for the 
greatest part as compared with mere 45% in actual value stock turnover.
(in nominal terms, the increase comes to only 25/5.)
The decline in the self-financing of industry has been the 
most important development in the investment process, a factor which has 
had severe implications on the soundness of the financial structure.
Since fixed interest securities have also regained pre-eminence in the 
sixties together with non-capital market loans, the credit worthiness 
of investors must be even better to qualify for investment funds.
Schneider has observed accurately by stating that am enterprise in capable
Kindleberger, p. 53.
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of financing through retained earnings is not creditworthy. The 
old German rule states that the firms' own capital should always 
account for about 60j of total invested capital. In Germany this per­
centage was only y2.?o in 1961. Bven with an additional new stock turn-
137over of 1.2 billion IM Germany was far from the 6Q% mark. The prob­
lem has unfortunately been fostered by government economic policy as a 
reaction against the excessive self-financement that took place in the 
early postwar years. At that time, however, any other method was im­
possible because no capital market existed, while the non-availability 
of commodities and the inelasticity of demand allowed an ideal self- 
financing through increased price. As late as 1956, 8j/o of sill profits 
in Germany were reinvested. The rate of plough-back was especially
high in the larger enterprises. Comparable figures for Britain and the
t 138United States in that year were only 50/o and 41yo respectively. In
addition, it was still the stock market that provided additionally re­
quired funds. This course only shifted after 1961, when the stock 
values fall, and fixed interest bonds became more important. The trend 
was initiated by the rising activity of the three levels of government 
borrowing at high interest rates. Since stock values fell, industry
likewise resorted to this market. 9.6 billion DM was acquired by
139industiy in this way, 2.5 times the amount of new stock issues.
13% Schneider, p. 242.
137 quoted from table in Melder.
Melder, p. 95.
. ibid. p. 95.
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Another 4.3 "billion CM was procured on the basis of promissory notes 
outside of the organized capital market.
A further noticeable change occurring in the financing of 
investments has been the changing character of bank credits. Firstly, 
the banks' proportion of all credit granted doubled within the fifties 
from 3 to ICfo, Since then the increase has only slightly continued. 
Secondly, short term credits are slowly replaced by longer term ones. 
Table 30 indicates the trend until 1962. The problem remains that the 
"banking system is never the best source of long term investment capital, 
even though the German banking system has a long tradition of co­
operation with industry. For co-operation in the early industrial era 
was based on the willingness of the banks to absorb large stock issues 
from industiy and not to provide long term loans at fixed interest rates.
A concluding remark on this phase of Germany's growth and 
capital formation is consequently similar to that made on the actual in­
vestment in productive power itself. Just as the capacity of the pro­
ductive power to grow was affirmed, so the capacity of the economy to 
finance the expansion can also be affirmed. (The former is really the 
outcome of the latter) Household savings alone can now finance $0% 
of total investments. If government and corporate savings are added 
there is a greater supply of liquidity than there is demand for. Simi­
larly, the success of the investment process depends on choosing the 
right sectors in which to invest, a search that is in itself difficult 
enough. But if in addition, the financial mechanisms are not flexible 
enough to transfer the resources to those sectors, growth will not be
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achieved. The problem arises through the rising ratio of household 
savings, the decline in corporate savings and thus the inevitable 
decrease in financing through retained earnings. Household savings 
Ejre not directly invested by their owners, and the institutions hold­
ing them do not necessarily direct them to their most useful occupa­
tion. When the degree of self-financeraent is great the mechanism 
works automatically; the most productive enterprises save the most 
and immediately have investment funds at their disposal to undertake 
the investments once more. Growth is a two-step programme, first to 
find out which sectors are most productive and second, to make sure 
that investment occurs there.
Economic Folicy and Investment 
The success of government economic policy in encouraging 
the right reactions will now be analyzed. The "Social Market Economy5' 
stresses that the price mechanism is the best regulator of supply and 
demand in the market, and that interventions in the market distort the 
price mechanism's function, leading to inefficiencies. Interferences 
aimed at structural change would seem to be excluded. The only excep­
tion granted is that intervention could be justified on social grounds 
as part of "Vitalpolitik". Whether the philosophy underlying modern 
structural interventions could, however, be classified as such is a 
question demanding a very broad interpretation. This philosophy states 
that the aim of structural policy is to leave the risk of profit or loss 
to the entrepreneur, but that it would be economically wrong not to
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intervene if the total economic utility of government interventions is
140
considerably greater than their financial cost. Investments that
would qualify under such interpretation are elasticity promoting mea­
sures, structural adjustment aids and complementary investments. To 
admit the possibility that they might be necessary is to deny the per­
fect functioning of the price mechanism. While no one would go so far 
as to insist on its complete perfection, not even the "Social Market" 
economists, the nature of the structural interventions implied would 
no doubt go beyond what they regarded as permissible. For direct 
structural interventions could be objected to if they were called forth 
merely to bridge sudden changes in demand. Today, however, the economy 
has become more interdependent, and this interdependency has become tech­
nically conditioned. The effort of a sudden innovation in one branch 
immediately spreads to others, but the price mechanism will not follow 
at once, or the magnitude of its change will not accurately reflect the 
new environment. Intervention is not justified in the modern version 
to promote social goals but to promote growth.
In the German Federal Republic, structural interventions have 
occurred for a variety of reasons. Their successes have also differed 
widely, sometimes very successful and at other times utter failures. 
Generally the interventions were more successful in the fifties than in 
the sixties. One of the most accomplished structural interventions by 
the government was the massive support for the public utilities, the
Heinz Kohn, "Sektorale Strukturpolitik ist notwendigy 
V/irtschaftsdienst. (January, 1967), p. 87.
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railroads and the coal and steel industries set up by the "Investment
341Aid Law" , which wan in effect from 1952 to 1954. In this unique
venture of business cooperation with government 3 billion EM were 
a.llocated for investment as a direct result of tax benefits given to 
these industries, and the chain reaction that followed led to the first 
boom of the postwar period. The intervention definitely intended to 
increase the elasticity of supply to put the country back on its feet, 
as it were. The price mechanism was not allowed to run its course 
because it would have meant too high prices and that would have been 
against the social interest, so even as a "Social Market Economy" device 
the intervention could be justified. But there is no doubt that the 
underlying motive was the nationalistic sentiment for reconstruction and 
industrialization beginning with basic industry regardless of how market 
conforming the action was. Fortunately, in this case it could be justi­
fied on both grounds, but what is most important is that the intervention 
was successful. 7/hen the end is prosperity the means are rarely question­
ed later.
The typical example where no "Social Market Economy*' principle 
could be used as justification is the shipbuilding industiy. Subsidies 
were given because the prestige of an industrial country required a fleet, 
and because all other countries followed the same practice. And again 
in fev/ areas was the continuation of subsidies and tax privileges so
*1 I ■"I
Karl Hauser, "West Germany" , Foreign Tax Policies and 
Economic Growth. National. Bureau of Economic Research (New York:
Columbia University Press, 1966), p. 124.
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successful in the fifties. Although shipbuilding is now a shrinking
industry, Germany became the second largest shipbuilding country in the 
world.
Another area of reasonably successful structural intervention 
that does not quite fit into the logic of the "Social Market Economy1' is 
agriculture. Beginning with the "Agriculture Law" in 1955, the govern- 
ment sought to increase the productivity of agriculture through rational­
ization of production of cultivable land and equipment. Prom 1956 to 
1961, the principal era of the so-called "green plans" ("Gruner Plan"), 
7.6 billion DM were spent for revenue increasing and cost decreasing
measures and another 12.3 billion DM were spent in the form of general
143 /-credits, subsidies and tax privileges. Also by I960 the number of
farmers was reduced by a third vis-a-vis 1955 und that of farm labour­
ers by two-thirds. Henceforth about a third of German agriculture was 
internationally competitive.
This was a strong structural adjustment, an elasticity of 
supply promoting measure and a complementary investment to increase the 
labour supply for industry all rolled into one. The impact was un­
questionably beneficial. Moreover the government was quite willing to 
finance some of the cost via higher prices to the consumer, a move that 
was non-market-conforming and against the social interest according to 
"Social Market" theory. In this case then its logic is lacking. It
142 H.Busch, Steuerliche Entlastungen einzelner Wirtschaftsbereiche 
- Ein Problem der sektoralen Pinanzpolitik. Dissertation (Cologne :
(no publisher), 19&5), p. 107.
Lilge.
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is not surprising for its is well known that the government's interven­
tion in this sector was encouraged in part by the well-organized farmers' 
pressure group under Erhard's personal friend Rehwinkel, and that some 
of the subsidies coincided with national elections. The programme has 
never been completed to bring 10Q-j of the units up to international stan­
dards of efficiency, requiring the exit of 2 million more farmers from 
their occupations.
The outstanding success in the housing programme has been 
the most positive "Social. Market" inspired structural intervention. In 
the period up until 1966 there have been more than half a million units 
built annually, for Germany is the record holder internationally. The 
basis for this interference was clearly phrased in terms of "Social 
Market Economy5' doctrine: the market economy after the war was too weak
to produce social equilibrium, and so public regulation of production 
became necessary. Rents were kept below what they would have been, 
given the free interplay of supply and demand, and construction was kept 
at a rate above what it would have been, given the natural market forces.
The structural intervention has been carried out in four 
phases according to the legislation introduced. It began in 1950 and 
the last regulation was instituted in 1963. The first housing law in 
1950 created three categories of housing; namely, the publicly financed, 
the tax privileged and the privately financed type according to the
144degree of restrictions on rents and the origin of the support. During 
p, J,
A. Hampe, "Strukturwandlungen in der Wohungswirtschaft"
Strukturwandlungen. ed, Neumark, p. 969.
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this period which lasted until 1955* 50/^ of the investments in housing 
were financed by government funds and only 39/0 by private capital., mort­
gages constituting the rest. The second set of laws implemented in 1955 
and 1956 moderated the restrictions on rents somewhat and encouraged more 
building of private homes. During this period the proportion of public 
funds was consistently reduced to 30-4-Qo of the total and privately finan­
ced mortgages attained more importance. Quasi-cooperative building funds, 
("Bausparkassen") were also slowly entering the investment business.
The last two housing laws significantly cut the amount of public money 
engaged and the restrictions on rents. The first one in 196l eased the 
restrictions on rents in tax-privileged and old houses, while the subsidi­
zation through public funds continued by means of low interest rates on 
loans. The principle of the "white county"vas also introduced, which 
meant that where the excess housing demand was less than 3% the rent res­
trictions were cancelled on all old privately financed housing. This law 
was complemented in 1963 by a further law redefining the relationship be­
tween owner and tenant and revising the remaining rent restrictions which 
took the form of ceilings, upward to correspond approximately to the actual 
maintenance costs. Prom Table 31 it can be seen that although public in­
vestments always increased absolutely, they constitute only 20/o of the 
total invested now. Much of the continuing success of encouraging the 
private capital to invest in housing stems from the cooperative nature of 
the investment process. Public funds were contributed conditional on 
sizeable concurrent private contributions. These contributions came 
about by virtue of the fact that consumptive expenditures were replaced
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145by investive ones. After seventeen years of government direction the
housing need has been met.
The other successful interventions are more or less of minor 
individual importance. The German tax system is filled with special 
provisions for privileges under certain conditions, such as those allowing 
higher depreciation allowances for sewerage investments and for water 
pollution control, etc. Since the eariy sixties, however, the Federation 
of German Industiy has generally no longer demanded subsidies or special 
tax privileges. Its emphasis has shifted much more to demands for equal­
izing the starting conditions of industry in international competition 
than to structural aids.
An important field in which the intervention of the government 
has been very unsuccessful is the coal mining industiy. Ever since the 
late fifties this industiy has been plagued with overcapacity, partly attri­
butable to the excessive expansion encouraged several years earlier. The 
mine owners, nevertheless, came up with "metaeconomic" arguments like the
Ili-Sfarmers and secured support for rationalization and consolidation programmes. 
But in contrast to the agricultural sector a concrete programme was not set 
up until five years later. The structural aid funds did not improve the 
production process. Finally, in 1963 a structural plan came into existence, 
fostering the combination and shutting down of unprofitable mines, reducing 
the tax rates on undistributed profits to encourage modernization, and
'^+'> J. Hoffner, Jahrbuch des Instituts fur Christliche 
Sozialwissenchaften. (Munster: Verlag Regensburg, 19 6d), p.100.
Mertens, p. 169.
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promoting the use of coal in industry through accelerated depreciation
147rates for the construction costs of the factory using it. At the
same time different methods were used to retrain workers for other jobs 
cr pension the older workers if they so desired. Still, productivity 
changes to this day cannot be witnessed and the workers resist moving to 
other industries. Erhard was never able to solve the problem while in 
office.
The example shows that a structural intervention designed to 
shrink an industry is always more difficult than an intervention with 
an expansionary purpose. The case of the coal mining industry in the 
two instances, 1952 and 190, shows this contrast poignantly. And only 
a resolute government can succeed especially since contraction brings 
sociological and political complications with it. But worst of all, 
and this is the ultimate critique of the coal mine intervention, were 
the indecision and contradictions accompanying it. Subsidies were paid 
to economize on the one hand, and on the other the use of the product was 
encouraged. The opinion has often been voiced that the intervention did 
not aim for a positive restructuring but for the preservation of an in­
efficient overexpanded industry, and that is under any conditions irre- 
conciliable with the premises of a "Social Market Economy” . An almost 
similar condition prevails at this time in the shipping industry, except 
that it does not catch the eye as much as the traditional Rhr coal indus­
try. One must, nevertheless, see the problems of an industry such as 
coal mining in international perspective. Most countries in the world
Mesenberg, p. 678.
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are presently facing a situation of high operating costs and excess 
supply of coal. Inexpensive hydroelectric power and oil and gas have 
placed the industry at a severe disadvantage that makes its ultimate 
contraction inevitable, What the German government can be reproached 
for are the endless delays that prevented any decisions from being final­
ized after intervention had been decided upon and the extent that Erhard 
was influenced by the mine owners to decide in their favour. Even agri­
culture, another "enfant terrible" of most developed countries proved to 
be less of a problem in Germany.
Whether contractive interventions will be successful in the 
future cannot be determined a priori, for much of the coal industry dilemma 
rested on Erhard1s shoulders, and he is no longer in any executive decision 
making position. ’What is certain is that more similar problems will arise 
as more traditional primary industries will lose their competitiveness to 
newer ones. The steel industry has,fortunately, already taken the first 
step to consolidation itself after the High Commission of the EEC in 
Luxembourg allowed it to set up an all-embracing counting-house system, 
("Stahlkontore" ) , The free competitive process is no longer of much help 
to such industries. The price mechanism has long lost its advantages 
there. There is much that the government can and must do in the future, 
if positive economic growth is to be maintained. So far it has been 
spared many a task; industry has been able to adapt fairly well on its own.
Now it is necessary once more to turn to the second step of the 
analysis of the growth process, the financial aspect. By its very nature
government influence here is taken for granted. Monetary and fiscal
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policy automatically have a certain effect on growth. Prcrn what could 
he seen from the statistics, government monetary and fiscal policy seem 
to have succeeded to a considerable degree in both creating the ability 
cjid the will to save in the postwar era, and both continue undiminished 
in the present. However, it was seen that the disposition of the savings 
was not always satisfactory. Of most importance for the financing of 
German growth have been the taxation system, in general, and the laws 
governing the capital market within it, in particular.
The characteristic of the German tax system is that it has gone 
very far in creating specific encouragements and discouragements in great 
detail to further a certain economic behaviour. It is a remnant in some 
respects of the allied occupation after the war. Taxes in that period
were very high; for example, there was a 5Qo tax rate on an annual income
* 118 of 25,000 EM, and the marginal 50,3 rate began at 9,000 EM. 7/hen the
allies refused the German government to undertake a general tax cut, it 
simply punctured the system, providing tax privileges for funds invested 
in certain areas, such an exports and public utilities. Hence business­
men were virtually compelled by the tax saving opportunities to invest at 
very high rates, for the tax savings rose cumulatively with the income 
bracket. Because the investments were at the same time financed by means 
of raising prices the amount of savings was further augmented. And the 
higher the income the higher wan the saving. Naturally the large savings 
were achieved at the cost of a grossly unequal distribution of wealth, 
which still continues today. The unequal wealth distribution is new
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encouraged, however, not “by tax privileges for selective investment but 
by the degree of the progression of the income tax rate. The maximum 
rate which anyone must pay is 53/a today, compared with Q8/o for the 
United States, for example, while at low incomes the rate increases much 
more steeply.
Fortunately, the social, security system has taken much of the 
edge off the otherwise ruthless methods of taxation designed to finance 
the promote investment. At low levels of income the problem of in­
security as to sickness or accident is non-existent. As Reuss stated 
it, the system works through incentives at the top and through paterna­
lism at the bottom. Moreover, if one compares the absorption by pay­
roll taxes including social security taxes of income otherwise used for 
consumption with the savings of the public insurance funds, it is clear 
that the German social security system is an additional channel of sa­
vings that can be injected into investment, the fruits of which the
149middle and lower classes certainly partially reap. The same held
true throughout the fifties for the LAG funds, the equalization of
burdens tax, which Hauser has estimated were saved and invested up to 
150
50^ o. * Finally, not only did collective savings contribute poten­
tially to investment by virtue of the customary discrepancy between 
absorption and savings, but the very collectivity gave an additional 
impetus, for it increased the lending capacity of the banking system.
In the sixties the procurement of savings was no longer 
strictly dependent on the existence of such an institutional, system
^  Reuss, p. 182.
Hauser, p. 135.
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that created forced savings. Savings other than those generated by 
the social security system were possible on the part of the middle 
classes. However, to organize them, higher interest rates for savings 
by the less privileged were paid if they kept them there for specific 
periods. The success can be shown in Table 28 and is considerable. 
Premium saving ("Pramiensparen"), as it was called, increased from 
nothing in 1959 to over a billion EM in 1965. The reason the govern­
ment resorted to this .means is attributable to the low popularity of 
securities among the less privileged. In order not to let the funds 
leak into consumption, a saving incentive had to be provided. Among 
the higher classes, the higher rates of saving and investment still 
continue.
While the government has thus had remarkable success in 
organizing household savings in latter years, it has not been equally 
successful in seeing that they are productively applied. As has been 
mentioned already, the problem lies in the fact that a 5Qu proportion 
of household savings is too great to carry for the still not fully de­
veloped capital market and the imperfect transfer system between the 
suppliers and demanders of credit. Corporate savings have been neglect­
ed in recent years, as can be seen in the rapid shrinkage of their pro­
portion. The tax system has discriminated against this form of saving 
ever since the latter part of the fifties. It is in the discrimination 
toward corporate savings that a burden of the tax system is found. The 
discouragement of this form of saving is a misallocation of resources in 
an e conomy that must rejuvenate its economic structure at an accelerated
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rate to remain internationally competitive. The decline in the propor­
tion of corporate savings can he attributed first of all to the different 
and changing method of taxation of distributed and undistributed profits, 
and secondly to the lower depreciation allowances progressively instituted. 
During the early fifties the latter were high and constituted the princi­
pal weapon for encouraging corporate investment. They were especially 
effective as part of the "Investment Aid Law" of 1952. The high depre­
ciation allowances were actually still higher as a result of rule that 
firms were able to use the "Teilwert" (partial value) appraisal method; 
that, a specific capital good was evaluated not on the basis of purchase 
price but on the basis of its value as part of the total production com- 
lex, a method leaving room for much administrative discretion. In 1958, 
however, the system was replaced by a more rigid scheme of regressive 
depreciation allowances limiting the minimum deductible amount in the 
first year to 25% and permitting a maximum value of 67.2/1 to be written 
off in five years. A new lav/ in i960 lowered the first year's allowable 
write-off to 20,1, placing Germany internationally in the worst competitive
position. (Table 32). In fact, German firms are not even taking advan-
151tage of the maximum permissible depreciation rates as Melder has shown. 
Hence they cannot be really suffering under the low rates, and it is a 
tribute to the firms ability to provide adequate finance at low cost.
There are bound to be some firms to whom the low limit does, however, pro­
vide a restraint to their ability to expand, Hor the larger enterprises 
the value of higher depreciation allowances will certainly become clearer
151
Melder, p. 135.
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the greater the replacement requirements will become.
The negative influence on corporate savings resulting from 
the altering taxation of distributed and undistributed profits has been 
generally of more importance. The first German instituted tax reform 
sifter the occupation era, known as the "small" tax reform, set the tax 
rate on distributed profits at 3Q/o, and that on undistributed profits 
at 6ofo. Such obvious discouragement of financing through retained 
earnings was ended under the influence of the drastic need for invest­
ment funds beginning with the boom a year later in 1953. The tax re­
form of 1954, known as the "big" reform, changed the relationship to 
3Qe and 45yo for distributed and undistributed profits respectively. 
However, in 1958 the roles were drastically reversed to a a-nd 15% 
for undistributed and distributed profits. 7/hen in 1959 the stock 
market reform allowed the corporations the tax free change of undistri­
buted profits into stock capital, the decline in self-financing was well 
under way. This law meant simply that the undistributed profits could 
be distributed tax free as shares, which limited the use of the funds 
for reinvestment. No change has since been made in the tax rates appli­
cable to the effect that German companies are again in the worst position 
internationally with respect to taxation of undistributed profits.
Erhard always believed that because of the fear of inflation and the un­
equal distribution of income it would be good to reduce financing through 
retained earnings further, regardless of the adverse effects on the 
industry's position.
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And this occurred at a time when the transfer of private 
capital to investment was hampered. As the statistics show, since 
1961 the volume of government fixed interest securities have increased 
enormously, funds which are not productively invested except in housing, 
where the government has been taking over mortgages. Because of the 
great volume the public sector demands the interest rates have likewise 
risen, and that naturally constitutes another block to the greater par­
ticipation of industry in the capital market. The discrepancy between 
the supply and the demand remains. One cannot be certain whether those 
sectors which require the most investment funds will actually obtain 
them, and even if they can the price will be too high. This failure of 
the government to create a capital market must be regarded as one of its 
major faults. Even if the proportion of self-financing ever rises again 
to international averages, industry cannot do without a well functioning 
capital market to turn to if it needs funds to retain its high growth 
rate. The performance of the economy under these conditions is remark­
able, but, and in this manner one can conclude every section in this 
analysis, it does not insure permanent continuation. Certainly the 
principle of the establishment of a good capital market should be regard­
ed as market conforming in philosophic harmony with the "Social Market 
Econony” .
Conclusion
In conclusion, the findings of this chapter should once again 
be summarized. Investment and capital formation were analyzed as growth 
influences from the point of view of objective factors and economic policy
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influences. It was seen that West Germany has had a most successful 
growth record in the postwar period hut that this record is being pro­
gressively jeopardized. Both objective and subjective influences are 
discernable as causes, and they are closely connected with investment 
end capital formation. The existence of a capital goods oriented eco­
nomic structure was seen to have contributed greatly to growth. It 
meant large exports, economies of scale and great productivity gains 
that brought prosperity to the economy. In the consumption goods 
sector growth was achieved through technical progress and innovation 
■under the pressure of a shortage of labour. Structural interferences 
on the part of the government were helpful in sectors that required 
expansion. Shipbuilding, housing, agriculture and primary industries 
owe their growth to government economic policy. Housing is noteworthy 
because the structural interference was an overwhelming success of 
"Social Market" theory. In the other sectors nationalism, the desire 
for reconstruction and lobbying were more important considerations, 
but these interventions must be regarded as secondary explanations re­
lative to the objective factors as causes of Germany's growth.
Economic policy was more influential as far as the "financ­
ing" of investment and growth is concerned. The government successfully 
exploited the already present savings mentality of Germans, particularly 
at higher income levels. The action exemplified the essence of the 
"Social Market Economy" , incentive at the top and paternalism at the 
bottom. Both factors were seen to have contributed to the savings 
effort, the regressive tax at the top, and the social security system 
at the bottom.
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The progressive jeopardization of the growth of the German 
economy in the sixties could be explained similarly by the structural 
factors and the system of financing that underlies them. Whereas 
structure and financing did not require coordination in the fifties, 
when aggregate demand was always greater than supply, since 1962 it 
lias become essential. The savings that result from incentive at the 
top must be applied productively. Economic policy has not been acccm- 
'nodated to fit the new requirements. It is, however, questionable 
whether the lack of accommodation was attributable alone to the hands- 
off attitude of "Social Market" theory on this point. At a time when 
growth industries are in great need of investment funds to finance their 
expansion, the government's tax laws are progressively discriminating 
against self-financement and the government's borrowing volume limits 
industries use of the capital market. In the immediate postwar era 
self-financing via prices had been the only possibility to get capital 
and it was permitted because reconstruction was necessary. Later Erhard 
feared inflation and income inequalities, and so he counteracted the 
practice. Thus taxes on retained earnings were raised and depreciation 
allowances lowered. Ibis would indicate that the "Social Market" prin­
ciple of countering inflation was the causal consideration. If discri­
mination against self-financement is to persist, only a better utiliza­
tion of the rising household savings will secure the continuation of 
growth. Parodoxically this would require a more elaborate structural 
interference policy than the automatic device that self-financing pro­
vided. There are, in fact, signs that economic policy does tend in
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this direction. The reorganization of steel industry in 1967 was an 
indication that henceforth competition was no longer required in the 
primary industries. German economic policy with respect to investment 
and capital formation has become on the whole less competition oriented 
than it might have had to be if considerations of inflation and income 
distribution had not become such vital questions.
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CONCLUSION
In the introduction the object of this thesis was defined 
to be the evaluation of the effect of economic policy on Germany's 
economic development in the postwar period in general and in particular 
the extent to which that policy was motivated by thetheory of a "Social 
Market Economy". In conclusion, some general comments should be made 
as to what was revealed in this purpose. The "Social Market Economy" 
itself was found to be not a system of concrete economic policy but an 
economic philosophy, idealistic and individualistic in its outlook.
The pillars of the "Social Market" theory, competition and social better­
ment, primarily evolve through the philosophical attitudes of those res­
ponsible for the execution of the whole gammut of day-to-day economic 
policies. Exceptions certainly exist and they have been mentioned in 
the text.
Consequently, the successful development that the German 
economy has displayed in the postwar period was revealed rarely to rely 
on the tenets of "Social Market" doctrine. The positive and beneficial 
balance of payments position was above all accounted for by the favourable 
composition of German industry, its technical ability and the non-colonial 
ambitions of the country. Economic policy contributed little of positive
152
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value; it was not necessary that it did. But the emphasis on trade 
liberalization and comparative advantage by the German government was 
inspired by "Social Market" theory. The European Economic Cammunity 
tiiat was thus helped into existence certainly stimulated the develop­
ment of the German economy. It is, nevertheless, difficult to show 
it as a direct outcome of "Social. Market" theory.
Similar logic holds for investment and capital, formation. 
Their successful record of growth was the outcome of a fast growing 
capital goods oriented economy, German nationalism, the desire for 
reconstruction and the German saving mentality. The less successful 
record of the sixties can, likewise, be explained by these factors to 
a great extent. Economic policy played a somewhat more important 
role, however, than it did in the case of the balance of payments 
question. The industrial structure was favourable to rapid growth, 
but the government had to exploit and support this positive inclina­
tion by enabling the financing. Erhard's policy of "incentive at 
the top and paternalism at the bottom" was the propeller in the fif­
ties, and it was directly inspired by "Social Market " theory. As 
long as all sectors of the economy required expansion and there was no 
problem of inflation this strategy worked quite well. When the six­
ties came along the danger of inflation and overexpanded industries, 
however, complicated the problem. Structural policies were required 
which necessitated intervention in many sectors that were contracting 
and special incentives to those needing to expand. 'With the exception 
of the contrived success in the provision of housing, the government's
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
15b
economic policy has been unable to cope with this more complex problem. 
"Social Market" theory provided no guidelines in this regard and so 
could not be of help nor hindrance. It has had an influence only in­
directly in the sense that "Social Market" motivated anti-inflation 
policy has discriminated against growth industries through progressively 
heavy taxation of retained earnings.
The problem of inflation has indeed provided the government 
with most of its problems of economic policy although not so much its 
economic development problems. The degree of inflation that Germany 
experienced since the war, particularly since the sixties, has not been 
excessive in comparison with other countries, but it has shown that 
economic policy has not been able to cope with the problem. The govern­
ment's counter-inflation oriented economic policy has suffered from the 
overemphasis on monetary policy, the unwillingness to use anti-cyclical 
fiscal policy, the unsuccessful moral suasion attempts on the part of 
the economics minister and the division of levels of government. These 
defects are almost exclusively related to "Social Market" theory. After 
disastrous experiences with inflation in the past, monetary discipline 
became the watchword of the "Social Market Economy . Fiscal policy was 
not suitable for the competitive mechanism nor was much attention paid 
to it, for only a balanced budget was constitutionally legalized. The 
"Lander", moreover, did not have any sense of financial responsibility 
as they consistently went into debt regardless of the cyclical period.
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Counter-inflation policy was consequently the most negative aspect 
of "Social Market" motivated economic policy and thus contributed 
strongly to the slowdown of the economic development of Germany in 
the sixties.
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TABLE I
INTERNATIONAL TRADE:GERMAN FEDERAL REPUBLIC I950-I965(mill.DM)
1950 II374 8362 232 170 25 23 18 26
1951 14726 14577 297 294 26 32 29 I 36 10
1952 16203 16909 325 399 31 36 35 6 40 4
1953 I60I0 18526 318 368 35 40 38 3 44 4
1954 19337 22035 380 433 43 49 47 9 53 9
1955 24472 25717 467 500 54 56 58 II 61 8
1956 27964 30961 538 593 60 65 64 6 70 9
1957 31697 35698 602 683 67 74 70 6 78 8
1958 3II33 36998 584 694 72 78 75 5 81 3
1959 35823 4II84 659 785 85 87 87 12 89 8
I960 42723 47946 771 865 100 100 100 13 100 II
1961 44363 50975 790 907 Io7 106 106 16 105 5
1962 49498 52975 869 930 123 110 119 13 107 2
1963 52277 58310 908 1013 131 122 126 7 117 10
1964 58839 64920 IOIO III4 146 134 138 12 138 II
1965 70448 7I65I 1193 1214 169 145 159 21 136 8
Source: Statistisches Jahrbuch fur die Bundesrepublik 
Nftnt-Cinhl and ; TQFin-TQ66 .
COLUMN I: TOTAL IMPORTS
2: TOTAL EXPORTS
3: PER CAPITA IMPORTS
4; PER CAPITA EXPORTS
5; IMPORT VOLUME INDEX 1960=100
6: EXPORT VOLUME INDEX 1960=100
7&8: PER CAPITA VODUME INDEX OF IMPORTS 
AND ANNUAL CHANGE
9&I0; PER CAPITA VOLUME INDEX OF EXPORTS 
AND ANNUAL CHANGE
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TABLE 2
MERCHANDISE TRADE AND THE BALANCE OP PAYMENTS 
GERMAN FEDERAL REPUBLIC 1958-1965(mill.DM)
1958 58134 50629 75.05 48528 40490 7838 5598 4240
1959 4 2911 55159 6752 55549 46559 6990 5814. 5176
I960 50385 41805 8580 62262 54820 7442 5960 5482
1961 53525 45558 9767 65241 56760 6481 5824 265.7
1962 55464 49256 6228 68707 65677 3030 4556 -1506
1963 6II05 51957 9166 750II 69080 5951 4289 1642
1964 68216 58562 9654 85549 78123 5426 4220 1206
1965 75455 70560 5095 91950 92345 -595 415,2 4547
Source: Statistisches Jahrbuch fur die HundaarepuhUk 
Deutachl and^QHS-TQfifi.
COLUMN Is MERCHANDISE EXPORTS 
2: MERCHANDISE IMPORTS 
3* BALANCE X-M
4» BALANCE OP PAYMENTS CREDITS 
5: BALANCE OP PAYMENTS DEBITS 
6; BALANCE X-M
7: PAYMENTS BY FOREIGN MILITARY
8 ? BALANCE OP PAYMENTS BALANCE - MILITARY COMPONENT
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TABLE 5
INDEXES OF MAIN IMPORTS' AND EXPORTS' PRICES
(1958=100)
GERMAN FEDERAL REPUBLIC 1958-1965 (mill.DM)
IMPORTS
PRODUCTS 1958 1959 I960 1961 1962 1963 1964 1965
Textiles 100 9 8 .6 105.6 104.6 IOI.O 107.7 1 12 .0 108.9
Oil 100 91.1 87.6 78.8 76.7 75.7 72.4 69.1
Chemical 100 9 6 .2 96.0 91.1 86.4 84.0 8 4 .6 8 5 .8
Products 
Mach'y 100 99.8 10 0 .2 98.5 99.5 1 0 0 .2 Io2. 2 103.1
Refined 
& Prec. 100 Io9.I 113.4 106 .6 105.6 10 6 .6 118.5 103.0
Metals
Ores 100 82.2 82.0 81.3 75.4 69.5 70.7 71.4
TOTAL 100 97.5 9 0 .2 94.5 93.6 95.8 97.8 1 0 0 .2
EXPORTS 
PRODUCTS 
M acH'y 100 100.3 103.2 107.0 I0 8 .8 112.9 1 1 6 .1 1 2 1 .1
Vehicles 100 9 8 .8 9 8 .2 9 8 .6 99.5 99.5 99.8 I0I.3
Chemical 100 97.7 9 6 .0 92.9 89.7 88.9 89.5 90.3
Products 
Elect'1 100 100.4 I0I.3 102.9 103.5 103.7 105.2 107.5
Mach'y 
Textiles 100 95.0 99.9 98.3 97.6 9 8 .8 99.4 100.4
Coal&Coke 100 9 6 .2 95.5 94.8 95.6 97.4 100.4 100.5
TOTAL 100 99.2 100.5 100.3 100.5 10 0 .6 104.2 106.7
Source: SftaUsiUisches Jahrbuch fur die Bundesrenublik Deutsche
1958-1966,
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
TABLE 4
MOST IMPORTANT EXPORTS AND IMPORTS 
GERMAN FEDERAL REPUBLIC I958-I965(mill.DM)
EXPORTS 1958 1959 I960 1961 1962 1963 1964 1965
Machinery '"7560 Yb92 9065 1098b"” 11778’ 1253'2 13779" " 15004
Vehicles 4838 5579 6327 6529 7098 8551 9742 10806
Chem.Products 4199 4936 5604 5887 6161 7033 8052 8895
Iron&IronProds. 5206 5807 4074 7555 4724 5132 5774 6455
Elect'l Mach'y 3183 3717 7386 4493 7349 7063 7742 883.5
Textiles 1810 2072 2375 2427 2680 3179 3688 4057
Coal&Coke 1997 2036 2310 2253 2258 2424 2 246 2079
Prof. Instrumts 1015 1125 1218 1299 1364 1699 1749 1815
TOTAL 6998 4II84 47978 50978 52975 58310 64920 7I65I
IMPORTS
Textile 3597 3981 4970 4790 5428 5823 6449 7494
Oil 1965 2299 2885 3113 3829 4405 4951 5045
Iron&Ir onProds. II9I 2388 3030 2903 3209 3208 4118 4322
Fruit&Veg's 2270 2457 2650 2996 3502 3324 3624 4579
Refined. Metals 1558 2076 2970 2766 2378 2413 3448 4409
Non-elt.Mach'y I2II 1516 2151 2740 3064 2981 3408 4357
Chem.Products 1579 1891 2448 2341 2506 2825 3457 4256
Ores 1709 1628 2344 2205 1830 1713 2226 2380
TOTAL 3II33 36823 42723 44363 49498 52277 58839 70448
Source: Statistisches Jahrbuch fur die Bundesrenublik Deutschland
laaa-riasg.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
TABLE 5
ORIGIN OP MAIN IMPORTS,DESTINATION OP MAIN EXPORTS 
GERMAN FEDERAL REPUBLIC 1958-1965(mill.DM)
COUNTRY 1958 1959 I960 1961 1962 1963 1964 1965
IMPORTS
U.S.A. 4193 4576 5974 6097 7033 7941 8066 9196
Prance 1595 2761 3998 4618 5270 5495 6270 7843
Netherlands 2500 3500 3638 3762 4196 4788 5350 6826




















U.K. 1351 1630 1956 1965 2351 2472 2782 3141
Sweden I4II 1533 1804 1930 2000 2014 2304 2472
Switzerland 1167 1432 1627 1612 1707 1722 1839 2226
EXPORTS
Prance 2154 2970 4202 4777 5440 6432 7424 7792
Netherlands 2995 3465 4210 4755 4883 5718 6735 7391
Switzerland 2062 2408 2991 3620 3583 4142 4879 5741
U.S.A.. 2642 3776 3723 3454 3858 4195 4785 5558




















EEC 9465 III26 I4I49 I6I29 18426 21897 23312 24333
Source: Statistisches Jahrbuch fur die Bundesrenublik 
Deutschland,1958-1966.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
TABLE 6
CAPITAL ACCOUNT:GERMAN FEDERALREPUBLIC 1958-1965 










Source: Stacistisches Jahrbuch fur die 
Bundesreoublik Deutschland 
1965-1966.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
TABLE 7
INDEXES OP WHOLESALE PRICES (I958*Ioo)








1955 81 97 99 93 96 99 96 97 9 9
1956 85 99 104 96 98 100 98 100 100
1957 90 100 107 99 100 100 100 101 105
1958 100 100 100 100 1000 100 100 100 100
1959 105 99 101 100 100 100 100 101 95
I960 107 100 102 100 100 100 101 101 100
1961 110 102 103 100 Iol 102 104 102 102
1962 113 103 101 100 102 104 107 101 Io2
1963 117 104 103 100 102 106 108 101 104
1964 119 104 103 100 104 106 III 103 106
1965 121 107 104 102 106 108 IL2 106 107
1966 123 109 108 Io5 108 III 113 108 108
Source: United Nations, Statistical Yearbook. 1965.1966,
U.N. Monthly Bulletin of Statistics. October.1967.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
TABLE 8















Source: United Nations, Statlstic 
Yearbook. 196*5.1966.
U.N. Monthly Bulletin of 
Statistics.October, 1967.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
TABLE 9
INDEX OF AVERAGE WEEKLY GROSS PAY(1962*100) 
OF THE INDUSTRIAL WORK FORCE BY SECTORS 
RawMats&
Year Indy Mining ProdnGds I Gds C Gds Constn
1958 70.6 79.9 70.4 6 9 .6 67.9 70.9
1959 74.4 81.2 74.5, 70.3 72.1 15.1
I960 81.3 84.7 81.6 80.7 80.1 81.8
1961 89.7 9 2 .0 90.6 88.4 89.9 88.9
1962 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
1963 107.5 106.9 107.0 10 6 .0 1 0 9 .0 109.5
1964 116.5 112 .8 115.8 1 1 6 .2 116.9 1 2 0 .1
1965 127.9 126.3 126.4 127.2 128.3 131.5
TABLE 10
INDEX OF AVERAGE MONTHLY GROSS PAY(I958rIOO)
OF SALARIED WORKERS IN INDUSTRY AND TRADE
1958 100.0 100.0 100. o 100.0 100.0 100.0
1959 103.7 99.8 104.3 103.0 104.2 106.1
I960 III.3 104.1 112.9 119.6 112.5 113.9
1961 I2o .8 III.7 122.9 119.5 1 2 3 .2 122.9
1962 130.9 120.7 1 3 2 .1 129.3 134.0 140.1
1963 138.4 126.9 139.4 135.8 14 2 .8 150.7
1964 146.6 133.5 147.7 143.3 151.7 164.1
1965 158.8 144.8 16 0 .0 154.9 163.5 177.4
Source: Statistisches Jahrbuch fur die Bundesrepublik 
Deutschland^I958-I966T
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
TABLE II
CHANGE IN LABOUR COSTS PER UNIT OP OUTPUT 
OP SELECTED COUNTRIES
USA 0 0
Ger. 3% 5 &
J ap. \1o 51o
Can. fyfo I M




Source: Geachaftsberichte der Deutschen 
Bundesbank 1965-66. Monatsbe- 
richte der Deutschen Bundesbank 
1965-66.




INDEX OP CONTRACTUAL WAGES OP MALE AND FEMALE EMPLOYEES IN 
MANUFACTURING AND GOVERNMENT IN GERMANY(1962*100) 
EMPLOYMENT(IN MILLIONS)
CAPACITY UTILIZATION IN INVESTMENT GOODS INDUSTRY 
CAPACITY UTILIZATION IN USER GOODS INDUSTRY 
CAPACITY UTILIZATION IN CONSUMPTION GOODS INDUSTRY 










90 90 91 89
89 86 89 87/
88 89 89 88
87 88 89 87
88 91 90 89
88 91 91 89
83 88 87 84
Source: IFO-Institut fur Wiri:schaftsforschung, Die Wirtschafts- 
entwicklung der Bundesrepublikj1964-65*




Y ear Consumption Investment Consumption Index PC
1950 14.8 22.8 63.6 90.0
19 51 14.8 23.0 60.3 98.0
1952 15.7 22.8 59.0 IOI.O
1953 14.9 21.4 59.9 99.0
1954 14.5 22.0 60.0 100.0
1955 13.6 26.3 58.3 102.0
1956 12.9 25.1 59.2 104.0
1957 12.8 24.3 58.7 107.0
1958 13.4 23.7 59.0 108.0
1959 13.6 24.9 58.2 IIO.O
I960 13.6 26.7 56.8 III.5
1961 14.7 26.6 56.9 114.6
1962 15.0 26.4 57.6 118.7
1963 15.7 25.8 57.2. 121.4
1964 15.0 27.5 56.3 124.2
1965 15.6 27.7 56.9 128.1
Source: Statistisches Jahrbuch fur die Bundesrepublik Peut3chland] 
1955-66.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
TABLE 14
INDEBTEDNESS OF THE PUBLIC SECTOR(mill.DM)
Federal Lander Local
Year Govt Govts Govts
1962 7285 5411 7440
1963 I025I 5422 16800
1964 I09I0 4521 20510
1965 12069 7557 24900
Source: Geachaftsberichte der Deutschen Bundesbank.1965.













I960 97.6 101 60.8
1961 99.9 103 62.5
1962 100.0 107 63.9
1963 100.5 109 64.5
1964 I0I.6 112 64.6
1965 104.0 115 66.0
Source: Statistisches Jahrbuch fur die Bundesrepublik 
Deutschland^1958-66.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
TABLE 16
INDEXES OP PRODUCTIVITY 
PRODUCTION PER HOUR OP EMPLOYMENT 
(1958=100)
Raw Mats&
Year Mining Prodn Gds I Gds C Gds Pood TOTAL
I960 119.0 122.3 114.7 118.0 107.1 116.6
1961 127.9 126.1 119.8 125.3 112.8 122.0
1962 138.5 135.6 124.1 135.1 118.5 129.3
1963 149.9 145.6 128.5 142.6 124.7 135.5
1964 159.3 162.2 137.2 153.5 132.6 147*8
1965 166.0 170.7 142.8 164.7 139.7 155.0
Source: Statistisches Jahrbuch fur die Bundesrepublik Deutschland.
1958-66.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
TABLE 17
INDEX OP ACTUAL AND CONTRACTUAL EARNINGS 
IN THE ECONOMY 
(1960=100)
Year CE AE Change in CE Change in AE
I960 100. 0 100.0 - -
1961 108.5 III 8.5$ 11.0$
1962 116.9 121 7.7$ 9.0$
1963 122.9 128 5.2$ 6.1$
1964 120.0 139 4.9$ 8.9$
1965 137.7 152 6.7$ 9.c$
Source: Geschaftsberichte der Deutschen Bundesbank^963-66.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
TABLE 18
HOUSING DEFICIT INDEX 







Source: Geschaftsberichte der Deutschen 
Bundesbank.1965-66. Monatsbe- 
richte der Deutschen Bundesbank 
1965-66.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
TABLE 19




















Source: Statistisches Jahrbuch fur die Bun' 
desrepublik Deutschland^1959-66.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
TABLE 20
DEVELOPMENT OF GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT 











1956 198.8 189.3 7.0
1957 216.3 200.2 5.8
1958 231.5 206.8 3.3
1959 250.9 221.0 6.9
I960 296.8 254.9 8.8
1961 326.2 268.6 5.4
1962 554.5 279.6 4.1
1963 377.6 289.3 3.5
1964 313.8 305.5 6.6
1965 449.6 323.2 4.8
1966 477.9 331.5 2.7
1967 -1.0
Source: IFO-Institut fur Virtschaftsforschung. 
Die Zeit.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
TABLE 21
INDEX OP INDUSTRIAL PRODUCTION BY SECTORS 
(1958*100)
RawMat.s&
Year Mining ProdnGds I Gds C Gds Constn
1956 99.2 94.4 91.5 95.1 96.6
1957 100.5 98.9 94.4 99.5 95.4
1958 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
1959 97.0 112.9 107.4 108.0 114.5
I960 99.6 129.5 125.0 118.9 117.4
1961 I0I.2 135.4 135.1 124.9 128.0
1962 103.7 148.1 141.3 136.0 141.3
1963 I0I.9 141.4 138.6 132.7 137.7
1964 105.3 168.4 153.9 156.1 158.9
1965 103.1 178.7 165.1 156.8 162.0
Source: Statistisches Jahrbuch fur die Bundesrenublik Deutschland.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
TABLE 22









Mining &  
Raw Mats
77.5 55.1 74.5
Steel Industry 149.9 91.6 50.4
Machinery 167.1 112.6 25.6
Road & Aircraft 
Construction
108.6 105.6 1.4
Shipping -51.9 -47.7 50.4




Small Industry 125.4 44.1 55.0
Housing 186.8 88.5 52.5
Trade 172.1 115.9 27.2
TOTAL 158,8 92.2 54.5
Source: Input-Output Rechnung
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
TABLE 23











Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
TABLE 24
GROSS INVESTMENT BY SECTORS 
(bill.DM)
Sector I960 1961 1962 1963 1964 1965 1966 1967 1970
Agric. & 
Forestry
4.91 5.58 5.68 5.61 6.62 7.80 8.20 7.20 7.80
Energy 3.25 3.68 4.34 4.75 5.36 6.00 6.40 5.80 5.80
INDUSTRY
Mining 1.76 1.70 1.62 1.59 1.29 1.30 1.20 1.10 0.60
Raw Mats & 
Prodn Gds
6.53 7.29 7.83 7.88 8.12 9.50 9.80 8.90 11.50
I Goods 5.63 6.72 8.18 5.92 6.55 7.80 8.20 7.30 9.20
C Goods 2.49 2.62 2.82 2.69 2.99 3.80 4.00 3.60 3.40
Foodstuffs 1.57 1.77 1.95 2.07 2.26 2.30 2.40 2.10 2.00
Small Indy 2.21 2.64 3.10 3.00 4.90 5.70 6.10 5.40 6.40
Construction 2.46 2.95 3.61 3.83 4.44 4.50 4.30 3.88 5.90
Trade 5.30 5.49 6.53 6.40 7.40 8.20 8.90 7.90 10.30
Railroads 2.17 2.66 2.94 3.00 3.19 2.40 2.10 1.90 2.50
Shipping 0.88 0.99 0.83 1.03 0.98 1.10 1.20 1.10 0.90
Government 9.42 Io.83 13.41 15.73 18.31 19.30 20.30 - -
Housing 75.74 17.81 19.77 21.18 24.40 25.90 27.50 - -
TOTAL 71.42 81.45 90.92 96.03 Io982 I2Q20 126.20 70.00 83.10
* estimated values
Source: D.Mertens, W.Kirner, Input-Output Rechnung: Investitions- 
verflechtung in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland 1950-70. 
DIW, Berlin.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
TABLE 24A
INVESTMENT GROWTH 







































GROSS CAPITAL INVESTMENTS IN INDUSTRY
CAPACITY INCREASES IN MANUFACTURING INDUSTRY (in percent) 
INDEX OF ORDERS RECEIVED IN INDUSTRY (1954*100)
INDEX OF TURNOVER IN INDUSTRY (1954*100)
INDEX OF ORDERS IN INVESTMENT GOODS INDUSTRY (1954=100) 
INDEX OF ORDERS IN CONSUMPTION GOODS INDUSTRY (1954=100)
1955 9.3 10 137.2 133.6 149.5 124.0
1957 9.3 9 144.5 144.7 154.5 130.0
1958 II.9 10 145.8 147.6 155.4 129.9
1959 13.1 8 188.4 168.6 220.4 151.9
I960 16.4 II 204.3 189.1 264.5 150.7
1961 18.9 7 199.0 199.6 250.5 163.3
1962 19.8 8 208.7 215.4 250.9 172.4
1963 18.5 7 227.8 224.5 283.1 192.1
1964 19.9 9 247.6 246.2 311.3 195.5
1965 23.3 9 264.4 262.4 . 338.2 213.8
1966 23.3 7 253.3 264.1 322.8 193.8
Source: IFO-Institut fur Wirtschaftsforschung.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
TABLE 26
INVESTMENT AND THE CAPITAL COEFFICIENT
Investment 1958 1959 I960 1961 1962 1963
Gross Invt. 
in Industry 13526 14488 17974 20731 21397 19950
Gross Wealth 




Mining 2.79 2.95 2.92 2.92 2.95 2.95
Raw Mats & 
Prodn Gds 1.78 1.87 1.52 1.56 1.60 1.65
I Goods 1.00 1.01 0.96 0.99 1.07 1 . 16
G Goods 1.13 1.13 I.II 1.15 1.16 1.21
TOTAL 1.38 1.36 1.29 1.31 1.36 1.41
Source: Viertel.jahreshefte zur Wirtschaftsforschung, 1965*
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
TABLE 27
GROSS INVESTED WEALTH OP GERMAN INDUSTRY 
PER EMPLOYEE BY SECTORS 
(mill.1958 DM)
Raw Mats&
Year Mining Prodn Gds I Goods C Goods TOTAL
1958 35955 34410 13029 II648 20329
1959 39406 35557 13837 12543 21442
I960 43559 35451 I4I86 I30I8 2I86I
1961 46541 36565 15049 13826 22847
1962 50388 39551 16403 14762 24482
1963 54202 42881 17782 15852 26317
1964 57565 45768 18679 17028 27931
Source: Viertel.jahreshefte zur Wirtschaftsforschung, 1969*




Tax Prem Savgs Cred Cred Postal
Year TOTAL Privd Privd Banks Coops Banks System
1956 24276 2917 - 15606 3418 3782 145.7
1957 29388 3785 - 18655 4140 4615; 1822
1958 36102 4157 - 22882 5081 5698 2786
1959 44268 4045 558 27958 6267 7142 2783
1959* 45039 4051 565 28516 6306 7204 2793
I960 53H4 3216 1408 33724 7554 8402 3274
1961 60424 15,8 2554 38525 8551 9313 3754
1962 69705 57 3972 44407 9843 10896 4204
1962*# 69874 56 3977 44407 I00I2 10896 4204
1963 81522 36 6026 5I7I3 II925 12668 4701
1964 94212 - 7269 59713 I4I60 14681 5196
1965 II0678 _ 10396 69369 17080 17992 5709
* Saar added 
*# Berlin added
Source: Geschaftsberichte der Deutschen Bundesbank.1965<
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
TABLE 29
GROSS NEW TURNOVER OF STOCKS AND BONDS 
DIVIDENDS AND RETURN 
(mill.DM)





1957 4204.5 4058.9 1631.7 1676.2 5836.2 7.43 4.15
1958 8127.I 7976.3 1339.5 1214.5 9266.6 8.64 4.64
1959 10048.I 9903.7 1383.0 I85I.3 II43I.I 9.28 3.29
I960 5372.3 5195.4 1904.5 2792.5 7276.8 10.63 2.91
1961 9620.8 9491.4 2192.4 3295.7 II8I3.2 11.79 1.96
1962 II944.5 II84I.I 1506.7 2195.9 I345I.2 13.17 2.49
1963 16584.5 16498.6 IOI5.7 I3I8.8 17600.2 13.65 3.44
1964 17802.4 17596.8 1608.4 2243.0 I94I0.8 13.44 3.16
1965 I622I.9 15761.4 2445.9 3958.7 18867.8 13.24 3.08
■* Nominal Value 
# Actual Value
Source: Wirtschaft und Statistik.1958-1966.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
TABLE 30
BANK CREDIT TO INDUSTRY 
(mill.DM)
Industry Industry Housing
Year Short Term Long Term Long Term
1956 13706 9246 19557
1957 13694 10222 22661
1958 13781 II535 26276
1959 13882 13672 31650
I960 16354 14320 37076
1961 19769 17202 43219
1962 21065 20897 50554


















1956 10300 3600 4408
1957 10860 3800 4290
1958 115-50 3900 4766
1959 13950 4200 6640
I960 13740 4600 2923
1961 I78I0 4110 9226
1962 19770 4890 10706
1963 21400 4810 II939
1964 24500 4900 13670
1965 26000 5000 14950
* Comprises mainly savings banks, mortgage banks and building 
funds.
Source: Deutsches Institut fur Wirtschaftsforschung, "Die Fi-
nanzierung des Wohnungsbaus in der Bundesrepublik durch 
Kapitalsammelstellen im Jahre 1965." Viertel1ahreshe£te 
zur Wirtschaftsforschung. 1965.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
TABLE 32

















Source: R.Melder, Die Kapitalnachfrage der Privaten Wirtschaft.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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